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Abstract
My thesis aims to demystify the form of the Korean state by unveiling the theoretical
shortcomings of developmental state theories and re-examining the historical
development of the Korean state in the context of the formation and reproduction of
capital relations in Korea. The first part develops a Marxist critique of theories of the
developmental state. Through a close reading of Marxist theories of the state and
Marx's own theory of value and commodity fetishism, I derive an understanding of the
state as a differentiated moment of the reproduction of capital relations. Accordingly, I
define the most serious theoretical shortcoming of the statist approach as its
understanding of the state as a set of institutions and of capital as a set of businessmen.
This approach enabled statist to define the state in East Asia as a state 'autonomous'
from capital by deriving the form of the state from the nature of the seriously narrowed-
down state-society relations as relations between state officials and a group of
businessmen. On the basis of an understanding of capital as a social relation through
which social labour is organised toward commodity production to make profits, and of
the state as a social form through which unequal class relations are inverted into class-
neutral relations between citizens, I argue that the developmental autonomy of the state,
which underlies developmental state theory, results from a mystified form of the
capitalist state and contributes to mystifying the state further.
In the second half of this thesis, I present the Asian 'developmental state' as resulting
from a particular mystification of the state in the historical development of the highly
politicised formation and reproduction of capitalist social relations, in which the state's
complementary role to capitalist development was maximised in suppressing labour, on
the one hand, but also at the same time its differentiation from individual capitals in
strictly regulating financial flows and selectively promoting industries developed to a
great extent, on the other. An extensive investigation into the state's involvement in
forming and reproducing capital relations in the 1960s and 1970s shows the real process
of building-up the mystified state. Furthermore, I will show the demise of this mystified
state through analysing crises of the politicised reproduction of capital relations, by a
massive politicisation of domestic class conflicts, on the one hand, and the weakening
of state control over individual capitals, particularly over the chaebol (Korean
conglomerates) as capitalist development deepened in a growing involvement in the
global economy from the 1980s, on the other. On the basis of this historical exposition,
I also attempt to grasp the nature of the restructuring of capital relations in Korea in the
aftermath of the Asian crisis in 1997, which is understood as an ultimate expression of
the amalgamation of the crisis of the early configuration of capitalist social relations
with the growing involvement of Korean capitals into the crisis-ridden development of
global capitalism. Looking closely at the development of the increasing marketisation of
the reproduction of capital relations, I argue that, although the form of the state has
undergbne a significant transition, it is still subjected to the further development of new
forms and subjectivity of class struggle, through which the unresolved contradiction of
the newly created basis of capital accumulation manifested itself by putting the market-
based reformulation of capital relations into an increasingly difficult condition.
Chapter 1: Introduction
New reformism and the late blooming of statism in Korea
About a decade ago, it was very common to see the state described as a public enemy
in Korea. Under the influence of the theories of 'state monopoly capitalism' and
Leninism with a strong Stalinist twist, revolutionary sectors and groups in universities
and workplaces concentrated on developing the best possible strategy to break down the
state apparatus that exercised its force against the struggle of the working class in order
to sustain 'monopoly capitalism'. At that time, the state was regarded as an enemy not
only by this hard-line Marxist-Leninist movement, but also by the democratic
movement in general, which saw the state as a big bureaucratic body that overshadowed
civil society by exercising its overwhelming force against democracy and civil liberties.
In this sense, all reformist political movements shared a common idea about the state: 'a
public enemy'. From the other side, the 'state was also often described as 'evil', not
because of its strong anti-labour policies, but because of its heavy-handed
interventionist policies in private businesses. Capitalists often argued that the state
hindered more effective economic development by controlling the financial markets and,
therefore, undermining the rule of the market that would bring national prosperity.
As time goes on, there seems to have been a significant change in the reception of the
state by the dissident movement and more generally by people in Korea, while capitalist
views on the state still keep repeating the free-market and anti-state rhetoric. Now in
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2003, after the presidential election in December 2002, the result of which turned out to
be a victory for the nationalistic reformist candidate Rob Moo-hyun over the hard-line
conservative candidate, many Koreans do not hesitate to express an expectation greater
than ever before, an expectation that the state will bring greater democracy and fairer
economic development, in which fast economic growth goes along with better
distribution. For many political dissidents, even some Marxist academics, Roh's victory
is conceived as a 'social democratic', if not revolutionary, development in which people,
having suffered from suppression by the brutal state and, however, having managed to
fight back, finally won the state apparatus which, as it had been a tool of the military
and capitalists, would become a vehicle to deliver democracy and economic justice.
Certainly, by comparison with the previous military governments or even with the so-
called people's government of a Nobel Peace Price winner, Kim Dae-jung, Roh's
government, which, not to mention the president-elect himself who has been actively
engaged with the humanitarian movement as a political reformer, consists of many
former political dissidents, looks good enough to satisfy people who remember the dark
days under the military regimes or the unfair treatment of Kim's government toward the
working class in overcoming the economic crisis in 1997. In this sense, it is no surprise
that president-elect Roh, even before officially coming into office, faces criticism of
capitalists, noticeably the KBF (Korean Businessmen Federation), who express their
fear about Rob's government by describing Roh as a 'socialist' (New York Times, 10th
February 2003), in spite of his repeated confirmation that his government will not harm
free-market based development.
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Having seen this, one would say that the 'state' is ever more becoming a centre of the
discourse of the reforms of Korean society as a vehicle to realise the aspiration for
reforms of Korean society. However, to be fair, Roh's government can hardly be called
in principle socialist or even social democratic, in the sense that it does not pursue, in
any fundamental way, fundamental reform that might possibly undermine the principle
of capitalist development based on the rule of the market. To be more correct, this wide-
spread reformism and political aspiration in Korea in 2003 resembled a statist belief that
the state could be a vehicle to resolve to a large extent the social problems caused by
economic inequality without, however, undermining the operation of the capitalist
economy. It also resembles the statist idea in the sense that it understands the nature of
the state as determined by those who occupy the state apparatus. Certainly, there is
nothing new about the idea that the interventionist state could bring healthy economic
development through enhancing better distribution, a social safety-net and even worker-
friendly working conditions. Nonetheless, this resurrection of the rather out-dated statist
belief in Korea, having seen all the market-based reforms after the demise of the
Keynesian interventionist state all over the world, appears to be strong enough to attract
particular attention.
This resurrection of statist reformism in Korea reflects the fact that there has been
growing discontent with market-based reforms pushed forward during the last four
years 'after the economic crisis and subsequent IMF's bail-out, during which
unemployment and polarisation of the quality of living between the social classes
massively increased. It also shows that statist arguments about the so-called
'developmental state', adopted by former political dissidents and reformists, have
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developed as a strong alternative to market-based reforms. Outside Korea, this statist
argument about the state in Asian NICs, including Korea, enjoyed its heyday long
before it became an alternative theory offering a strategy for a more balanced economic
development in Korea. From the 1980s, when the state was still regarded as the public
enemy in Korea, the theories of the developmental state began to dominate both the
explanation of the particular form of the state in Asia and an alternative economic
development strategy in late-developing countries, providing detailed analyses of the
extraordinary performance of the state, particularly with respect to its role as an
economic promoter. Largely due to the massive capitalist development in the region and
subsequent improvement of the living condition of the mass of the population, the statist
exposition of the role and nature of the state in Asian NICs attracted many scholars in
the West and became a more relevant explanation than the liberal argument that largely
ignored the role of the state in Asian economic development.
It was after the emergence of the Asian crisis that neo-liberal advocates seemed to
have a great opportunity to blame the 'developmental state' for causing so-called
transparency problems. Given the undermining of the real practices of the
developmental state in the aftermath of the crisis, it seemed unnecessary to refer to the
neo-classical argument in order to confirm the demise of the developmental state as well
as that of the theories of the developmental state. However, contrary to the poor
perforMance of the 'developmental' states, the 'developmental state theories' could now
enjoy another popular reception, this time not in the West but in the East, by arguing
that the developmental state 'was' a relevant strategy of the Asian miracle, but it is now
by and large declining due to the deregulation of the market caused by the reforms
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pursued by neo-liberal agencies, particularly the imperialist financial capital from the
U.S. and elsewhere in the West. Those statist counter-arguments are based on the idea
that the growing globalisation process did not allow the national economy, which relied
on state regulation of the market to sustain the Asian model of economic development
any longer (Wade 1998, 2000; Wade and Veneroso 1998a, 1998b; Jayasuriya 2000,
2001). In doing so, the theory of the developmental state successfully came back to
mainstream political and economic discourse, if not in the West, certainly in Korea.
Indeed, it was these statist arguments that have been welcomed and swiftly introduced
in Korea by social democrats and radical academics as an alternative, in an urgent need
to form a political alliance against market-based reforms under the Kim Dae-jung
government. Once the statist agenda was recognised as an alternative to reforms based
on neo-liberalism, the early literature by the statists began to be read widely but in a
very specific way. For those who remembered the suffering from the military regimes
that had ruled Korea for more than thirty years, statist admiration toward the
developmental regimes that pursued a development-first human rights-later approach
could not be easily accepted. However, instead of recognising the political nature of the
statist argument, which was inherently anti-labour as we will see in the following
chapters, the statist admiration for the bureaucratic body of the state was read as
suggesting an ideal form of government that could lead to an alternative development.
So the 'immediate task is to organise the ideal government. It is in this process that the -
state, which was described as 'the' public enemy, became all of sudden a vehicle to
deliver reforms.
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Demystifjdng the practice and theories of the developmental state theories
This thesis began to be written at the beginning of the process in which
developmental state theory was becoming an alternative understanding as well as a
model of the development of Korean society. Having experienced the extreme anti-
labour policies in the period of the so-called state-led capitalist development, the statist
argument, which dominated the field of Asian studies and exposition of Korean
economic development, appeared to me to be an absurdity. Therefore, this thesis began
firstly as an empirical critique of a serious misreading of history, from which all the
facts about labour and a hundred years of the struggle of the working class were
removed. As time went on, however, it became clear that the problem of the statist
argument lay deeper in the theoretical framework of the statist argument, the result of
which created the absurd theory of the developmental autonomy of the state, in which
the state appears to be detached from' other societal forces, although it serves capital
accumulation by exercising its force directly against the working class. By this time, the
statist approach was becoming more and more influential not only as an understanding
of the form of the Korean state but also as an alternative theory that would offer a
theoretical basis for a political alliance among the civil and political movements against
market-based reforms in Korea. Indeed, a proper theoretical critique of the statist theory
seemed to be an urgent task for critical academics in Korea. However, rather than
developing a critical understanding of the statist theory, radical academics in Korea
began to rely more and more on possibility of state-led reforms. This led me to engage
not only with the historical misreading by the statist theories but also with its theoretical
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problems that produce a serious mystification in understanding of the real nature of the
capitalist state. Once I began to develop a theoretical critique of the developmental state
theories, it also became clear that the statist theory was not only a product of mystified
history but also a political project that contributed to mystifying the nature of capitalist
social relations and the form of the capitalist state. Indeed, having seen the growing
political aspiration on the basis of a great expectation toward the state-led reforms in
Korea, it seems that the statist mystification of the form of the capitalist state is finally
being realised in a concrete form as a political project in Korea.
My thesis is aimed exactly at challenging the political project of the statist
theorisation of the state and capitalist development by demystifying the practice and
theories of the so-called developmental state. I will do so by offering a two-fold critique
of the developmental state 1) a critique of 'developmental autonomy' as a pillar of
developmental state theories and 2) I will provide an alternative reading of the history
of the formation of the Korean state. The first part, from chapters two to five, will be
devoted to developing a Marxist critique of theories of the developmental state. In doing
so, I will define the most serious theoretical shortcomings of the statist approach as its
understanding of the state as a set of institutions and of capital as a set of businessmen.
It will be argued that it is on the basis of this benign understanding of the relations
between the state and capital that the statists finally conceptualised the state in East Asia
as a stAte 'autonomous' from capital by deriving the form of the state from the nature of
the seriously narrowed-down state-society relations, as relations between state officials
and a group of businessmen. Understanding capital not as a set of businessmen but as a
social relation through which social labour is organised toward the production of
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commodities to sell to make profits, and the state not as a set of state officials but as a
social form through which unequal class relations are inverted into class-neutral
relations between citizens, I will refute the argument that state leadership against
individual capitals in Korean capitalist economic development can be translated into the
existence of the autonomous state. Accordingly, I will argue that the developmental
autonomy of the state should be an object of critique, rather than a yardstick of state
analysis. However, this does not mean that my thesis will be devoted simply to proving
the class characteristics of the Korean state. Rather, the historical exposition that will
follow the theoretical critique will be focused on tracing the mystification process
through which the state appeared in reality as detached from the interests of capital, i.e.,
the material basis of the mystification.
Chapter two will attempt to grasp the core argument veiled behind the empirical
analyses of the developmental state. By examining the development of statist theories,
from case studies of the states in Asian NICs to the more serious statist attempt to 'bring
the state back in', I will define the most important theoretical basis of developmental
state theories as the developmental autonomy of the state. At the same time, I will show
that developmental state theories are full of descriptions of what the state looks like
from the outside, rather than offering an appropriate explanation of how and why the
Korean state appeared in the particular form of the developmental state. Developing a
critical' inquiry about state autonomy, chapter three will explore firstly traditional
Marxist debates about the capitalist state by looking both at the essentialist argument
and the autonomy-centred approach, which will be presented as failing to offer a basis
of a critique of the form of the capitalist state. It will be argued that in both theories
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political domination appears separated from economic domination, because the
essentialist approach ignores the question of separation itself and the autonomy-centred
approach does not criticise but only describes the way in which the separation emerged.
To answer the question about the contradictory form of the capitalist state, I will move
on to Marx's critique of the general reproduction of capitalist social relations, by
looking at Marx's critique of the theory of value and commodity fetishism, in which he
explains the particular way in which capitalist social relations are reproduced into
technical relations through mystified social forms. In chapter four, I will develop an
explanation of the form of the capitalist state as a differentiated moment of the
reproduction of capital relations by dev eloping -fintbet -the -form-analsis once -piontzted
by the German derivation debate. Finally, defining the state and capital as
differentiated-but-complementary forms through which capital relations are mystified
into technical relations, I will refute state autonomy as a relevant basis of the analysis of
the state. On this basis, chapter five will show, step by step, how the statist approaches
fall back into the mystification of the state that the particular fonn of the reproduction of
capitalist social relations produced, on the one hand, and how the statist expositions of
the state justify this theoretical shortcoming in making itself into a political project on
the basis of an unrealised aspiration to the ideal state, on the other.
This theoretical chapter will also be a process of building up a critical method that
will be applied to understanding the development of the form of the Korean state.
Throughout the theoretical critique of the developmental state, the uncritical nature of
the theories will be defined as being based on a method that Marx called formal
abstraction. With the method of formal abstraction, the nature of the conceptualised
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social categories is derived from the natural form itself and thereby the categories are
presented and treated as naturally given entities. The totality of social relations in this
case appears to be a mere 'sum' of independent entities, rather than a 'whole', and the
relations between those entities are external. In turn, the parts of the totality are
explained as independent entities that form in turn a totality by aggregating together
through interacting each other. By contrast, as we will see in more detail, rather than
beginning with recognising social categories as naturally given entities, Marx's critique
of history on the basis of his critical method demonstrates social institutions and
categories as particular 'social forms', in which the movement of the totality of social
relations appear and exists. Contrary to the 'sociological theory' of social institutions
(including the state), therefore, a critique of social institutions is to show how the
institutions are formed (even though they may appear to be autonomous from capital) in
the movement of the totality of social relations and how the institution acts and takes
part again in the formation of a totality, rather than trying to define the state as an
autonomous 'naturally occurring' institution.
This understanding of Marx's critique of social forms and of the naturalistic
conceptualisation of the social categories in capitalist society has been developed
through the studies of Marx's labour theory of value by several writers. Rubin, in his
extensive reading of Marx's theory of value, integrated Marx's theory of fetishism into
Marx' critique of the value-form and thereby attempted to understand Marx's critique
and analysis of the value-form as a critique of the social mechanism in which social
realities are organised through fetishised social forms (Rubin 1978, 1990). The state
derivation debate also followed Rubin's understanding, in that they understood state
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formation as a fetishised moment of the development of social reality based on the
fetishism of money and the commodity (Holloway and Picciotto (eds.) 1978; also
Muller and NeusUss 1975). The argument was further developed in debates by a group
of Marxists belonging to the Conference of Socialist Economists and also discussion
under the name of Open Marxism. The understanding of Marx's critique of value as
offering a critical method to understand capitalist social relations and the state from now
on will rely largely on my critical reading of those particular understandings of Marx's
theory of value developed in the CSE debates and Open Marxism (Bonefeld 1992;
Clarke 1977, 1978, 1988, 1991a, 1991 b, 1991c; Elson 1979; Holloway 1991, 1992,
1995; Holloway and Picciotto 1978). In fact, the attempt to develop this methodology
further is to go back to Marx's principle for the investigation of the development of
society.
This conception of history thus relies on expounding the real process of
production - starting from the material production of life itself - and
comprehending the forms of intercourse connected with and created by this
mode of production, i.e., civil society in its various stages, as the basis of all
history; describing it in its action as the state, and also explaining how all
the different theoretical products and forms of consciousness, religion,
philosophy, morality, etc., etc., arise from it, and tracing the process of their
r
formation from that basis; thus the whole thing can, of course, be depicted
in its totality (and therefore, too, the reciprocal action of these various sides
on one another) (Marx, The German Ideology, 1976a, p. 53, my emphasis)
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On the basis of this method of critique, the state will be analysed in terms of
particular form-formation in the movement of the totality of capital relations through
class struggle in my empirical critique of the Korean state. To do so, a wide range of
literatures on the history of the formation of the Korean state, labour and capital,
including those written in the statist tradition, will be brought into discussion. However,
the historical 'factors' presented in those literatures will not be understood as they are
but decomposed in an attempt to recognise the relations between capital, labour and the
state that articulate capital relations in a specific way. Furthermore, these forms of
articulation of capital relations will not be presented as they are but will be
recontextualised in a way in which they show the development of the state in the
movement of the totality of capital relations.
The second part of this thesis will be devoted to an empirical critique of the
particular mystification of the Korean state, which appears as a developmental state.
Tracing the formation of the Korean state in the context of the development of capital
relations in Korea from the colonial period to the 1970s, chapters six and seven will
present the Korean developmental state as a mystified form taken by the highly
politicised formation and reproduction of capitalist social relations, in which the state's
complementary role to capitalist development was maximised in suppressing labour, but
also at the same time its differentiation from individual capitals in strictly regulating
rfinancial flows and selectively promoting industries developed to a great extent.
Furthermore, I will present the development of the crisis of the early settlement of
capital relations and the form of the state also as a consequence of the early
development trajectory based on the mystified state, which inevitably accompanied the
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massive politicisation of domestic class struggle. Chapters eight and nine will deal with
the most recent transformation of the form of the state. Firstly, chapter eight will discuss
the ten-year period of contested transfon-nation of capital relations, during which the
deconstruction of the early settlement of capital relations accelerated, by the upsurge of
the working class challenge to the state's control over labour as well as managerial
authority of individual capitals, on the one hand, and increasing liberalisation of
financial and commodity markets and weakening of the state's control over individual
capitals, on the other. In this context, the general crisis of 1997 in Korea will be
explained as an ultimate expression of the amalgamation of the crisis of the early
configuration of capitalist social relations with the growing involvement of Korean
capitals into the crisis-ridden development of global capitalism. The final chapter will
be devoted to understand the further development of the form of the Korean state as a
moment of the newly emerging social basis of capital accumulation in the aftermath of
the crisis. Looking closely at the development of a more marketised labour control as
well as the accelerated marketisation of the regulation of individual capitals, I will argue
that the form of the state has undergone a significant transition in accordance with the
marketised reproduction of capital relations. However, it will also be suggested that the
transition of the reproduction of capital relations as well as the form of the state is not
over at all, but is inevitably subjected to the further development of the new forms and
subjectivity of class struggle, through which the unresolved contradiction of the newly
created basis of capital accumulation manifested itself by putting the market-based
reformulation of capital relations into increasingly difficult condition.
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Chapter 2: The Mystified State: Explaining the State in
the Economic Miracle
Introduction
Although the state has played a major role in the economic development of the Asian
NICs since the 1950s, it was not until the mid-1980s that the state has been focused on
as such. It is no wonder, because the studies of the state in Asian NICs, if any, had
largely been dominated by the neo-classical minimalist view of the state, in which the
role of the state is reduced to its negative role of not harming the movement of market
rationality and cultivating the conditions in which the market can operate properly
without external problems. Since the mid-1980s, however, this neo-classical exposition
of the East Asian state has been seriously challenged by the theories of the
developmental state. Deriving the development of the state from its significant role in
capital accumulation, these theories emerged from the empirical analysis of state
interventions in the process of economic development. It is true that, at least before the
advent of the Asian economic crisis in 1998, these studies seemed to offer a more
relevant analysis of the state in this region than the neo-classical expositions did. In
analysing the policies and organisation which made the interventions successful, the
fundamental assumption of the developmental state theories, in contrast to the neo-
classical assumption about market perfection, is the autonomy of the state. State
autonomy is believed to be the presupposition of successful state intervention. In other
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words, according to the developmental state theories, state interventions are effective
because there is a certain degree and kind of state autonomy which cannot be found in
other regions, such as Latin America and India. In this chapter, I will take into
consideration the debates on the developmental state, attempting to trace the core
argument and presupposition of the theories of the autonomous state.
I. The Neo-classical Ideal State and the Economic Miracle
The argument about the existence of a specific form of the state in Korea emerged
from the critiques of the neo-classical account of Korean economic development after
the Korean War, which explains Korea's miraculous capital accumulation in terms of
the liberalisation of the market developed in Korea, i.e., the process of subordinating all
other socio-economic factors to the market. In explaining economic development, neo-
classical economists rely on 'factors to make the link between free markets and higher
growth' (Wade 1990, p14), contrasting the outward-economies and inward-economies
in order to prove the link between a free market and high growth (Balassa 1980, 1982;
Lal, 1983; Krueger 1978, 1979, 1984, 1990, 1991, 1995; Westphal and Kim, K. S.
1982). For example, Lal argued (1983) that the inward-economies, such as India, could
not achieve what outward-economies, Korea, Taiwan, etc. achieved because of state
interventions which placed their economic competitiveness not in the market but in state
protection for the trade regime and labour market, which precipitated serious distortions
in the market.
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The most serious current distortions in many developing economies are
not those flowing from the inevitable imperfections of a market economy
but the policy-induced, and thus far from inevitable, distortions created by
irrational dirigisme (Lal 1983, p. 103).
For neo-classical advocates, the initial point of Korean economic development was
the liberalisation of imports from 1961 to 1963, which is interpreted as a successful
example of the state's role in removing the hindrances to the free market condition,
which is, for neo-classical theories, the real basis of the following export-oriented
industrial development under Park's regime. There is a significant difference between
the era of ISI (Import Substitution Industrialisation) which covered mainly the 1950s
and early 1960s, and that of EOI (Export Oriented Industrialisation) in terms of the
degree of liberalisation of the market. During the 1950s, economic development was
suppressed because of 'distortions' such as a high fixed nominal exchange rate for anti-
inflationary policy, quantitative control over imports and highly repressed financial
markets. According to their arguments, these distortions caused the low growth of the
1950s and undermined the positive factors, which can be represented by the unregulated
labour market which could supply an unlimited amount of cheap labour power to
industry. Seeking the rationality that could explain the take-off of the Korean economy,
these market advocates focused on the significant changes which had occurred from the
late 1950s to the 1960s. With the emergence of Park's regime by a military coup in
1961 after a student revolution in 1960, there were several reforms signalling that the
Korean economy was going for the process of liberalisation, which provides apparent
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evidence of liberalisation as the engine of late industrialisation from the perspective of
neo-classical theories. Firstly, there was a dramatic reform of the exchange rate, which
had almost been fixed at an exaggerated level to attract more aid from the U.S. during
the post-war period. Secondly, the quantitative regulation of imports was drastically
abandoned. Furthermore, Park's regime continuously sought tariff reduction during the
1960s and finally, the labour market remained the most unregulated in the world
economy, in spite of the political conflicts. Consequently, for market advocates, the
Korean economy, as an almost classical example, seems to have jumped into the right
track which can establish industrial development oriented to export, by acquiring a
liberal trade and payment regime (Westphal 1978). Krueger, explaining the Korean
Miracle in terms of the continuing maintenance of a realistic exchange rate, which is
believed to support liberalisation of the trade and payment regimes and, in addition, an
unregulated labour market, concludes that the conditions of the economic miracle are
marked by the successful and continuous liberalisation which could have minimised the
expected state failure which could have caused 'more enormous damage than market
defects' (Krueger 1991; also La! 1983). In this neo-classical account of Korean
economic development, there is no specific explanation of the state form and role in
development. It is not because, according to the statist counter-argument, there is no
state intervention but because from the neo-classical perspective, the state's role in
economic development is inherently negative and the state's role is something which
must be subordinated to the market.
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In neo-classical accounts of society, the state is explained not as it is in reality but
as it must be in ideal form. It is the counterpart of the understanding of the market in
these accounts because the market is understood, for neo-classical advocates, in the way
it must be, in abstraction from society. This means that the state has an inherent defect,
in spite of its necessary role, which can always threaten the market mechanism with its
over-intervention. In this sense, neo-classical accounts of the state seem to be confined
strictly within the presuppositions of classical political economy, in which the market is
given the status of the culmination of human economic rationality and therefore
culmination of the development of human society, providing a naturalistic and
rationalist justification for market-based capitalist social relations (Clarke 1991a, pp.
185-94). Neo-classical arguments share the presupposition of the economic rationality
of individuals, which can be fully realised only in the market, which must entail as its
primacy free competition among producers and the factors of production. The market
rationality appears to be an embodiment of individual economic rationality. Again, the
neo-classical point of view is based on the strong belief that money, as a purely
economic method, is the supreme regulator which can control the capitalist economy
and promote economic development fully in a free market. In this sense, money is
understood as a rational and neutral instrument for the realisation of individual
economic rationality. Therefore, to promote free market conditions means securing
moneyr power or allowing money to regulate the market with its own power, without
external intervention. Assuming the economic rationality of the individual, the
rationality of the market as the natural basis of the accounts of society and money as the
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intrinsically rational regulator of society, neo-classical accounts consequently abstract
the social forms of capitalist social relations from capitalism itself, as Clarke shows:
The theory also purports to explain the rationality of the fundamental
social relationships of capitalist society, by deriving those institutions from
the rationality of the individual: property, exchange, money, the division of
labour and the separation of the labourer from the means of production are
all explained not as forms of historically specific social relation but as
technical instruments that facilitate the most perfect realisation of individual
rationality. It is only on this basis that marginalist economics abstracts the
economic institutions of capitalist society from their social and historical
context, reducing them to the rationally developed instruments appropriate
to the optimal allocation of scarce resources. It can only make economics a
'natural science' because it 'naturalises' the fundamental economic
relationships of capitalist society (Clarke 1991a, pp. 194-5).
According to neo-classical understanding, contrary to the inherent rationality of the
market, which relies on the power of regulation of money and individual rationality, the
state is inherently, transcendentally and potentially irrational and, therefore, it 'cannot
copy the individuals' variety and diversity' because it must reflect some particular
interem, in the era of classical political economy as well as in contemporary capitalist
development (Friedman 1962, p. 17). In other words, neo-classical theorists tend to
assume the possibility of the perfect market positively, on the one hand, and deny the
19
possibility of the state as the embodiment of economic rationality, on the other.
Therefore, the state's proper function is a negative function, which basically ensures the
security of property and the freedom and enforceability of contracts, i.e. the
presuppositions of market interactions, and protects the basis of capitalist social
relations from other more irrational and external problems, rather than a positive
function, which could 'promote' or maximise the efficiency of the market by itself.
Hence, there is no wonder that the state's role is limited and determined by the extent
that its policies cannot harm the link between the free market and higher growth, in neo-
classical arguments. The successful state must attempt to remove the external effects
and shocks from outside the market, such as policies for political legitimacy or the
interest of particular capitalists that are not based on economic rationality. The
unsuccessful economies can now be explained in terms of misguided intervention of the
state, which inevitably causes serious distortions in the market mechanism, which is
represented by price distortion. The supreme, in fact the only, proper role of the state is,
therefore, to secure the market mechanism for getting the price right and thereby
ultimately to get the fundamentals of an economy right, i.e., to provide the general
conditions of successful economic development. Therefore, the neo-classical arguments
about Asian NICs were focused on the state's role in letting market rationality rule
economic development without being subordinated to particular interests. However,
although they seem to be able to answer the question about the relations between the
state and economic growth through showing the extent to which the state actually
secures the rule of the market, they seem not to be able to contribute to the analysis of
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actually existing states, beyond suggesting such an ideal norm and examining effects of
particular state policies according to that norm, without providing an explanation of the
ways in which particular state interventions and the particular form of the state in Asian
NICs were formed in a real social context.
In contemporary arguments, the neo-classical approaches to the Asian economic
miracle have recently begun to reconsider the role of the 'developmental state' as their
accounts have been seriously challenged by the new generation of 'statists' who have
attempted, since the early 1980s, to place the state in the middle of the question about
the Asian economic miracle (Amsden 1989; Johnson 1982; Haggard 1990; Luedde-
Neurath 1988; Wade 1990; White and Wade 1988). The state's role in the 'market
friendly economy', even for neo-classical theorists, became an unavoidable reality,
which had to be explained differently from the previous accounts. The World Bank's
World Development Report in 1993 well reflected the seriousness of the statist
challenge to the neo-classical market-based explanation of Asian development. In this
report, market advocates came to admit the importance of state intervention in the
process of late-industrialisation, yet exceptionally in the Asia Pacific region, locating
themselves 'between a neo-classical and the revisionist Amsden/Wade view' (Evans,
1995, p. 40). They argued that extraordinary aspect of HPAE (High-Performing Asian
Economies) growth lies in the fact that 'government interventions resulted in higher and
more equal growth than otherwise would have occurred' (World Bank 1993, p. 6). In
spite of their efforts to distance themselves from the neo-classical view, the fundamental
ideas never changed. The main reason why the Asian economy could gain fast growth
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still lies in state intervention which promoted capital expansion and, nevertheless, did
not harm 'the stability of macroeconomic stability' (World Bank 1993, p. 7). Arguing
the effectiveness of the mix of fundamental and government intervention, rather than
other methods which have been used by HPAE, such as repressing interest rates,
directing credit and selective promoting, the report claimed that government
intervention, fortunately and exceptionally could contribute to getting the fundamentals
right.
Whether these interventions contributed to the rapid growth made
possible by good fundamentals or detracted from it is the most difficult
question we have tried to answer. It is much easier to show that the HPAEs
limited the costs and duration of inappropriately chosen interventions - itself
an impressive achievement - than to demonstrate conclusively that those
interventions that were maintained over a long period accelerated
growth...Most of the policies that the HPAEs used reflected sound
economic fundamentals: they enhanced the working of markets, helped
prices communicate information about relative economic costs, and fostered
competitive discipline (World Bank, 1993, pp. 354-366).
In sum, the state in the Asia-Pacific Rim has played a very important role in
creating a fair system of trade. This fair system allowed domestic capital to invest in
export-centred industry with neutral incentives based on the market and foreign capital
to feel free to invest their capital into the industries in the Asia-Pacific region. State
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intervention could be a reason for economic development only as far as it never harms
the logic of the market. In other words, the role of the state is still explained as
something which must be subjected to the absoluteness of the market. The state can be
considered only in terms of the function of the liberal form of the state that at best can
remove external problems which may distort the market mechanism and, thereby, create
unfavourable conditions for capital accumulation. Therefore, the role of the state, which
they recommend, appears to be ultimately nothing but securing an optimal market
condition, in spite of the rhetoric.
2. The Developmental State Debate
Strong disciplinary state over the private
Against the neo-classical exposition of economic development and the state's role in
development, there have been challenges from state-centred accounts of economic
development and the role and forms of the state in development. Deriving a theory of
the state from the state interventions which are believed to have led to an economic
miracle, these literatures are marked by the concept of the 'developmental state' as a
specific form of the state which could plan and implement a series of successful
interventions for economic development, which exists 'in time and space in East Asia'
and also exist 'as an abstract generalisation about the essence of the East Asian'
examples' (Johnson, 1999, p. 43). Excoriating the neo-classical view that promoting the
free market mechanism is the only way to catch up economic development, these statist
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accounts describe the role of the state in East Asian as one compensating or even, in
some occasions, substituting the market's regulation. These statist arguments seem to
succeed in finding an affinity between the market and state intervention through
evaluating the 'quality of state involvement in industry promotion' (Weiss and Hobson
1995, p. 138). According to them, the quality of state intervention in industry promotion
in East Asia was reliable and, thereby, there is no reason to deny the fact that the market
can be governed successfully through some specific method, such as incentives, guiding
market institutions and selective promotion and strong financial market control.
On this basis of the empirical observation of the extraordinary performance of the
East Asian states, Johnson (1982), Amsden (1989), Haggard (1990), Evans (1995) and
Wade (1990) tried to show that the states could have their own roles far beyond a mere
contribution to the market perfection, which is the role of the liberal state, even to the
extent that the states distort 'the prices wrong' (Amsden 1989, p.149) in favour of
national economic aims. Apparently, for statists, East Asian late-industrialising
countries appear to provide an excellent epitome of the fact that the state-guided market
can be a more successful way of late industrialisation because, in certain conditions,
economic growth can rely heavily on government intervention to augment supply and
demand. According to Amsden, Korean late industrialisation is the case which reveals
the importance and effectiveness of state intervention, indicating the existence of a
specifi rc form of the state.
Korea, therefore, provides supporting evidence for the proposition that
economic expansion depends on state intervention to create price distortions
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that direct economic activity toward greater investment. State intervention is
necessary even in the most plausible cases of comparative advantage,
because the chief asset of backwardness - low wage - is counterbalanced by
heavy liabilities. Where Korea differs from most other late industrialising
countries is in the discipline its state exercised over private firms (Amsden
1989, p. 14, emphasis in original).
Like Amsden's argument about Korean development, Wade also offers an elaborated
explanation of the role of state intervention in the developmental process of Taiwan
(Wade 1990). Through a careful analysis of the state's role in Taiwan, he argues that the
state in late industrialisation must not be subordinated to the market but, in fact; must
govern the market, providing a detailed analysis of the Taiwanese national policies and
institutions to promote export-oriented growth and, at the same time, the stability of the
financial, commodity and labour markets. According to these statist empirical analyses,
it seems true that the neo-classical argument about Korean economic development, and
Asian NICs in general, is irrelevant. The liberal reform which was argued by the neo-
classical view as the basis of Korean EOI development was not a liberal reform but a
'highly managed affair' aiming to promote exports (Weiss and Hobson 1995, p. 143).
Also the liberal trade regime argued to be the pivotal origin of late development was a
mere illusion, resulting from the selective abandonment of some unnecessary sectors at
the expense of selective promotion or even a by-product of export-centred development
based on the import of raw materials. Since, according to their argument, this shift from
the ISI to EOI was based on the pursuit of developmental goals by the state, now it
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becomes the state that should be at the centre of the exposition of rapid industrialisation
in this region.
The developmental state is firstly a strong-disciplinary state, as widely accepted,
which can discipline and guide private business and this strength of the developmental
states is explained by their 'unusual degree of bureaucratic autonomy' (Onis 1991, p.
114). It is this 'political autonomy from the short-term interest of private sector' that
makes it possible for the state 'to shift policy toward a more outward-looking growth
strategy' (Haggard 1990, p. 40) and to 'avoid becoming the captive of its major clients'
(Johnson 1985, p. 81). Here, authoritarian political rules appear to be the best way to
impose a national developmental goal, thorough discipline over private business as well
as labour, on the mass of population. However, the politically authoritarian regime can
be a necessary condition of the 'existence of a developmental state' but not a sufficient
condition. On the basis of 'an authoritarian, executive-based political structure' that can
guard 'the feebleness of the legislature' (Wade 1988, p. 159), the economic decision-
making bodies have also to be insulated from all political as well as economic pressure
groups. This was possible through what Johnson called an 'open division of labour
between reigning and ruling' (Johnson 1986, p. 560) by which the economic
bureaucracy 'is given sufficient scope to take the initiative and operate effectively'
(Johnson 1982, p. 315). Now what is, first of all, necessary for the success story of the
develorpmental state is a pilot organisation, such as MITI (Ministry of International
Trade and Industry in Japan), EPB (Economic Planning Board in Korea) and CIECD
(Council on International Economic Cooperation and Development in Taiwan), which
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plans and implements long-term economic policies, enjoying a great degree of
autonomy from political pressures as well as from economic interest groups.
Co-operative autonomy and its mechanism
According to the developmental state theories, successful economic development
becomes possible due to the existence of the developmental state. Thus, to find a way
for successful capital accumulation is to find the way in which the state can become
autonomous from social groups and classes and become an autonomous actor that is
able to implement interventionist policies. In this sense, accounting for the apparent
autonomy of the developmental state lies at the centre of their argument. In other words,
the basis of developmental state theory is the theory of state autonomy. The theory of
the autonomy of the developmental state is developed inductively, deriving a certain
degree of autonomy as the common feature from the economic development of the
countries which succeeded in late industrialisation. However, according to those
arguments, to define the developmental state only in terms of the autonomous and
coercive power of the strong-disciplinary state that allowed the effective planning and
implementation of economic policy could be misleading. 'A disciplined (or
developmental) state refers to one that advances capital rather than accumulating it, or
at least does not allow its own enrichment to derail the development effort' (Amsden
1989, p. 148). Therefore, the real 'developmental' state can be distinguished from a
,
mere interventionist state also in terms of restrictive and highly selective uses of its own
power. Most of the statist expositions emphasise the specific form of legitimation of the
developmental state, as the basis of the restriction of the abuse of power. They argue
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that the developmental state inherently cannot be abusive because the basis of the
developmental state itself is largely based on the legitimacy coming neither from 'their
ideological pretensions' nor from 'some formal rules whereby they gained power', but
from 'the overarching social projects their societies endorsed and they carried out' and
'their results' (Johnson 1985, p. 69; 1989, p. 148; Wade 1988, p. 160).
Restricted by its own logic of legitimacy and by some external help, such as the
'hyperactive student movement', that 'mobilize popular support to keep the government
honest' (Amsden 1989, p. vi), instead of exercising its power excessively, the
developmental states appear to show an 'unusual degree of public-private cooperation'
and therefore 'the coexistence of two conditions: the autonomous bureaucracy and co-
operation between private sectors and the state' (Onis 1991, p. 114). This coexistence
seems to be the essence of the mutual promoting relations between authoritarianism and
capitalism, distinguishing the developmental state from mere 'predatory' rent-seeking
states, which exercise their power excessively through the one way relations between
the private sector, as provider, and the state, as beneficiary (Johnson 1986, p. 559; see
also Johnson 1982, p. 309; Evans 1992, 1989). Therefore, the issue becomes not just the
autonomous state but a 'specific kind' of autonomy of the state by which the state does
not abuse its political power while it maximises its developmental role in the relations
with private firms.
Evans, attempting to conceptualise this 'specific autonomy' of the state, emphasises
the fact that greater autonomy does not always cause positive consequences for
economic transformation (Evans 1989, 1992, 1995). In Africa, especially in the case of
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the prototype of the Zairian state, and elsewhere, we can observe the example of
stronger state autonomy becoming a hindrance to economic development. The Zairian
state, according to Evans, is autonomous 'in the sense of not deriving its goal from the
aggregation of social interest' but, at the same time, not autonomous in the sense of
designing policies 'for sale to private elite' (Evans 1992, p. 151). Therefore, the
autonomy of the Zairian state has nothing to do with 'developmental autonomy' so that,
in this case, it is better, for the sake of economic development, that the state becomes a
part of the economically dominant class. Otherwise, there is always the possibility that
state intervention precipitates economic crisis and disaster. According to Evans, the
autonomy of the developmental states is apparently distinguished from that of those
predatory states 'in which the preoccupation of the political class with rent-seeking has
turned society into its prey' (Evans 1992, p. 149). It is because
They extract surplus but they also provide collective goods. They foster
long-term entrepreneurial perspectives among private elites by increasing
incentives to engage in transformative investments and lowering the risks
involved in such investments. They may not be immune to rent-seeking or
to using some of the social surplus for the ends of incumbents and their
friends rather than those of the citizenry as a whole. Yet, on balance, the
consequences of their actions promote rather than impede economic
adjustment and structural transformation (Evans 1992, p. 148).
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The specific autonomy found in Asian NICs consists firstly of a meritocratic and
coherent bureaucracy, members of which are tightly linked with one another through an
informal network (Evans 1992, p. 153). Together with this internal coherence, one more
necessary condition is the embeddeness of this autonomous bureaucracy with the
market players through an 'external network connecting the state and private' (Evans
1992, p. 153). This is the specific mechanism of implementing the interventionist
policies in co-operation with private sectors. The coexistence of the coherent
bureaucracy through the informal network with the embeddedness of the bureaucracy
into society is now explained in terms of 'the embeddedness of the state autonomy',
which, he argues, characterises the autonomy of the Korean state (Evans 1995).
The autonomy of the developmental state is, however, of a completely
different character from the incoherent despotism of the predatory state. It
is not just 'relative autonomy' in the structural Marxist sense of being
constrained by the generic requirements of capital accumulation. It is an
autonomy embedded in a concrete set of social ties that bind the state to
society and provide institutionalised channels for the continual negotiation
and renegotiation of goals and policies. `Embeddedness' is as important as
autonomy. The embeddedness of the developmental state represents
something more specific than the fact that the state grows out of its social
r
milieu. It is also more specific than the organic interpretation of the state
and society that Gramsci called hegemony. Embeddedness, as it is used
here, implies a concrete set . of connections that link the state intimately
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and aggressively to particular social groups with whom the state shared a
joint project of transformation (Evans 1995, p. 59).
3. Explaining the Specific Autonomy by Bringing the State Back in
Deriving the autonomy of the state from the organisational features of the state
In fact, as Evans noticed, the coexistence of the autonomous state with tightly
networked relations between business and the bureaucracy is a 'contradictory
combination' since it is apparently difficult to explain how the state can be autonomous
from the private sectors if it is tightly engaged with them (Evans 1992, p. 154). This
contradictory relation, however, seems to be explained, surprisingly simply, in terms of
the relative strength of the state in the relations of co-operation. Again, in order to
explain this state's relative superiority among the competing social actors, statist
arguments seem to bring in politico-economic situations from which the superiority
sprang up: the Cold-War world order, which unlimitedly legitimated the government
leadership and left no choice for the state but the pursuit of market-based development
(Johnson 1985, p. 71; Evans 1992, p. 164); experiences under the Japanese colonisation,
which inherited an interventionist tradition to the state; land reform, in which the
traditional landlord class lost its competitive power against the state (Amsden 1989, p.
147; Evans 1992, p. 164) and the remarkable absence of a labour movement that could
possibly have prevented state autonomy (Wade 1988, p. 159).
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However, it is their enthusiasm about the 'brightness of the state bureaucrats' that
reduces, implicitly if not . explicitly, all other societal conditions to a mere situation,
without which the developmental elite's 'vision could not implemented' (Amsden 1989,
p. 52). It is not difficult to recognise that the statist argument, in essence, derives the
autonomy of the state from internal, organisational and even individual characteristics
of the state bureaucrats.
A developmental elite creates political stability over the long term,
maintains sufficient equality in distribution to prevent class or sectoral
exploitation (land reform is critical), sets national goals and standards that
are internationally oriented and based on non-ideological external referents,
creates (or at least, recognizes) a bureaucratic elite capable of administering
the system, and insulates its bureaucrats from direct political influence so
that they can function technocratically. It does not monopolise economic
management or decision making, guarantee full employment, allow
ideology to confuse its thinking, permit the development of political
pluralism that might challenge its goals, or waste valuable resources by
suppressing non-critical sectors (it discriminates against them with
disincentives and then ignores them) (Johnson 1985, p. 69).
r The central decision-makers are the kind of people who identify with the
objective of their organisations and of the state and do have some sense of
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moral responsibility for achieving objectives other than the use of public
power for private enrichment (Wade 1988, p. 160).
Now translating other social conditions into the results of activities of the state based
on the insight of the elite-bureaucrats, the statist argument focuses on the basis of the
inner-coherence of the state bureaucrats as well as of its leadership in its cooperation
with the private sector. The developmental state organisations are seen to be
autonomous most of all because the members of the organisations are usually 'the best
and the brightest' (Evans 1995, p. 51). The ability to have a certain route to negotiate
their policies with private groups through various ways, which are formal and informal,
without subordination to the interest groups, appears here to be incarnated in the bright
bureaucrats selected through the 'rigorous system of recruitment' (Weiss and Hobson
1995, p. 165). Therefore, the specific kind of autonomy of the state is explained as
based on the ability of the state bureaucrats to cooperate with private business, through
formal and informal networks, however, under the strict guidance of the state elite-
bureaucrats who are enormously single-minded and focused on the development goals.
In consequence, in spite of their complicated analysis of the extraordinary state and its
relations with social groups and classes, there remains only the meiitocratic national
examination for the high-level state bureaucrats and the long tradition of the selection
system, as the basis of the developmental state. Having seen these explanations, what is
r
apparent is that statist arguments tend to explain the state explicitly in terms of the
organisational features of the government, avoiding any serious attempt to put it in its
social context. This is not just because they are focusing on the relations between
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business and the government or primarily attempt to explain the role of the state in
economic development. The reason lies deeper, originating in the theoretical basis of
the statist argument.
Bringing the state back in
As we saw, the analyses of the developmental state are focused on deriving the
autonomy of the state and its embeddedness from the organisational features of the state
bureaucrats. The state here appears to be internally coherent and externally insulated
from other social groups. While these arguments are focused exclusively on an
empirical derivation, the theoretical basis of statist analyses had been presented in more
rigorous theoretical studies on state autonomy developed by Skocpol, Evans and
Rueshemeyer, in their monumental edition called 'Bringing the State Back in', the task
of which had been putting the state 'itself' at the centre of the analysis of the state.
Skocpol attempted to distinguish her concept of state autonomy from that of neo-
Marxists, especially that of Poulantzas, which prevailed in the studies on the state,
particularly on the autonomy of the state. Skocpol's first remark is that state autonomy
is not something which can be theorised at the level of the capitalist state in general.
Poulantzas's approach is ultimately very frustrating because he simply
posits the 'relative autonomy of the capitalist state' as a necessary feature of
the capitalist mode of production as such. Poulantzas insists that the state is
'relatively autonomous' regardless of varying empirical ties between state
organisations and the capitalist class, and at the same time he posits that the
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state must invariably function to stabilise the capitalist system as a whole
(Skocpol 1985, p. 33).
According to her, state autonomy is neither a general feature of the capitalist state
nor a necessary characteristic of the capitalist state, which can be supported by the fact
that the state always functions as the guarantor of the interest of capital-in-general. On
the contrary, the concept of state autonomy is able to be captured and explained 'only in
truly historical studies that are sensitive to structural variations and conjunctural
changes within given polities' because 'state autonomy is not a fixed structural feature
of any governmental system' (Skocpol 1985, p. 14). Therefore, a certain degree of state
autonomy, with which the state can plan a specific state intervention in society, and a
state capacity, with which the state can implement the plan and pursue a social goal, can
be found only when analysing specific countries empirically. Whether the state can be
autonomous or not depends not on the structural features of society or mode of
production but on the organisational features of the given state. Therefore, state
autonomy is the autonomy of the state, as 'a set of organisations through which
collectivities of officials may be able to formulate and implement distinctive strategies
or policies' (Skocpol 1985, pp. 20-1). Her concept of autonomy is autonomy not from
the particular capitalist or from capital-in-general but from other social 'groups' and
'organisations' as sets of social actors without regard to the specific form of social
relations. Her concept of autonomy is quite distinguishable from Poulantzas's concept
in that the autonomy cannot be limited within the function of the capitalist state in
capital accumulation and in that the state is not necessarily autonomous. As a result, the
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extent to which the state is able to be autonomous could be extremely expanded,
depending on the organisational features of the given state, from the degree of
'committee of the bourgeoisie' to the absolutely autonomous state.
For Skocpol, the essential basis of state autonomy lies in the fact that the state in
principle can be potentially autonomous from other social groups at least as much as
other social groups can be from one another. The autonomy of an organisation is not
inherently conditioned by the social relations within which the organisation develops
but originates inherently from the organisation itself particularly from the
organisational coherence of the institution. Moreover, the state is a supreme
organisation, for her, an organisation inherently having the possibility to be autonomous
from other groups in society.
In short, state autonomy is neither a 'general' feature of the 'capitalist' state nor a
structural feature of capitalist society but an organisational potentiality of the state as a
set of organisations without regard to specific social relations. However, the argument
that state autonomy can be theorised only at the level of individual states means here, in
fact, that the possibility of the autonomy of the state is determined `transhistorically'
without regard to the social relations in and through which the state exists.
Consequently, the specificity of state autonomy, which she initially emphasised in
opposition to the neo-Marxist concept of state autonomy, eventually changed into the
universality of the concept in essence since she abstracted the state and other social
categories by abstracting the social groups as actors from specific social relations of
capitalist production and, in so doing, she confirmed the externality between state and
36
society by abstracting the state from society. This abstraction of social institutions,
especially the state, from the specific social relations marks Skocpol's conceptualisation
of the autonomy of the state, which, as she intended, has been largely accepted as the
starting point and presupposition of state analysis by the statist argument.
The contradictory basis of the capitalist state and unresolved question
Contrary to the `ahistorical and organisational' conceptualisation of state autonomy
given by Skocpol, Evans and Rueshemeyer initially appear to define the autonomy of
the state in a way that is slightly closer to the neo-Marxist approach. For them, state
autonomy is understood in principle as autonomy from the dominant class in society,
therefore conceptualised in the context of class relations, rather than merely as
organisational autonomy from social actors (Evans and Rueshemeyer 1985, p. 49).
Recognising the contradictory tendency of the state to appear in reality as an instrument
-
of domination, as a corporate unit, as an arena of social conflicts and as the guardian of
the universal interest, they argue that whether state intervention can contribute to
economic development depends on how these contradictory patterns are combined in
and out of the state structure.
The efficacy of the state will always depend on the pattern in which these
contradictory tendencies are combined, both in its internal structure and in
its relation to the social structure as a whole (Evans and Rueshemeyer 1985,
p. 48).
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The state efficacy here appears to consist of state capacity, mostly with regard to
state structure, and its autonomy from the dominant class. Therefore, it is not only the
organisational features of the state but also the context of the social structure, especially
with regard to the state's relations with the dominant class, that condition the successful
state interventions. To enhance the efficacy of the state, two conditions are exclusively
discussed. Firstly, the state's ability to support markets and capitalist accumulation
needs a specific state structure represented by what Evans called `Weberian
bureaucracy', which is 'a corporately coherent entity in which individuals see
furtherance of corporate goals as the best means of maximizing their individual self-
interest' (Evans 1992, p. 146). The elements of Weberian bureaucracy, such as adequate
bureaucratic machinery, expertise, superior knowledge and a distinctive perspective, all
together make up a basis of the state structure that can guarantee more effective
interventions. In addition, what appears to be more intrinsic is 'a minimum of coherence
and coordination within and among different state organizations' which enables all the
organizational parts of the state apparatus to be more responsive to 'internal guidance
and co-ordination of state action rather than to outside interest and demands' (Evans and
Rueshemeyer 1985, p. 55). If the inner-coherent bureaucratic organisations, enhancing
the capacity of the state, are an internal condition of the state efficacy, the outer
condition is its relative autonomy from the dominant class.
the state must acquire a certain degree of 'relative autonomy' from the
dominant class in order to promote economic transformation effectively.
we take the importance of relative autonomy to be as established as the
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need for a bureaucratic apparatus, arguing in particular that a certain
autonomy is necessary not only to formulate collective goals but to
implement them as well. Therefore, most of our discussion focuses on the
social structural conditions likely to promote autonomy (Evans and
Rueshemeyer 1985, p. 49)
The concept of relative autonomy, however, seems initially rather under-defined, as
they recognise by saying that 'what is meant by "relative autonomy" varies substantially
depending on the theoretical context in which it is embedded' (Evans and Rueshemeyer
1985, p. 49). In some occasions, as in the argument shown above, the autonomy of the
state seems to mean autonomy from the dominant class as a whole, rather than
autonomy from a particular fraction of the dominant class, indicating the possibility of
the state going beyond the social dominance of the capitalist class and, therefore, to be a
class-neutral state. On the other hand, the autonomy of the state appears to be
constrained within instrumental autonomy to enable the state to 'sacrifice the interest of
certain segments of capital in the pursuit of policies that maintain the viability of the
socio-economic system and preserve the general rate of return' (Evans and
Rueshemeyer 1985, p. 60). As the argument moves on, the concept of the autonomy of
the state appears closer to the concept of 'instrumental autonomy' by which the state
guarantees the long-term interest of capitalist development by exercising its power
r
against the short-term interest of certain fractions of the capitalist class.
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The state remains dependent on private capital, foreign and domestic, not
only to promote accumulation but also to produce a surplus in which the
state itself may share...Autonomy remains very relative; the handmaiden
role remains an inescapable part of the repertoire of even the most
autonomous modern state. Within these limits, however, a positive
connection between increased autonomy and state intervention remains
plausible, and the social structural conditions that might increase the
likelihood of autonomy remain correspondingly worth exploring (Evans and
Rueshemeyer 1985, p. 62, my emphasis).
The degree of the autonomy of the state in Evans and Rueshemeyer's argument,
therefore, appear to vary significantly according to, as they argue, the contingent
unfolding of social structural conditions. Whether the state can be against the dominant
class as a whole or merely against a certain segment of the capitalist class cannot, for
them, be a theoretical issue. Rather, it is only a matter of different degrees of autonomy,
which is determined in the development of a particular state in a specific societal
context. The social determination of the degree of autonomy of the state also appears
very contingent, since even the most obvious social structural conditions 'favoring
greater autonomy', for example, 'constellation in which the pact of domination has
serious cleavages within it, in which threats from below induce the dominant classes to
grant greater autonomy to the state, or in which subordinate classes acquire sufficient
power to undo monolithic political control by the dominant classes' (Evans and
Rueschemeyer 1985, p. 63) do not necessarily lead to a greater degree of autonomy.
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Rather, the degree of the autonomy depends on 1) 'the internal relations of control and
coordination within the state structure', 2) 'on the relative strength of the state apparatus
and outside forces', and 3) 'on the specifically political patterns and processes
mediating between the state and the interest structure of society that have not been
considered here' (Evans and Rueshemeyer 1985, p. 64).
It is the East Asian developmental state from which Evans, in his further studies,
finally found the ideal prototype of maximum autonomy of the state (Evans 1992, 1995).
For him, the East Asian developmental state fulfils the two conditions, the inner-
coherent bureaucratic machinery as well as the social context of the relative autonomy
of the state, both of which seem to precondition each other. Furthermore, for Evans,
even if the state autonomy is a presupposition of the efficacy of state intervention
(Evans and Rueshemeyer 1985, p. 62) and the state can acquire autonomy, greater
autonomy cannot always guarantee successful intervention unless it satisfies the third
condition, an appropriate pattern and process mediating the state with other social forces.
In other words, what is necessary to enhance the efficacy of the state is not only the
autonomy of the state machinery but also the specific mechanism of the social process
of implementing the interventionist policies, through which market players and
bureaucrats can be networked formally and informally. It is this coexistence of the
Weberian bureaucracy, internally coherent and externally autonomous from the
domirint class, with the specific networks of the guidance of the state over the private
sectors, through which relative autonomy can go beyond class relations and the interest
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of the dominant class and become a basis of the pursuit of an economic transformation
for the collective good.
At a glance, Evans and Rueshemeyer's understanding of the state seems much more
developed than that of Skocpol, in that the state appears not to be entirely abstracted
from the social context within which the state develops, in both historical and
geographical terms. They rightly point out the societal condition as one of the bases of
state autonomy. Furthermore, Evans attempted to theorise state-society relations in
terms of `embeddedness'. Whereas Skocpol did not explain any form of external
barriers to state autonomy, they elaborate the external constraints imposed on the
autonomy of the state. Therefore, while Skocpol falls back into self-contradiction by
which the specificity of state autonomy is turned into universality, they seem to manage
successfully to avoid the same problem by not naturalising the autonomy of the state but
contextualising it in both state structure and class relations. However, their
conceptualisation of the developmental state and of 'autonomy' as the basis of the state
still remains problematic, leaving a fundamental question unresolved.
In a given society, the degree and nature of the autonomy varies significantly. The
degree of autonomy appears in between 'instrumental autonomy', by which the state
can be independent from a segment of the capitalist class as a whole, and 'structural and
more apparent autonomy', by which the state can implement policies against the interest
r
of capital 'as a whole', in accordance with the state structure, social context, and the
channel through which it delivers its policies. The former is similar to the relative
autonomy which is prevalent in traditional Marxist argument. It is the latter, if anything,
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that distinguishes their developmental autonomy from the relative autonomy in the
Marxist tradition. Particularly with regard to the state in Asian NICs, as far as Evans
recognises them as the prototypes of an efficiently autonomous state in his arguments,
the autonomy of the developmental state is to be considered, or at least can be
considered, more than autonomy from a fraction of the capitalist class.
At this point, Evans's intrinsic idea with regard to state autonomy appears clearer.
Evans explains the basis of the autonomy of the developmental state by showing the
evidence of the extraordinary leadership of the state in cultivating more successful
capital accumulation. If we look at the specific state-society relations which are subject
to his analysis, those are in fact exclusively narrowed-down to the government-business
relations rather than state-society relations (Evans 1992, 1995). In spite of this limited
analytical framework, however, his concept of autonomy keeps going beyond the state's
leadership against private business as well as a mere 'relative' autonomy from the
dominant class, which is prevalent in the Marxist tradition. His early definition of
'relative' autonomy from the dominant class now completely disappears and more
'apparent' autonomy from 'society' seems to substitute for it. In particular, the
embedded autonomy appears to imply a social mechanism through which the state
acquires the channel of continual negotiation and re-negotiation with societal forces,
which are supposed to include different social classes, and by which the state is bound
to society, indicating far more than closely interwoven relations between state
bureaucrats and businessmen (Evans 1995, pp. 12, 50, 59). In consequence, the state
appears to be class neutral and exist above the class relations so long as the state has
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leadership against private capitals, without regard to the relations between dominant and
subordinated classes or the state and the subordinated class. In short, the leadership of
the state against private businessmen appears enough to explain automatically the
significant degree of independence of the state from capital and, furthermore, from
'society'. Not surprisingly, there is no analysis of even a single case of negotiation, let
alone continual re-negotiation, between the state and labour, while he argues that
embedded autonomy expresses the relations between the state and 'society'.1
This image of the independence of the state resulted, therefore, from a very narrow
and a-historical understanding of the relations of the state with capitalist society as the
relations between different societal forces, or more exactly societal organisations as
'sets of individual-social actors', rather than from a serious attempt to understand the
nature of the capitalist state in relation to particularly capitalist social relations of
production. Evans's problem shows exactly the limits of the statist approach as well as
its contribution to understanding the capitalist state. The apparent limits of Evans's
approach lies in the fact that he is able to conceptualise the state in Asian NICs as
having 'developmental autonomy' only as far as he considers the relations between the
state and capital as relations between different organisations comprising different sets of
people, in other words, between a set of state bureaucrats and a set of businessmen. As
Partly but unconsciously, this reflects the reality of Korean society. As we will see in
following chapters, there has been virtually no negotiation, as such, between the state and labour,
particularly in the 60s and 70s when the developmental state is described as having been formed
through 'continual negotiations with societal forces'. This absence of labour is an important
element of the statist approach. We will discuss it later in Chapter 5.
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far as the relations between the state and capital are understood as the relations between
different organisations, an exposition of the state based on this understanding of the
relations cannot help being a-historical without regard to the particular way in which
the 'capitalist' state relates itself to capital and other societal forces. In this perspective,
the mode of existence of the capitalist state, through which the state appears basically in
separation from capital and society, is merely assumed because any organisation can be
seen to have autonomy from other organisations as far as it is a distinctive organisation
from other societal organisations. It is only within this limit that the theory of the
developmental state and the concept of developmental autonomy appear to be relevant.
It is clear that, if they go beyond this boundary, it becomes difficult for them to argue
that the state is autonomous from capital and society, since the developmental state as
an organisation which is autonomous from capital as set of businessmen results in
nothing other than the more effective accumulation of capital. However, it is in this
sense that, in spite of all defects and limits, their argument is provocative enough to start
a more thorough theoretical investigation into the mysterious form of the capitalist state,
through which political authority appears to exist above society, by showing in detail
the state as it appears and is perceived. The contribution of developmental state theories
to understanding the capitalist state, therefore, lies in the fact that they show the
contradictory form of the capitalist state not by explaining it but by showing in detail
the way in which the contradictory basis of the capitalist state manifests itself in reality
and builds up its image as a political entity in separation from class relations.
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Concluding Remark
As we saw above, statist arguments contributed to the analysis of the role of the state
in economic development on the basis of elaborate empirical research on the relation
between the government and private business. Most of all, they seem to have been
extraordinarily successful in undermining the market-fetishism of the neo-classical
account of economic development. They argue that their understanding of the state is
distinguishable from that of the neo-classical approach, represented by the
subordination of the state to the market, on the one hand, and also from traditional
Marxist understanding, in which the state appears to be subordinated to capital in
general, on the other. According to their argument, the Marxist tradition has ignored the
question of the autonomous existence of the state by merely assuming the state is
necessarily subject to the capitalist class. Alternatively, they suggest that the state can
and does exist in separation from society, i.e., above class relations, without being
subordinated to the interest of a particular class. However, the statist arguments do not
offer a satisfactory exposition of the fundamental theoretical problems with regard to
the contradictory mode of existence of the capitalist state. They could not resolve the
contradiction between the fact that the state appears to exist in separation from capital
and the fact that the state eventually serves capital accumulation. Rather, they ignored
this question by limiting their inquiries about the nature of the relations between the
r
state and society within the relations between different organisations of government
officials and businessmen, unconsciously assuming the separation of the state from
society. The developmental state in Asian NICs offered extremely favourable resources
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to empirical analyses by statists, through showing an outstanding leadership against
capital and thereby enabling them to suggest a theory of the autonomous state merely by
summing up those case studies. In short, the contradiction in the mode of existence of
the capitalist state that appears in separation from society, on the one hand, and in
subordination to capital accumulation, on the other, remains unresolved and completely
unexplained. To overcome these arguments now demands a closer look at the
contradictory basis of the capitalist state. In the next chapter, we will explore Marxist
debates on the mode of existence of the capitalist state, in an attempt to criticise the
theories and practices of the so-called developmental state more fully.
r
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Chapter 3: Marx's Theory of Value and the Critique of
Capitalist Social Relations
Introduction
We found a problematic basis of developmental state theories in the previous chapter.
Most of all, they understand the relations between the capitalist state and other societal
forces, such as capital, in an a-historical way in which the state and capital appear
merely as different sets of individual social actors, without regard to the nature of the
capitalist state in relation to particularly capitalist social relations of production. By
doing so, they were able to conceptualise the particularity of the state in Asian NICs as
'the developmental state' that appears to exist above society and in separation from
other societal forces. However, in doing so, those expositions do not question the
contradictory form of the capitalist state which appears in separation from capital, but at
the same time serves capital accumulation. In this chapter, we will explore first of all
Marxist accounts of the state, that have themselves been subjected to a statist critique.
We will see that developmental state theories actually share many ideas with orthodox
Marxist analyses of the capitalist state, whether the essentialist argument or structuralist
argument which appear not to overcome the benign understanding of relations between
r
capital and the state either. Furthermore, in an attempt to overcome the shortcoming of
the theories of the state which understand relations between the political and economic
as mechanical and external relations, we will explore Marx's own understanding of
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capital's social domination. By reading carefully his critique of the labour theory of
value, capitalist social domination will be understood as an abstract domination in that
the social power of capital appears not immediately in a concrete form of domination
but rather through fetishised social forms and thereby in a mysterious reality. This will
lead us to grasp how the relations between the state and capital, or between the political
superstructure and social relations of production, are to be distinguished from the
relations between a set of bureaucrats and set of businessmen, and thereby how to
develop a critique of a given capitalist state, which will be further discussed in the next
chapter.
I. Unresolved Question: The Form of the Capitalist State in the Marxist
Tradition
Orthodox tradition
We found a common theoretical basis of developmental state theories in the last
chapter. These theories, finding the origin of successful state intervention in state
autonomy, rely on the assumed separation between the state and the economy. In the
traditional understanding of the state in Marxist orthodoxy, the dichotomist paradigm
appeared to be rejected by their definition of the state, despite its ideological disguise,
as an instrument of the ruling class.
In relation to the society as a whole, the state acts as an instrument of
direction and government on behalf of the ruling class; in relation to the
opponents of this class (in an exploiting society this means the majority of
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the population), it acts as an instrument of suppression and coercion.., no
form, not even the most democratic, can change the essence of the
exploiting state as an instrument for the domination of one class over others
(Kuusinen 1961, pp. 193-5).
The root of this soviet-type orthodoxy of state theory can be found in Lenin's works
which, relying largely on Engels's 'The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the
State', aimed primarily to criticise the argument that the reconciliation of classes can be
achieved and presented in the form of the state as a public institution. For Lenin, this
argument was not only theoretically and empirically nonsense but also politically
poisonous since it implied that 'the liberation of the oppressed class' was possible
'without the destruction of the apparatus of state power which was created by the ruling
class' (Lenin, The State and Revolution, 1970a, p. 294). Defining such arguments as an
opportunistic 'adulteration of Marx', Lenin argued that the development of the state,
despite its variety of forms and types, is 'the creation of "order", which legalises and
perpetuates this oppression by moderating the conflicts between the classes', essentially
expressing the 'irreconcilability of class antagonism' (Lenin 1970a, p. 294). In this
sense, the more democratic political institutions in Western society are understood as
the very best way of securing the domination of capital once 'capital has gained control
of this very best shell' (Lenin 1970a, p. 296). This rather essentialist theory of the
r
capitalist state, once a strong criticism of the social democratic understanding of the
state in which the state was described as a vehicle to overcome (or more precisely
minimise) the very contradictions of capitalist production relations through delivering a
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more just distribution, reappeared as a dominant tradition of the Marxist approach to the
capitalist state in 'state monopoly capitalism' throughout the 60s. 2 The core of this
argument lies in the definition of the contemporary stage of capitalist development as
state monopoly capitalism in which monopoly capitals, in order to secure their interest,
directly subordinate the state apparatus to their concentrated economic, especially
financial power, and thereby survive the development of the general tendency to crisis.
While this theory relied on the feature of the specific stage of the development of
capitalism in the postwar period and focused particularly on the state corresponding to
the concentration of social power by particular monopoly capitals, the main theme of
the theory of state monopoly capitalism is not distinguished from that of Lenin in that
they identify the interest of capital with the interest of the state (Clarke 1991d, p. 3).
The intrinsic limit of these essentialist expositions of the state, although they at first
glance appear to overcome the dichotomy between the economic and political through
identifying the interest of the ruling class with that of the state, lies in the fact that they
do not understand the capitalist state with respect to specifically capitalist social
relations of production, dealing with the state in an a-historical manner, not explaining
but ignoring the specificity of the capitalist state which really appears in the separation
of the state from civil society, as a specifically capitalistic feature appears to the
essentialist accounts as nothing special, but as a general feature of class-based society.
For them, it is not the specific capitalist character but only the class-character in general
that is to be under investigation. The capitalist state has been analysed not as a part of
2 For a more rigorous exposition of the state monopoly capitalist arguments, see Jessop 1982.
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the critique of specifically capitalist social relations, in which social labour is organised
specifically, but as an institution of the ruling classes in an a-historical and mechanical
manner.
The history of mankind knows scores and hundreds of countries that have
passed or are still passing through slavery, feudalism and capitalism. In each
of these countries, despite the immense historical changes that have taken
place, despite all the political vicissitudes and all the revolutions due to this
development of mankind, to the transition from slavery through feudalism to
capitalism and to the present world-wide struggle against capitalism, you
will always discern the emergence of the state. It has always been a certain
apparatus which stood outside society and consisted of a group of people
engaged solely, or almost solely, or mainly, in ruling... The state is a
machine for maintaining the rule of one class over another (Lenin, The State,
1970b, p. 265).
However, for Marx, the separation of the political from the society is not a general
feature of a class-based society but a striking feature of the development of capitalist
social relations. It is capitalist society in which the state appears in abstraction as
something really differentiated from the economy, 'alongside and outside civil society'
(Marx,' The German Ideology, 1976a, p. 90).
The abstraction of the state as such was not born until the modern world
because the abstraction of private life was not created until modern times.
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The abstraction of the political state is a modern product. In the Middle
Ages there was serf, feudal property, trade guilds, scholastic corporations,
etc. That is to say, in the Middle Age, property, trade, society and man were
political; the material content of the state was defined by its form; every
sphere of private activity had a political character, or was a political sphere,
in other words politics was characteristic of the different spheres of private
life. In the Middle Ages the political constitution was the constitution of
private property, but only because the constitution of private property was
political. In the Middle Ages the life of the people was identical with the life
of the state (i.e., political life). Man was the real principle of the state, but
man was not free. Hence there was a democracy of unfreedom, a perfected
system of estrangement. The abstract reflected antithesis of this is to be
found only in the modern world. The Middle Ages were an age of real
dualism; the modern world is the age of abstract dualism (Marx, Critique of
Hegel 's Doctrine of the State, 1981, p.90, my emphasis).
Hence, to argue that the state is a mere class apparatus is to ignore the specific mode
of manifestation of capitalist social domination. Therefore it concludes that the capitalist
state is a mere apparatus of the ruling class without considering the abstract feature of
the state that characterises the capitalist form of the state and is essential, to
understanding the specific nature of the capitalist state. Moreover, in so doing, the
assumption of the distinctive superficial appearance of the separation between the state
and the economy, although it is essentially false for them, is merely recognised without
53
questioning the specifically capitalistic way in which the essential nature of class
relations comes to appear in the distinctive form of the political state. Therefore, the
state is understood as something structurally or mechanically distinguished from society
and exists above class relations while the essential nature of the state immediately
reflects the nature of the relations of 'economic' exploitation. Hence, Lenin's state
theory and subsequent essentialist arguments do not seem to provide a proper ground
for overcoming predominant state theories based on the understanding of the state as it
is since 'it refers generally to the need to smash the state apparatus, but provides no
tools to evaluate the effectiveness and extent of state interventions in the process of
capital valorisation' (Willer and Neustiss 1978, p. 34). It is very easy to understand the
capitalist state as a mere ruling class apparatus, without understanding the specific way
of formation and reproduction of the capitalist state, the way in which it appears as
representing a fetishised social category, the political, if we read the famous paragraph
from Marx's Preface to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy without
placing it in the wider context of Marx's works.
The general conclusion at which I arrived and which, once reached,
became the guiding principle of my studies can be summarised as follows.
In the social production of their existence, men inevitably enter into definite
social relations, which are independent of their will, namely relations of
production appropriate to a given stage in the development of their material
forces of production. The totality of these relations of production constitutes
the economic structure of society, the real foundation, on which arises a
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legal and political superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of
social consciousness. The mode of production of material life conditions the
general process of social, political and intellectual life. It is not the
consciousness of men that determines their existence, but their social
existence that determines their consciousness... No social order is ever
destroyed before all the productive forces for which it is sufficient have
been developed, and new superior relations of production never replace
older ones before the material conditions for their existence have matured
within the framework of the old society (Marx 1971b, pp. 20-1).
In this notoriously contentious paragraph, which is one of the few comments
exclusively on the state in Marx's works, it can be seen as if the state as a political
superstructure arises mechanically from, therefore, is ultimately separated from 'the
economic' relations which are also given by the development of the forces of
production. Likewise, if we understand this without considering Marx's work as a
whole, it can be understood as a-historical in that, no matter what step of the
development of the society we are on, the structure of the society can be determined in
the same manner: political superstructure above the economic relation above the forces
of production. This mechanical and a-historical understanding does not offer us a
starting point for a critique of the state. On the contrary, it gives us a mere superficial
r
exposition of the state or at best a description of the class character of the state.
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State autonomy vs essentialist debates
This intrinsic limit of the essentialist argument has been rigorously illuminated by a
further debate between essentialist and structuralist approaches, which is represented by
the debate between Miliband and Poulantzas. In the argument, Miliband tried to show
that there is evidently a dominant or ruling class which owns and controls the means of
production and that the dominant class has close links to those powerful institutions,
such as political parties, the military, universities, the media and the other apparatuses.
Therefore, the state has never been a neutral regulator among social interests. Despite
the adequacy of his argument in terms of finding the class character as the essence of
the capitalist state, the first problem of this approach lies in the fact that it defines the
class character of the state by exposing the domination of the state 'directly' by
members of the capitalist class. However, his most critical failure lies not merely in his
way of relating the state and capital but more fundamentally in his understanding of the
state and capital, in that he understands the state and capital merely as sets of
'functioning' individuals by equating 'capital and the state' directly merely with two
different sets of individuals who belong to those social categories, state bureaucrats and
capitalists. In other words, although he succeeded in showing the class character of the
capitalist state, therefore revealing the empirical basis of the 'links' between the state
bureaucrats and members of capitalist class, i.e., collective individual capitalists, he
ultimafely failed to understand the relations between capital and the state since he could
not overcome the bourgeois foundation that derives the nature of social phenomena
from the very surface of the social categories by seeing the state and capital merely as
two sets of individuals, without criticising the specific social 'forms' through which the
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social domination of capital appears in the form of the relations between different sets
of individuals. Therefore, the bourgeois understanding of social arenas as differentiated
from one another and inter-related merely by interactions of individuals, remains
completely intact.
This dichotomy between two different arenas, i.e., the political and economic, is also
the clearest defect of the structuralist analysis of the state, the other side of the debate.
As a strong critique of the essentialist arguments in a very developed form, Poulantzas's
analysis of the state represents a critique of the Communist orthodoxy of state
monopoly capitalism, which has understood the state merely as 'simple epiphenomena
reducible to the "economic" basis' (Poulantzas 1969, p. 68), and a critique of
Miliband's interpersonal interpretation of the state. Initially, Poulantzas's concern was
to fulfil the 'absence of a study of the state' (Poulantzas 1969, p. 68) through deriving
Marx's political theory from Marx's political writings. Poulantzas, in the tradition of the
structuralist understanding of Marx, especially that of Althusser, in which Marx appears
variously in different forms such as the political Marx, the economic Marx and the
philosophical Marx, sees that Marx's Capital is about economic life as a regional theory
within capitalist society without explicit implication for ideological and political
instances (Poulantzas 1973, pp. 12, 21; Clarke 1991d, p. 17; Jessop 1982, p. 159). In
contrast to economic Marxism, the rigorous contribution to which was offered in
Capita'!, the regional theory regarding the political, which has not been developed in any
way which is comparable with Capital, needs to be developed a lot further through a
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closer look into Marx's political writings. 3 Moreover, to develop a proper theory of the
political state is for him to overcome the prevalent economism which is the other side of
the absence of political theory (Polulantzas 1969, pp. 67-8).
Accusing Miliband of analysing the state in terms of the individual human subjects
who control it, rather than in relation to its structurally determined role in capitalist
society, Poulantzas argues that, reinterpreting the Althusserian 'determination of the
economy in the last instance', the different instances of capitalist domination are not
subordinated to the economy immediately but serve the economy only in the sense that
they together constitute the mode of production and, therefore, serve the reproduction of
capitalist society as a whole. Those instances (political, economical and ideological) are
'united' at the level of the mode of production but they are also 'distinct' instances from
each other at the level of relatively differentiated autonomous 'regions' (Poulantzas
1973, p. 16). In this sense, the state serves capital not through immediate subordination
to capitals by interpersonal relations but through structural subordination to the
reproduction of capitalist society as a whole. While the state is an instance of the
structured society as a whole, the state for Poulantzas has a specifically important
meaning since the state has a 'particular function of constituting the factors of cohesion
between the levels of a social formation' (Poulantzas 1973, p. 44, emphasis in original).
According to Poulantzas, the social function of maintaining social cohesion, which is
3 In the sense that he divides Marx's critique of capitalist society into different spheres of
studies, this understanding is, in fact, exactly the same as Lenin's argument that also
understands Capital as exclusively belonging to economics (Lenin, Three Sources and Three
Component Part of Marxism, 1970c, p. 68).
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necessary for social reproduction, cannot be offered by individual capitals since the
competitive relations between capitalists inherently lack the ability to derive a common
interest through compromise among individual capitals. Then, he claimed that the state,
structurally, should function as an organiser for the integration of the whole society for
the capitalist class-in-general, which is essentially vulnerable to fragmentation and, at
the same time, to the political mobilisation of the working class which threatens the
hegemony of the dominant class. In order to let the different arenas of the reproduction
of capitalist society, especially the state, serve the reproduction of society as a whole, it
is necessary for the state to be autonomous from particular capitals. In this sense, for
Poulantzas, the autonomy of the state is an important premise of the reproduction of
capitalist society.
Poulantzas's argument certainly developed a more systematic theory of the capitalist
state in that he recognised there are more 'systematic' relations between capital and the
state other than 'personal' links between those two sets of individuals, particularly in
reproducing capitalist society as a whole. However, Poulantzas's argument, in deriving
the necessity of the autonomy of the state from the functional necessity of capital-in-
general, appears to rely ultimately on capital's functional needs. Therefore, his
argument is not free from functional economic determinism, although he emphasised
the sphere of politics in reproducing the whole structure of the society and class struggle
in whi 'eh the forms of such political regulation are moulded. Moreover, the problem of
his theory lies deeper. Here, the core problem is that he attempted to explain a general
form of the capitalist state by structurally linking capital and the state without
overcoming the fundamental view of social categories — capital-in-general as a mere set
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of individual capitals and the state as a set of institutions which consists of state
bureaucrats. That is to say, he merely replaced Miliband's inter-personal link between
the state and capital with a structural link between them, without recognising the
bourgeois foundation of Miliband's understanding of capital and the state, by putting
those two different sets of individuals and institutions into the structurally differentiated
arenas of the political and economy. Therefore, just as in Miliband's argument, the
political and economy, although now not inter-personally but structurally related with
each other, appear in his argument as two different arenas in which capital and the state,
merely as two distinctive collective sets of 'individuals' — capitalists and state
bureaucrats — perform their given functions. While 'capital' appears as a set of
individual capitalists who pursue their own individual interests, in spite of the risk of
undermining the reproduction of capitalist society as a whole, the 'state' appears as a set
of individual bureaucrats or set of institutions which pursues a 'common' interest of
collective capitals. Worse still, in theorising the political as a sphere autonomous from
the economic, and therefore making the political into an entity which is independent
from the economic, he in fact strengthened the reified image of the independent social
arena, defining the autonomy of the state as its essential nature. In this sense, he could
not develop his theory of the state more than affirming there are structural, rather than
personal, relations between those arenas of the two sets of individuals and institutions,
capital, and the state. In short, he also could not develop his theory of autonomy into a
critique of autonomy, merely offering complicated interactions between the political
and the economic, without actually answering the question of the way in which the
separation emerged.
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The state as a moment offormal abstraction
In both autonomy-centred and essentialist analyses of the capitalist state, the Marxist
understanding of the state, no matter whether it is the theory of relative autonomy
(recognising the dichotomy as real differentiation between two different social spheres)
or the mere committee of the bourgeoisie (reducing the dichotomy to a mere false
differentiation between two different, but in fact inter-personally related, sets of
individuals), was not able to resolve the question of dichotomy. Neither of them could
overcome the dominant understanding of 'capital' as a mere group of capitalists or
structural set of individual capitals and the state as a set of institutions subordinated to
the interest of capitalists either by interpersonal relations or by structural relations. The
essentialist tradition could not address the specific characteristic of the capitalist state,
through ignoring it, therefore avoiding a proper theoretical analysis of the increasingly
autonomous-looking state. However, this does not justify the theory of state autonomy,
since merely to accept the reified image that the state is separated from economic class
relations, is to give up the critique of the mode of manifestation of capitalist social
relations.
These understandings of the state are firmly based on the substantial shortcoming of
the prevalent understanding of society and its aspects, which was criticised by Marx
himself as formal abstraction, through which concepts and categories of society are
abstracted immediately from 'phenomenal forms' and the appearance of society and
therefore exist in abstraction from the specific social relations that give rise to the very
categories and concepts. In this abstraction, therefore, concepts and categories are
regarded as naturally given entities (Marx 1968, p. 106; Marx 1993, pp. 100-8; also
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Clarke 1991a, pp. 140-1). Once these categories and aspects are regarded as naturally
given entities, then they are treated as if they are independent of and, therefore,
separated from one another, in abstraction from social relations. Once the social aspects
are regarded as naturally independent of one another, without understanding of the
inner-relations between those aspects, the only way to express the mysterious and
complex relations between them is to express the relations as externally mutual relations.
This understanding of the state based on what it appears on the surface of society is
deeply rooted in the Marxist tradition, as Wood succinctly points out:
In one form or another and in varying degrees, Marxists have generally
adopted modes of analysis which, explicitly or implicitly, treat the economic
'base' and the legal, political, and ideological 'superstructure' that 'reflect'
or 'correspond' to it as qualitatively different, more or less enclosed and
'regionally' separated spheres. This is most obviously true of orthodox base-
superstructure theories. It is also true of their variants which speak of
economic, political and ideological 'factors', 'levels' or 'instances', no
matter how insistent they may be about the interaction of factors or
instances, or about the remoteness of the 'last instance' in which the
economic sphere finally determines the rest. If anything, these formulations
merely reinforce the spatial separation of spheres (Wood 1999, p. 21).
To understand the capitalist state without being captured by this 'spatial separation of
spheres' is possible through understanding the formal abstraction neither as it is nor as a
mere fantasy but as a specific mode of manifestation of capitalist social relations,
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through which those relations are fetishised into forms of independent entities,
including the political state. Although it is true, as we saw above, that Marx does have
comments on the state, which might indicate spatial separation of the state from the
economic, it is not the case that Marx argued the capitalist state exists above society,
separated from 'economic' relations or is determined by the 'economy'. Rather, in order
to unveil his critique of the state and overcome the defects of the prevalent expositions,
we will explore above all the abstract nature of capitalist domination on which the very
state theories are based. What will be presented in the following chapter is to understand
Marx's critique of capitalism as a theory of social forms. This includes an
understanding of the areas and categories of social interconnection, including the state,
as forms of the totality, modes of existence of the social relations of capitalist
production, which are not a mere economic relation but social relations of political,
economic and social struggle (Holloway 1995, pp. 164-7).
If we consider social relations as a totality and social categories as fetishised forms
of the totality, Marx's exposition of the relations between the political state and
economic social relations, which is regarded largely as mechanically deterministic or
external, will appear in a very different light. It is possible through closely looking first
at Marx's critique of the labour theory of value as the core of the critique of capitalist
social relations which Marx began to investigate from his early works and finally
succeerded in penetrating into in his Capital. Here, his critique of the labour theory of
value is to be understood not merely as a critique of the shortcomings of the 'embodied'
labour theory of value but as a critique of the naturalistic conceptualisation of the
categories of capitalist society on which bourgeois understanding of social reality and
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social reality itself are built. In order to take advantage of Marx as the theoretical source
of a critique of the state, we now need to take a detour.
2. Marx' s Theory of Value as a Critique of Capitalist Social Relations
Marx's critique of capitalist social relations
Marx's distinction from classical political economy as well as the Hegelian
understanding of society lies in the fact that he understood the ideas, institutions and the
social reality of capitalism not as a result of the natural development of human nature or
an absolute idea, which is believed to impose itself on the whole history of human
society, but as a temporary and socially specific reality that is formed in the
development of specific social relations. In his early works, he embarked on a critique
of capitalist social relations by reconsidering the concept of private property, which was
taken for granted by classical political economy, and by explaining private property in
terms of a specific social form of labour, alienated labour (Clarke 1991a, pp. 66-70; also
Postone 1996, p. 31). For him, different forms of property stem from different social
forms of labour and it is a specific form of social relations that determines the social
form of labour. On the contrary, for Adam Smith, the technical division of labour was
the driving force of the historical development of society and private property as the
most developed form of property developed naturally as a consequence of the historical
development of the technical division of labour. Therefore, Smith did not criticise
private property, drawing on the assumption that private property is the natural form of
property for human beings who have the 'propensity to truck, barter and exchange' in
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nature. Thereby, capitalist social relations of production are naturalised by classical
political economy. As a result, 'political economy operates in permanent contradiction
to its basic premise, private property' (Marx, The Holy Family, 1975b, p. 32).4 On the
contrary, for Marx, the different forms of the division of labour result from different
social forms of labour, which are imposed on working people by particular social
relations of production. Private property as the category of political economy is not
permanent but is socially and temporarily formed through the development of specific
social relations. Private property is one of the ideas and social categories, which are
recognised in a specific way, in conformity with specific social relations, making a
specific image of social reality which consists of those conceptualised and recognised
categories and ideas.
The same men who establish their social relations in conformity with
their material productivity, produce also principles, ideas and categories, in
conformity with their social relations. Thus these ideas, these categories are
as little eternal as the relations they express. They are historical and
transitory products. (Marx, The Poverty of Philosophy, 1976b, pp. 165-6).
4 Therefore, when political economists recognised some superficial phenomena which
expressed the underlying contradiction of capital, at best, 'Adam Smith occasionally
polemieises against the capitalist, Destutt de Tracy against the money-changers, Simone de
Sismondi against the factory system, Ricardo against landed property, and nearly all modem
economists against non-industrial capitalists, among whom property appears as a mere
consumer' (Marx, The Holy Family, 1975b, p. 33). In other words, what political economy
could do was, at best, to deal with the necessary products of capitalist social relations as some
exceptional problems.
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Through his early critique of private property, Marx shows us that the social
categories are not naturally given but determined as a result of specific interconnections
between people. This critique of political economy's understanding of capitalist society,
based on the abstraction and the abstracted categories, now develops further in his
critique of the labour theory of value, primarily that of Ricardo, which could describe
the surface of the exchange relations but could not explain the specific way in which
social labour is organised and exchanged and moreover the way in which the labouring
individuals are organised and connected. For Marx, Ricardo's theory of value relating
the individual's labour immediately, in an a-historical manner, with exchange-value,
without regard to the specific social relations in which the individual's labour becomes
a part of social labour in the form of exchange-value and money, was the culmination of
an uncritical understanding of society by classical political economy. The absence of an
understanding of the value-form as the specific way in which individual labours, as well
as individuals themselves, are connected with one another specifically, i.e., the way
through which labouring individuals and their labour are alienated within commodity
producing society was, for Marx, the origin of the misunderstanding of the whole
capitalist society.
It is one of the chief fallings of classical political economy that it has
never succeeded, by means of its analysis of commodities, and in particular
r
of their value, in discovering the form of value which in fact turns value into
exchange-value. Even its best representatives, Adam Smith and Ricardo,
treat the form of value as something external to the nature of the commodity
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itself. The explanation for this is not simply that their attention is entirely .
absorbed by the analysis of the magnitude of value. It lies deeper. The
value-form of the product of labour is the most abstract, but also the most
universal form of the bourgeois mode of production; by that fact it stamps
the bourgeois mode of production as a particular kind of social production
of a historical and transitory character. If then we make the mistake of
treating it as the external natural form of social production, we necessarily
overlook the specificity of the value-form, and consequently of the
commodity-form together with its further developments, the money-form,
the capital form, etc (Marx, Capital Vol. I, 1990b, p. 174).
For Marx, value is the mode of existence of labour, the human activity in capitalist
social relations and, at the same time, the form in and through which the specific social
relations appear and exist. Marx defines labour in general as 'a condition of human
existence which is independent of all society' (Marx 1990b, p. 133). However, 'what
matters here is only the specific manner in which the social character of labour is
established' (Marx 1971b, p. 32). While the characteristic of human labour as concrete
labour is subordinated to labour as abstract labour, the characteristic of the commodity
as use-value is also subordinated to the characteristic of the commodity as value.
Concrete forms of labour 'can no longer be distinguished, but are all together reduced to
the same kind of labour, human labour in abstract' in the form of value (Marx 1990b, p.
128). Value, therefore, represents the social relations of capitalist production in which
the individual labour, and therefore individuals' social relations, are webbed with each
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other. And the development of the value-form marks the development of capitalist
social relations distinguished from other social systems. This understanding of value,
not as a quantitative amount but as a social organism, already shows up in embryonic
form in his early works.5
In the Comments on James Mill, Marx firstly attempts to understand the value-form
of social relations, defining private property, which was presupposed as the culmination
of the manifestation of human rationality by classical political economy, as a specific
historical being whose 'mode of existence is only a relation to something else' therefore
as value (Marx, Comments on James Mill, 1975a, p. 219). In commodity exchange,
social relations between men developed in such a way that the other exists only as a
means of acquiring the other's private property 'since men engaged in exchange do not
relate to each other as men' (Marx 1975a, p. 213). In the mutual relations of property
owners, connected through commodity exchange, someone else should be meaningless
unless s/he is an owner of a property and people exist not as people themselves but as
property owners. Therefore, 'the mediating process between men engaged in exchange
is not a social or human process, not human relationship; it is the abstract relationship
of private property to private property' (Marx 1975a, pp. 212-3, my emphasis). Private
property now loses its personal character and its mode of existence becomes value,
which is 'the expression of this abstract relationship' between property owners (Marx,
s It appears most apparently in the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844 and
The Comments on James Mill. It developed through all his major works on the critique of
political economy such as Poverty of Philosophy, Wage Labour and Capital and A Contribution
to the Critique of Political Economy, and it was finally completed in his Capital.
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1975a, p. 213). Again, these human relations in the value-form developed into the most
sophisticated form of the relations, the money-form, since money has become the
general equivalent representing the sole existence of property. In and by the money-
form of relations between private properties, the private properties become abstracted
from their specific personal nature and become commodities. As a result of this social
process of commodity exchanges, social relations between men appear as relations
between things, i.e., alienated private properties, i.e., commodities. Existing in the form
of value means that labour as human activity can no longer have meaning unless it
exists as social labour which is able to be expressed by socially necessary labour time
through commodity exchanges.
Although in his early works, the specific social form of labour is criticised in a
humanistic sense, in terms of alienated labour as the estrangement of the very existence
of the human being, Marx's understanding of the social form of labour is later
completed by his critique of the labour theory of value and his theory of commodity
fetishism, the expositions of the mechanism through which the individual's labour gets
abstracted and comes to exist in the form of value and, thereby of money, on the one
hand, and private direct social relations between men come to be 'hidden by a material
veil', on the other, in his Capital and A Contribution to the Critique of Political
Economy (Marx 1971b, p. 34).
Marx's theory of value and the nature of capitalist domination
Marx, in Capital, began his analysis with the two aspects of the commodity, use-
value and exchange-value. However, he discovered that exchange-value, which appears
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as the proportion of exchange between products, is regulated not by either use-value or
exchange-value but by a third, value as the coagulation of human general labour.
Therefore, exchange-value can no longer be the substance of the commodity but is
merely a form of appearance of value, a mode of expression of value, which is
determined by value as the coagulation of human labour within specific social relations
of producers. This value-form is a social mode of the manifestation of value into
exchange-value. The value of a commodity is expressed as exchange-value in the value-
form and a commodity appears as a use-value in the natural form.
Alongside the development of exchange relations, the commodity-form of the
products of labour and the value-form develop. Now the value-form develops as the
general equivalent in the general value-form. All commodities express their values in
the same body of a commodity and then express their value 'in a unified manner' (Marx,
The Value-Form, 1978, p. 146). In other words, they have a general relative value-form.
At the same time, all labours contained in all commodities are equated to one another
without reference to different particular types of labour, even in the natural form of their
equivalent, and therefore, exist as manifestations of human labour in general. The
commodity functioning as equivalent, i.e., in equivalent-form, now is the general social
form in its natural form itself (Marx 1978, p. 147). Through this development of the
value-form into the general value-form, commodities are, 'for the first time, really
brouglit into relation with each other as values, or permitted to appear to each other as
exchange value' (Marx 1990b, p. 158). The general value-form develops into the
money-form when the function of equivalent comes to be attached to a specific
commodity, such as gold and silver. Money is a general equivalent and the social power
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of money arises insofar as it functions as equivalent in a specific social relation of
commodity production. In the money-form as the most developed value-form, the value
of a commodity appears as exchange value expressed in a specific amount of money.
The existence of money presupposes this specific social relation, on the one hand, and
guarantees and, therefore, 'represents a social relation of production' on the other (Marx
1971b, p. 35). The social relation which money expresses is the social relation between
the labour of a commodity and the labour of all other commodities, i.e., labour of a
producer and labour of all other producers, and, therefore, the labour of society as a
whole.
What Marx shows us in this analysis of the value-form is that the development of
the value-form is the social process through which human private labour is deprived of
its specific private character and becomes abstract labour, i.e., is the formation of a
specific social form of labour, in fact the homogenisation of human labour, which
develops in the development of the value relation between people (in the value-form,
value-relations between commodities arise from the value-relation between people). 'It
is a definite social relation of the producers in which they equate their different types of
labour as human labour' (Marx 1978, p. 142). The different types of labour can only be
equated insofar as the products are produced in a definite social relation and both
producers are in the social relation. However, what is specific in capitalist social
relatioris is that the specific social characteristic of the private labour appears only in the
relation of exchange between commodities, since the producers come to be connected
with each other only through exchange. In other words, 'the labour of the private
individual manifests itself as an element of the total labour of society only through the
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relations which the act of exchange establishes between the products, and through their
mediation, between the producers' (Marx 1990b, p. 165). Through the relation between
things, the private labour of different individuals faces the equalisation of private labour
as human labour, as value-producing labour. This is the 'peculiar social character of the
labour producing commodities' which raises 'this fetishism of the world of
commodities' (Marx, 1990b, p. 165). Within this specific mutual relation between
producers, in which producers do not mediate the relation between products but
products mediate the relation between producers, the commodities' property of being
exchangeable, without regard to the natural form of the products, appears to pertain to
them by nature, not by the producer within specific social relations. This is commodity
fetishism.
Commodity fetishism, which appears especially strikingly in the equivalent form,
now causes the fetishisation of social relations, which is another essence of the
specificity of capitalist social relations. In other words, the social relations between
producers now appear as social relations between things (Rubin 1990). The value
relations between producers formed by a producer's relating himself to another are now
reversed into the value relations between products. Now commodity fetishism - the
phenomenon in which the immediate exchangeability of a commodity assumed by its
being produced by the producers in the specific social relations becomes the products'
own Property and therefore the specific character of the products as commodities
appears to be determined not by the producers but by the products themselves - reverses
the relations between the producers and products. In other words, although 'it is nothing
but the definite social relation between men themselves which assumes here, for them,
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the fantastic form of a relation between things', the social relations between producers
disappear behind and are veiled by the social relations between things and do not appear
immediately (Marx 1990b, p. 165).
It is a definite social relation of the producers in which they equate
(gleichsetzen) their different type of labour as human labour. It is not less a
definite social relation of producers, in which they measure the magnitude
of their labours by the duration of expenditure of human labour-power. But
within our practical interrelations these social characters of their own
labours appear to them as social properties pertaining to them by nature, as
objective determinations (gegensteindliche Bestimmungen) of the products
of labour themselves, the equality of human labour as value-property of the
products of labour, the measure of the labour by the socially necessary
labour-time as the magnitude of value of the products of labour, and finally
the social relations of the producers through their labours appear as a value-
relation or social relation of these things, the products of labour (Marx, 1978,
p. 142).
Furthermore, as a general equivalent, money's property of exchangeability appears to
arise from its own character, 'as it were naturally evolved', by nature rather than from
the relations between commodities, in which all other commodities, within a specific
social relation between producers, must express their value in money in order to be
exchanged with one another (Marx 1971b, p. 48). This fetishism of money arises in the
same manner as fetishism of the general equivalent, but more strikingly due to the
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developed immediate exchangeability of money. The social relation between producers,
which was reversed into the social relation between things by commodity fetishism
resulting from the specific social character of labour producing commodities, is now
fetishised into this form of universal equivalent, which appears to pertain to itself the
property of mediating the relation between commodities as a result of its own nature,
since the social relation between other commodities and money is again reversed due to
the fetishism of money. Now the social relation between producers which makes
possible the emergence of money appears in the money-form as social relations between
things. In other words, 1) the social relation between men appears as a social relation
between things since the social characteristic of the relation between men counts as that
of commodities themselves, 2) now social relations between things appear in money
mediating the relation between things, and thereby mediating the relation between
producers since the characteristic of money resulting from the exchange relation
between commodities counts as the property of money itself. It is in this sense that
money is not a mere thing but 'a social relation of production' and a mode of existence
of the specific social relation between producers, which represents the specific value-
relation that producers enter into, in the most developed value-form expressing the
social relation of producers within which a specific social form of labour as abstract
human labour lies (Marx 1990b, p. 176). Therefore, in the money-form as the most
developed value-form that represents the social relation of producers, money is not a
mere form of social relations but a `fetishised' form of social relations between people,
in that what is reflected in money is the social relation of people, which is reversed into
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a social relation of things through commodity fetishism so that characteristic of the
social relation between producers counts as a property of a thing, money.
However, it is not Marx's aim to indicate the real relations between human beings
behind the unreal relations between things. What appears as a result of all these
materialistic investigations is what, in reality, we face, that social relations between
people appear and really exist in the form of social relations between things. Those
illusory-but-real social forms, as Rubin puts it, consist of reality in which we live, the
reified reality of social categories.
Marx did not only show that human relations were veiled by relations
between things, but rather that, in the commodity economy, social
production relations inevitably took the form of things and could not be
expressed except through things. The structure of the commodity economy
causes things to play a particular and highly important social role and thus
to acquire particular social properties. Marx discovered the objective
economic bases which govern commodity fetishism. Illusion and error in
men's minds transforms reified economic categories into "objective forms"
(of thought) of production relations of a given historically determined mode
of production - commodity production (Rubin 1990, p. 6).
Thi; reading of Marx clearly suggests that Marx's theory of value did not aim merely
at completing that of Ricardo and of classical political economy, which 'has indeed
analysed value and its magnitude, however, incompletely, and has uncovered the
content concealed within these forms', by explaining the way in which a certain amount
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of individual labour is transformed into price in money (Marx 1990b, pp. 173-4; see
also Elson 1979, p. 123). 6 What Marx did in developing his critique of the value-form
was to show the material nature of 'a social formation in which the process of
production has mastery over man, instead of the opposite', of the social process that
appears 'to the political economists' bourgeois consciousness to be as much a self-
evident and nature-imposed necessity as productive labour itself (Marx 1990b, p. 175).
The analysis of the value-form firstly reveals that what appears as exchange-value is, in
fact, the expression of a specific social form of labour, i.e., value, and it also reveals that
the manifestation of human labour into exchange-value is only possible through the
specific development of the value-form, which distinguishes capitalist social relations of
production from all other relations. The conclusion of Marx's analysis of the value-form
shows that the social relation conditioning the specific social form of labour does not
appear immediately in a concrete form of domination but as an 'abstract social
domination' through the fetishised social forms, in a mysterious reality (See Postone
1996, pp. 31, 125). Through this critique of the labour theory of value and commodity
6 Rather, for Marx, the question of value-form is about 'why this content has assumed that
particular form, that is to say, why labour is expressed in value, and why the measurement of
labour by its duration is expressed in the magnitude of the value of the product' (Marx, Capital
Vol. I, 1990b, p. 174). Indeed, the analysis of the value-form does not merely show us the
process of manifestation of value as exchange-value. For Marx, the manifestation of human
labour into exchange-value is by no means a natural fact. It is only possible through a specific
social form of labour performed within a specific social relation that homogenises human labour
into abstract social labour then into socially valid labour through the value-form.
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fetishism, the nature of the naturalness of the bourgeois conceptualisation of society and
the specific reproduction of social relations was unveiled.
Concluding Remark
The traditional Marxist theories of the state appear to be trapped in what Marx
criticised as the most intrinsic shortcoming of classical political economy. Neither the
essentialist theory, in which the specific capitalist separation between the political and
economy is merely ignored, nor the autonomy-based structuralist explanation, in which
the state appears to exist in separation from capitalist social relations by understanding
the autonomy of the state as a essential nature of the state, seem to succeed in capturing
the nature of the capitalist state in relation to the abstract nature of capitalist society.
The starting point of a critique of the capitalist state is to see the capitalist state, not as a
given entity acquiring its characteristic by nature, but as a mysterious social form which
appears to exist in abstraction from capitalist social relations, as a moment of the
abstract social domination of capital. In order to understand the mode of existence of the
state, which appears as an independent entity in abstraction from capitalist social
relations in the traditional understanding of the state, we explored the abstract nature of
capitalist social relations, which is explained by Marx in his critique of the labour
theory of value and commodity fetishism. According to our reading of Marx, the law of
r
value is a law of the subordination of human labour to the value-form and therefore a
law of transformation of all individuals' labour into homogeneous value-producing
labour. Hence, it is also the law that underlies the appropriation and accumulation of
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alienated labour as private property. In the development of the value-form into the
money form, the law of value is a law of the reproduction of the social relations of
alienated labour between people into a form of relations between things. As we will see
in the next chapter, this is the law governing the reproduction of capitalist society,
abstracting the relations of class domination through the continual inversion of social
relations between people into the form of material relations between things. Marx, in his
critique of the labour theory of value and fetishism, offers a theory that enables us to
penetrate into the fetishistically naturalised abstract domination in capitalist society
through criticising capitalist social categories and forms. In short, what Marx did was to
explain the nature of the abstract domination of capitalist society by showing the
movement of the inversion of social relations. The superficial forms of abstract
domination establish the reality on which classical political economy and liberal social
theories are based. In the following chapter, we will attempt to grasp the implication of
the law of value exposed by Marx for the critique of the capitalist state. In doing so, we
will attempt to understand the mode of existence of the capitalist state in relation to the
nature of the reproduction of capitalist domination, which is based not merely on
coercion but on abstract coerciveness which distinguishes capitalist class domination
from other forms of class domination.
78
Chapter 4: The Reproduction of Capital Relations, the
State and Class Struggle
Introduction
In the previous chapter, we initiated an attempt to recapture Marx's exposition of the
capitalist state by tracing his critique of capitalist social relations. Marx's critique of the
labour theory of value and commodity fetishism offered us a basis for a critique of the
capitalist state by explaining the social organism governing the reproduction of
capitalist social relations. According to our reading of Marx, the law of value is the
most abstract law governing the reproduction of social relations in commodity-
producing society on the basis of the movement of the inversion of social relations
between people into material relations between things. The social reality of commodity-
producing society is built on those social forms, through which the social relations
between labouring individuals appear and exist. A serious attempt to relate the
particular form of the capitalist state in the context of Marx's critique of the abstract
nature of the reproduction of relations of commodity production has been made by the
'German derivation debate'. In this chapter, we will critically engage with the debate in
an attempt to develop an understanding of the contradictory form of the capitalist state
as a particular moment of the reproduction of the capital relations, the formation of
which is rooted in class struggle as a concrete manifestation of the general law
governing the inversion of social relations within capitalist social relations as fully
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developed relations of commodity production. By doing so, we will define the relation
between the state and capital as complementary-but-differentiated forms of totality of
capital relations. This will lead us to reject the developmental state theory based on a
statist understanding of capitalist society as a relevant basis of a critique of the Korean
state.
I. Fetishism, Social Forms and Derivation of the State
Defining capitalist domination as fetishised abstract domination was a starting point
of state derivation theory, which relies on the method of 'form analysis' deriving the
nature of fetishistic social forms from social relations as a totality. 7 This is to understand
the state-form, in which political relations appear as independent of the economic, in the
7 Blanke, iiirgens and Kastendiek describe form analysis:
The materialist method consists then of examining the forms in which the
particular relations between men are expressed and: 1. resolving them into
their fixed character, a character alienated from man, apparently materially
conditioned and a-historical, and then presenting them as having become
historical, grown out of and reproduced by human activity, i.e., as socially
and historically determined forms; 2. uncovering the inner connections, thus
theoretically reconstructing the entire historical-social formation. Here the
point of reference must always be the present conditions in which the forms
r have reached their furthest point of historical development. The aim of the
analysis is not, however, to realise in retrospect the 'course of history' but to
present the forms in the context in which they stand 'logically', that is, in
which they reproduced themselves under the conditions of a particular
historically concrete form of society (Blanke, Jfirgens and Kastendiek 1978,
pp. 118-9).
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way in which Marx understands money as a fetishistic form through which social
relations appear and exist. The state is now understood as a fetish as if it inherently has
an independent political authority, as Muller and Neustiss put it:
Readers of Capital can easily understand this development of the state as
a 'particular entity alongside and outside civil society' by recalling the
dialectical development of the value-form, and then money-form, from the
contradiction between value and use-value contained in the commodity.
Embodied in the dual character of the products of labour as a commodity,
this contradiction can only become apparent if it is expressed by a particular
commodity, the money-commodity. The value-form of the commodity,
which cannot be expressed in its own use-value-form, becomes expressed
by the use-value-form of a particular commodity which thus becomes
money. Money now appears as an independent thing, and the socio-historic
character of value becomes attached to it, either as a natural characteristic of
it, or by virtue of a supposed common agreement between people. The same
'fetishism' can be seen in the form of the state. According to the bourgeois
conception, either the state has always existed since man is 'by nature a
creature of the state', or else the state is indispensable for social (i.e.,
bourgeois) life, or again it was established consciously by social contract.
The fact that it is the particularisation of a specific mode of production
(capitalism) is turned on its head. This reification and autonomisation of the
state is a necessary illusion resulting from the bourgeois mode of production
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just as much as are the forms of money, capital, wage-labour, profit, factors
of production or revenues. These illusions are forced upon the agents of
production by the particular mechanism of this form of production, and it is
these which really determine their activity (Mailer and Neusass 1979, p. 36,
my emphasis)
So as to understand the mode of existence of the capitalist state without being caught
by the illusory appearance of the state, it is necessary to reconsider the way in which the
state became an independent political entity, i.e., the development of the way in which
the social relations of production appear in the particularised form of the political state.
For Mailer and Neusiiss, who began the German debate, the revisionist theories of the
state had epitomised the lack of understanding of the independent social institutions and
arena as distinctive moments of the movement of capital relations by merely accepting
the social entities as they are. For them the distinctive neutral-autonomous appearance
of the state comes not from its independence from the capital relation but from a
particular necessity based on a specific character of the very capita refaiim as the
relation of surplus value exploitation. The dual aspects of surplus value production as a
labour process (expenditure of useful-labour) and surplus value production process
(exploitation process based on abstract labour, value-producing labour) is the origin of
the capitalist state-form which appears independent of capital.
On this Marx says that the 'concentration of bourgeois society in the form
of the state' means that we must treat 'existing society... as the basis of the
existing state'. That is to say that the bourgeois state is the product of a
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society of developed commodity production (i.e., a capitalist society) and of
the contradictions which arise from this form of production. Hence it is an
institution moulded by these contradictions... So long as the purpose of
labour is the production of use-values, the subsistence of social individuals,
there is no need for a particular regulatory and coercive organisation which
seeks to prevent individuals and society from destroying themselves through
an excess of work. Only with capitalist commodity production is this
connection broken and the problem of the self-destruction of society created
(Muller and Neustiss 1979, pp. 33-8).
Despite the fact that the production process aims to valorise capital through the
exploitation of surplus value, the process continually needs to reproduce the source of
surplus value, labour power, in the labour process. However, as far as exploitation is the
supreme aim of production, individual capitals tend to destroy the very basis of surplus
value production in favour of capital valorisation. As we see in Marx's analysis of
factory legislation in Capital, this self-destructive nature inherent in the valorisation
process must be regulated by something outside of the valorisation process itself.
Therefore, 'the specific legal and organisational forms of the capitalist production
process are nothing but the necessary expression of the two-fold character of the
production process under capitalism as both a process of labour and capital realisation'
r
(Mailer and Neustiss 1975, p. 25). The state as an expression of the two-fold character
of surplus value production is an essential presupposition for the continual reproduction
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of the very process of valorisation. Indeed, the state-form external to the immediate
valorisation process is also necessary for its regulatory roles.
The concentration of bourgeois society in the form of the state, i.e., its
incorporation in an institution that appears as external to society and seems
to float above it, is necessary because it is only in this form that the
existence of capitalist society can be assured (Milner and Neusiiss 1975, p.
77).
Because of the fact that the state had been established as an external force, the fact
that the state comes actually from the specific characteristic of the capitalist relation of
production has now disappeared from our sight. Just as money becomes the bearer of
value by itself, the state appears, once established as an external regulator, as an
independent political entity, which has its political authority inherent in it, without
indicating its nature in relation to the two-fold character of capitalist production. Milner
and Neusiiss's contribution is to attempt to understand the capitalist state by applying
Marx's understanding of social institutions as fetishised social forms to the state
analysis seriously for the first time. To see the capitalist state, which appears external to
and independent of capital relations, as a fetishised expression of the very capital
relation and thereby to see the relations between the state and economy not in terms of
the relations between 'capital' and the state as two different sets of individuals but in
terms of the relation between the state and capital relations, i.e., between social form
and totality makes it possible to overcome the shortcoming of understanding the state as
a mere committee of the bourgeoisie as well as of the revisionist theory of the state. In
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so doing, this understanding seems to offer us an explanation of the dual nature of state
intervention which apparently has superficial-but-necessary neutrality, on the one hand,
and yet is strictly limited within the reproduction of capitalist social relations, on the
other.
However, their exposition seems neither to develop the method of form-analysis
fully nor to understand the abstract nature of the reproduction of capitalist social
relations. They attempt to derive the externality of the state from the necessity imposed
by the essential complementary functions resulting from the limits of the self-
reproduction of the capital relation. The limits of the self-reproduction are, however,
explained not in terms of development of class struggle but in terms of the self-
destruction of capital. The working class in this exposition is described as being
subordinated to capital as much as individual capitals want. In this regard, they have no
explanation of the essential relations between class struggle and the state in deriving the
state-form. Furthermore, the matter is not simply that they derive the form of the state
from the essential functions of the state but that they explain the state in the
reproduction process of the capital relation as a whole without integrating the state into
the inversion of social relations into the social form of the relations of things, a moment
into which state formation must be placed. In other words, they seem to succeed in
applying the principle of form analysis to an established state thereby understanding the
established state as fetish, but without fully integrating the formation of the state-form
into the formation of the abstract manifestation of the social relations of capitalist
production through the fetishisation of social relations. Therefore, Marx's understanding
of the reproduction of social relations, which developed in his critique of the labour
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theory of value in Capital, through the inversion of social relations is not yet fully
introduced into the analysis of the state. A more serious attempt to integrate the
formation of the state-form into the abstract nature of the process of reproduction can be
found in Blanke, Jilrgens and Kastendiek's arguments.
In order to derive the particular state from capitalist social relations, Blanke, Jiirgens
and Kastendiek concentrate on simple commodity circulation which is 'the most general
surface of this mode and is the most general form of the relation between the people
socialised in this mode' (Blanke et al. 1978, p. 120). For them, then, the nature of the
relations of simple commodity circulation, which is believed to necessitate 'extra-
economic coercive force' for the reproduction of those relations, should be investigated
(Blake et al. 1978, p. 121). Basically the relations of commodity circulation are based
on 'the movement of value' 'as a type of societisation free from personal, physical
force' (Blanke et al. 1978, p. 122). This is a purely material aspect of the value-relations,
the development of which brought about the `depoliticisation of the economy'.
However,
The material nexus of the movement of value is... a social relation
amongst human beings. It is a feature of the capitalist mode of production
that this relation assumes two different, opposing forms: as a relation
between things and a relation between people... the value relation as a
r
relationship of commodities (things) to each other exists independently of
the will of the producing and 'communicating' beings. Value is the reified
form of the sociality of their labour; in it the worker exists as nothing more
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than the 'result', than an abstract quantity of reified labour. On the other
hand, the realisation of value, i.e., the actual act of exchange, presupposes a
conscious act of will in the commodity owner. Commodities cannot go to
market by themselves, as Marx puts it; the act of exchange presupposes
acting people and constitutes a relationship between acting people, albeit
only as agents of circulation. Corresponding to the structure of exchange as
the comparative commensuration of unequal products of labour (use value)
according to an abstract measure (a quantity of gold representing labour
time), the exchange parties relate to each other as different beings with
different needs — all of which necessitates the formation on this plane of
action of an abstract point of reference making this commensuration
possible (Blanke et al. 1978, pp. 122-3, my emphasis).
Therefore, the two aspects of capitalist social domination, i.e., the political and
economic, both of which appear fetishistically independent of each other, are here
explained as resulting from the two different but coexisting aspects of the relations of
commodity circulation. Since the relations of commodity circulation are not only
material relations between commodities but also relations of human subjects who
actually perform the exchange, there should be 'an adequate form on the "subjective
side", ra form which makes possible the association of private property owners as
subjects, and without their being forced to an exceptional solution of conflicts through a
crisis of their relations' (Blanke et al. 1978, p. 121). The material side of the relations of
commodity circulation can be reproduced smoothly only with mutually coercive
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relations guaranteed by a third party outside of the immediate relations of exchange. In
this sense, 'the implementation of the law of value constitutes the implementation of the
rule of law' (Blanke et al. 1978, p. 123). The separation of the two dimensions of
domination is inherent in the relations of commodity circulation. In short, they derive
the legal relations as the basis of state formation from the relations of exchange which
involve subjective actions by the subjects of exchange which must be regulated by the
rule of law for the reproduction of the material relations. The state is a reified form of
mutual coercion in which the formal equality among the subjects of exchange is
guaranteed.
Blanke, Jiirgens and Kastendiek are right in arguing that the reproduction of the
relations of commodity circulation is based on the movement of value, abstract force
rather than physical force, on the one hand, and nonetheless, in practice, might need to
be guaranteed by extra-economic force. They rightly point out, therefore, the fact that
social relations of commodity production already involve coercive and unequal
elements in them. However, it is problematic to derive a basis of state formation from
the coercive subjective aspect of the relations of commodity circulation in contrast with
the abstract material aspect of the relations of commodity circulation since what
characterises capitalist social relations is not the fact that one aspect of the relations is
coercive and the other opposing is abstract, but the continual movement of inversion
between those two aspects, i.e., the fact that the inherently coercive relations appear
continually in the form of a material-abstract form of relations. Those two aspects of the
relations, coerciveness of class domination and abstractness of capitalist domination,
cannot be either logically or historically divided but exist only together in the movement
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of the inversion, i.e., in the fetishisation process. In this regards, Blanke, Jiirgens and
Kastendiek do not seem to understand the nature of the social relations of value-
producing labour in terms of this movement. The coercive nature of the relations does
not come merely from one aspect of the relations, i.e., subjective aspects, but from the
movement of inversion of the subjective coercive relations into abstract material
relations. What happens in this capitalist social relation is that the social relations
acquire coercive reproductive power in a fantastically naturalised form. This neutral
nature of the reproduction of the relations is established only through the continual
integration of the subjective relations into abstract-material relations and manifestation
of the subjective coercive nature in the form of neutral material forms. Therefore,
understanding a relation between things and a relation between people as mere opposing
forms is a misreading of Capital.
2. Logic of Abstract Domination in 'Capital'
The 'human relations', which condition the realisation of value, are expressed in the
form of social relations between things — that is, the value-form, the development of
which accompanies the fetishisation of social relations into a form of relations between
things. Hence, human relations do not necessarily logically appear in the form of legal
relations. The sociality of individual labour (based on the commensurability of
independent labour) as an intrinsic presupposition of the realisation of commodity
circulation is established not by extra-economic force but by money. In Capital, money
appears 'as the means of regulation of the reproduction of the social relations of
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commodity production' (Clarke 1984, p. 32) and there is no implication that the role of
money as social regulator needs to be complemented by extra-economic force based on
the legal relations between subjects of exchange. The relations of commodity
circulation, according to Capital, can be logically guaranteed by this homogenisation of
individual labours through the mediation of money. And the reproduction of the relation
is guaranteed by the movement of the inversion of the social relations. This self-
reproductive movement represented by two different natures, i.e., the abstract coercion
and coercive abstraction, in unity in continual movement is an essential nature of
capitalist abstract-coercive domination. The coercive force does not find a place outside
of the value relations but it is in there, i.e., in the movement from the coercive nature to
the abstract form through value-forms. This is the nature of the reproduction of value-
relations which Marx attempts to explain in his Capital. Therefore,
It is possible to analyse the process of capitalist reproduction through the
production, appropriation, and circulation of commodities in abstraction
from the state, as Marx does in Capital. The state is not a hidden
presupposition of Capital, it is a concept that has to be developed on the
basis of the analysis already offered in Capital (Clarke 1991c, p. 189, my
emphasis).
Although value is a form in which the social relations of commodity production
appear fantastically, it does not mean that the inversion of the (coercive-human) social
relations between people into the forms of (abstract-material) relations between things is
a naturally given one. The value-relation (ultimately in the money-form) between things
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is a social form into which people, in order to make their labour socially valid, must be
integrated continually and into which the social relations between people must be
inverted continually. What Marx shows us in Capital is the development of the social
form of value through which this inversion continually (but supposedly smoothly) takes
place and in which the coerciveness of this inversion as well as of the social relations
between people do not appear transparently because the coercive relations appear, as a
result of the inversion based on commodity and money fetishism, as naturalised
relations of material things, i.e., in the form of abstract domination. In short, as a result
of the inversion, the coercive nature of the inversion as well as of the social relation is
transformed into a natural phenomenon.
It seems right to say that the 'form' of a particularly 'capitalist' state, the form as a
moment of the inversion of the social relations, can be logically derived from
commodity production since this form of social relations certainly includes the basic
form of capitalist domination and reproduction, the movement of inversion of which the
state is a complementary moment. However, deriving the necessity of a certain state-
form from the process of the abstraction of coercive forces from the (immediate) social
relations of production, this argument eventually identifies the state with a bearer of the
coercive nature of the capitalist social relations and the immediate production relation
with an area of abstract domination, without understanding the nature of capitalist
domination based on the continual movement of inversion between coercion and
abstraction. As a result, the fact that the state appears to exist independently from the
social relations of production, although it develops within the social relations, is
simplified as the independence of coerciveness in the form of the state. This dichotomy,
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although argued as dialectical, between the coercive nature of the social relations and
the abstract nature of the relations has repeatedly appeared in many arguments.8
In order to properly develop a critique of the state-form on the basis of Marx's
understanding of the abstract domination of capitalist social relations, we have to see
the more concrete forms of the inversion of the social relations emerging from the
transformation of money into capital and the social organisation of commodified labour
under the command of the capitalist. With the emergence of the social domination of
capital, value no longer expresses the simple relations between individual producers but
expresses the capacity of capitalists to impose abstract labour in the form of surplus
value on commodified labour. In these fully developed social relations of commodity
production, the fetishisation of social relations now appears in more mysterious forms in
a complicated manner. At the same time, the immanent limits of the movement of
inversion of the social relations finally appear in 'class struggles' between wage
labourer and capitalist, which are extensively dealt with in the chapter on factory
legislation in Marx's Capital.9 The self-reproductive mechanism, i.e., the inversion of
8 We can find this dichotomy in Hirsch (1978). Even Holloway and Picciotto (1978, 1991),
who vehemently criticise the dichotomy at the beginning of the argument, often fall back into
the dichotomy without fully grasping the double nature of capitalist social relations, as a
movement in unity.
9 It is to be noticed that Marx did not deal, even implicitly, with class struggle before the full
development of the capital/labour relation. The chapter on working days shows the important
moment of the development of class struggle under the full development of capitalist social
relations of production. It is important here to understand exactly the theoretical implication of
the concept of class struggle in Marx because the class struggle is the key to connecting `the
abstract analysis of capitalist reproduction' with 'the concept of the state' (Clarke 1991, p. 190).
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the coercive nature of social relations to mutual contractual equal relations, now
develops a counter-movement, with the emergence of the struggle between capitalist
and the working class, as the inversion does not resolve the coerciveness of social
,
relations but draws on that coerciveness. The historical development of class struggle
expresses the movement of the inversion of the social relations (including fetishisation
and defetishisation), inherently incarnated in the development of the value-form of
social relations.
The state should be derived, therefore, not from the separation of the coercive nature
of the subjective aspect of commodity relations from the abstract aspect of objective
material relations as Blanke, Jiirgens and Kastendiek do, but from the class struggle that
is born in the full development of this inversion of social relations, in which the
subjective coercive relations are continually transformed into abstract material relations,
in capitalist relations of exploitation. Class struggle between wage labourer and
capitalists now express the immanent limits of the very inversion. In this sense, the
necessity of the state cannot logically be given to the state but is what has been acquired
in and through the development of class struggle. The emergence of capital conditions
and historically necessitates the actual development of the form of the state and its
separation from civil society, which can merely be 'supposed' as a moment of the
This is to connect the concept of class struggle as 'the determining principle of reality' with the
reproduction of the reality that appears in Capital as self-reproductive in the development of the
value-form (Marx, MEW, you, p. 51, quoted in Milner and Neusiiss 1975, P. 15). By doing so,
we can make it possible to conceptualise 'political power in the form of state' as an 'expression
of this contradiction of struggle' (Marx, MEW, Vol. 1, p. 51, quoted in Mailer and Neusiiss
1975, p. 15).
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inversion in the analysis of simple commodity circulation, in the development of class
struggle between collective labour and capita1.1°
3. The State Form and the Dual Nature of the Domination of Capital
The movement of the inversion of social relations as the basis of the abstract-
coercive nature of capitalist domination is already established in the general relations of
simple commodity production. Money appears and acquires the status of a fetish in
which the social relations of people appear and exist. As commodity-producing social
relations develops further, 'the dynamic of the society of petty commodity producers
gives way to the dynamic of a capitalist society within which money functions not only
as a means of exchange, but also as capital, serving as the means of expression and
means of regulation of quite different social relations' (Clarke 1984, p. 33, my
emphasis). However, the concentrated sum of value in the money-form or in the form of
the means of production is not capital by itself. In order to become capital, the sum of
money or means of production must be in a specific social relation in which the means
of production is monopolised by some specific individuals and social labour is
organised as a commodity under the command of the specific individuals. In short, a
sum of money and means of production becomes capital only within specific social
Hi This does not mean that the industrial struggle between collective labour and capitals is the
only form of class struggle in developed capital relations. Class struggle can dominantly appear
within industrial relations. However, it has recently become clearer that it also appears to
confront general and abstract forms of capitalist domination directly. See Neary and Dinerstein
(eds.) 2002.
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relations, i.e., capital relations between capitalists and the wage-workers. Therefore,
'the analysis of money in the society of petty commodity producers cannot simply be
transferred to the capitalist society, for exchange now has a quite different social
significance in expressing quite different social relations' (Clarke 1984, p. 34). That is
to say:
With the emergence of a new type of production relation — namely a
capitalistic relation which connects a commodity owner (a capitalist) with a
commodity owner (a worker), and which is established through the transfer
of money — the money acquires a new social function or form: it becomes
"capital" (Rubin 1990, p. 33).
However, although the social relations of production appear now in significantly
different (and concrete) forms, the abstract nature of the reproduction of social relations
in simple commodity production, which was based on the money-form, is preserved,
and the movement of inversion based on the social power of money is also preserved in
capital relations, since the general value relations between individuals are still the most
abstract dominant organism of the reproduction of this society. The movement of
inversion of social relations that was mediated by money appears now also in the form
of the inversion that the social relations of surplus value exploitation, i.e., capital
relations, continually appear in the form of technical relations between 'capital' and
'wage labour'. Particularly as the money takes the form of variable capital which
'directly connects the capitalist with workers' (Rubin 1990, p. 33), the relation between
capitalist and workers appears in the form of an exchange relation between two different
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commodities, a sum of money commodity and sum of labour power commodity. I I
While the exchange relation between workers as owners of labour power commodity
and capitalists as owners of money commodity is merely formally equal, i.e., 'what
,
really takes place is this — the capitalist again and again appropriates, without equivalent,
a portion of the previously materialised labour of others and exchanges it for the greater
quantity of living labour' (Marx, Capital Vol.1, 1990b, p. 547, quoted in Hirsch 1978),
the relations repeatedly, without indicating the exploitation of 'labour' by the capitalist
in the labour process, appear in the form of technical relations between two different
commodities. In other words, the unequivocal relations between capitalist and labourer,
i.e., capital relations, appear only in the form of relations between commodities, the
money commodity of the capitalist and the commodity 'labour power' of the labourer in
the wage-relation. Therefore, the relations of exploitation are fetishised into the
mysterious wage-form, through which the value of labour power appears as the
equivalent of the value that labour has produced in the labour process. This is a critical
moment of the inversion of capital relations. Through the repetitions of this inversion,
the capital relation between workers and capitalists appears finally in the form of a
relation between capital 'as' an economic category meaning (an owner of) a sum of
means of production as a source of revenue and labour 'as' a category showing (an
In the sociological version, they appear to be sets of social actors, who own the different
sources of revenue. These are what 'capital' and 'labour' mean in most sociological scholarly
literature on the theory of the state. As far as concerns Marx's argument, those arguments based
on the fetishised conceptualisation of the social categories also reflect the formal abstraction. In
the studies of industrial relations, they appear again to be relations between 'owners' of the two
sorts of commodities, employer and employee.
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owner of) a sum of labour power commodity as another source of revenue, reproducing
the illusion of a 'technically' just social reality without indicating the fact that capital is
'a social relation' through which a specifically capitalist exploitation occurs (Marx,
Wage Labour and Capital, 1977, p. 212). 12 As capital as a social relation of exploitation
between the working class and capitalist class continually appears to be a thing, the
capital relations that it represents are continually inverted into a material relation, which
is, however, not unreal but the only expression of the real organism of capitalist social
reproduction. The fantastic (but real) reality of capitalist domination appears now
completed with the social domination of capital in which the exploited and exploiting
are mediated and expressed merely as different sources of revenues and through
exchange of them, as Rubin puts it:
In capitalist society, as we have seen, such permanent, direct relations
between determined persons who are owners of different factors of
production, do not exist. The capitalist, wage-labourer as well as the
landowner, are commodity owners who are formally independent from each
other. Direct production relations among them have yet to be established,
and then in a form which is usual for commodity owners, namely in the
form of purchase and sale (Rubin 1990, p. 18).
12 This is exactly the way in which capital and labour are dealt with in the theories of the
developmental state. We will return to this issue in chapter 5.
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Therefore, the general form of the inversion (abstractisation) of the social relations
between commodity owners, as developed in the last section, does not disappear but
appears in a more concrete form in the inversion of the capitalist relation between wage-
,
labourer and capitalist. The abstract nature of the reproduction of the social relations of
commodity production still dominates the reproduction of the production relations
between wage-labourer and capitalists, however, in a significantly different mode of
manifestation. It is in this mode of manifestation of the social relations that the
capitalist state is fully established as a particular moment of the movement of the
inversion of the social relations, a moment of the fetishisation of the social relations.
Hirsch, recognising the fact that the reproduction of the social domination of
capitalist production is based not on direct force but on abstract rule, drawing on the
inversion of the social relations under the law of value, argues however that the state is
to be derived only from the fully generalised and developed form of commodity
production, the condition of which is 'the establishment of capitalist relations of
production (primitive accumulation, free wage labour)' therefore from the antagonistic
relations between labour and capital around surplus-value exploitation (Hirsch 1978, p.
59). In tracing the particularisation of the state as both logical and historical
consequence of the full development of generalised commodity production in capitalist
relations, he argues that the reproduction of capitalist relations of production is based
not on the use of direct force in the production process but on the 'blind operation of the
rule of value' in capitalist relations on the basis of the necessary semblance of the
exchange of equivalents (Hirsch 1978, p. 60). This blind operation of the law of value,
however, presupposes the separation of the means of production from the direct
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producers (primitive accumulation), on the one hand, and the existence of free wage
labourers, on the other. Here, the separation of direct force from the production relations
appears as one of the primary prerequisites for the establishment of capitalist relations,
the reproduction of which is based on the law of value, and as origin of the emergence
of the state as incarnation of coercive force, but in separation from the production
relations.
Because the process of the social reproduction and the appropriation of
the surplus products by the ruling class is mediated through the unimpeded
circulation of commodities based on the principle of equal exchange and
through the free disposal by the wage labourer of his own labour power and
by the capitalist of the surplus value which he has appropriated and
accumulated, the abolition of all barriers which stand in the way (i.e., of the
direct relations of force between the owners of the means of production and
of private relations of dependence and restraints ('feudalism') in the sphere
of commodity circulation) is an essential element in the establishment of the
capitalist form of society. The manner in which the social bond is
established, in which social labour is distributed and the surplus product
appropriated necessarily requires that the direct producers be deprived of
control over the physical means of force and that the latter be localised in a
social instance raised above the economic reproduction process: the creation
of formal bourgeois freedom and equality and the establishment of a state
monopoly of force (Hirsch 1978, p. 61, my emphasis).
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In this regard, for Hirsch, the apparent feature of the capitalist mode of production is
that the exercise of direct and physical force should be institutionalised in separation
from individual capitalists and must take the form of a public authority separated from
the ruling class. For him, this is an essential characteristic of the mode of reproduction
of relations of exploitation. This analysis rightly shows that the abstract nature of the
social relations is the dominant force in the reproduction of capitalist social relations
between labourers and capitalists. Indeed, he shows the apparent limits of the state's
role in the reproduction of capital relations by affirming the fact that the forms of the
state are contained within the principles of the reproduction of capital relations.
However, he also wrongly separates the coercive nature of the reproduction of capital
relations from this abstract nature by attributing the coerciveness to a separate entity and
leaving the immediate production relations in a purely abstract rule, just as Blanke,
Jiirgens and Kastendiek did. The two characters of the reproduction of social relations
(the abstractness-and-coerciveness in unity) in the movement of inversion are
understood here in separation. The law of value for him appears not as a law of the
movement of inversion from the class nature to the abstract-neutral nature of social
relations, therefore a law manifesting its intrinsic contradiction in the class struggle, but
as a law imposing a purely abstract rule on the passive working class, a rule of
abstraction. This misunderstanding of the nature of reproduction appears in his analysis
as an excessive emphasis on abstractness in the reproduction of the immediate social
relations of production and excessive emphasis on coerciveness in the political form of
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domination, both of which undermine a proper understanding of the inner connection
between the political and economic. 1 3
4
13 Holloway and Picciotto also seem not fully to grasp the two natures of capitalist
reproduction in unity when they attempt to derive the state, following Hirsch, from the
abstraction of direct force from immediate production relations.
Just as the latter freedom (the separation of the worker from control of the
means of production) makes possible the abstraction of the direct use of
physical force from the immediate process of exploitation, so the first form
of freedom, i.e., the fact that exploitation takes place through the free sale
and purchase of labour-power, makes this abstraction of direct relations of
force from the immediate process of production necessary. The
establishment of the capitalist mode of production necessarily involved the
establishment of both sorts of freedom — the expropriation of the peasantry
and the abolition of direct relations of dependence, sanctioned by force, on
individual members of the ruling class. This abstraction of relations offorce
from the immediate process of production and their necessary location (since
class domination must ultimately rest on force) in an instance separated from
individual capitals constitutes (historically and logically) the economic and
the political as distinct, particularised forms of capitalist domination. This
particularisation of the two forms of domination finds its institutional
expression in the state apparatus as an apparently autonomous entity
(Holloway and Picciotto 1991, pp. 113-4, my emphasis).
This argument certainly undermines the excellent and insightful argument about the
reproduction process as both fetishisation and defetishisation process in Holloway's later
development of the argument.
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4. Limits of Mystification of Social Relations, State Formation and
Capital
The emergence and formation of the state is not a presupposition of the constitution
of the law of value in capitalist relations but a result of the law of value, the limit of
which is the limit of the inversion (which is inherently coercive) of the capital relation
into class-neutral relations through class struggle between capitalists and wage-
labourers. It is through this development of class struggle that the capitalist state as a
moment of the capital relation, the basis of the reproduction of which lies in the
movement of inversion of capitalist social relations, is fully established. With the
emergence of capital and fully developed capitalist social relations of production, the
form of the movement changed and the limits of the movement clearly appeared. The
limit of the inversion of class relations into neutral non-class relations between different
sources of revenue emerges from the way in which social labour is organised within this
fully developed capital relation. Within capital relations, the exchange relation between
workers and capitalists appears, as mentioned, as an equivalent relation between capital
and commodity labour as two different sources of revenue or two different sets of
individuals who own the sources of revenue. At first glance, it really appears as a free
contractual relation between two commodity owners, one of commodity labour power
and one of the money-commodity, as far as the capitalist promises to pay a wage in
compensation for the labourer's labour. However, in the production process the
'labourer is no longer free, for the reproduction of capital depends on the capitalist
controlling the process of production and compelling the labourer to work beyond the
necessary labour time' (Clarke, 1991c, p. 191). Under the production of surplus-value
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as 'the absolute law of this mode of production', the reality is that the exchange
relations between workers and capitalist can be made only to the extent that labour-
power 'preserves and maintains the means of production as capital, reproduces its own
,
value as capital, and provides a source of additional capital in the shape of unpaid
labour' (Marx, Capital Vol. 1, 1990b, p. 769). The rule of the law of value governing
the inversion of social relations, through the inversion of the relation of exploitation into
the form of relations between commodities through free-contract, now appears in the
form of the 'rule of the capitalist over the workers', 'rule of things over man, of dead
labour over the living, of the product over the producer' (Marx, Results of the
Immediate Process of Production, 1990a, p. 991). Hence, the inverted social relations
(relations between workers and capitalist in the form of relation between commodities
they own) come into contradiction with the reality that workers face in the form of the
powerlessness of the direct producers over production and products in the production
process. Increasing accumulation of wealth in the form of capital, in contrast with their
poverty (relative if not absolute) that forces the workers once again to get into the
production process as powerless subjects, inherently precipitates spontaneous and, if
more developed, organised forms of struggle of the workers. Therefore,
Capitalist production... is... a contradictory process in the sense that its
reproduction involves the repeated suspension of its own foundations, which
is why reproduction is necessarily marked by class struggle. In reproducing
itself capital also reproduces the working class, but it does not reproduce the
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working class as its passive servant, it reproduces the working class as the
barrier to its own reproduction (Clarke 1991c, p. 190, my emphasis).
Here, it is thorough class struggle between wage-labourer and capitalists that the
inherent limit of the law of value ruling the movement of inversion of the social
relations of capitalist production into mystified technical relations emerges eventually,
showing the limits of the abstractness of the coerciveness of the movement by revealing
the coerciveness of the abstractness of the movement of inversion. This is the fully
capitalistic manifestation of the limit of the movement of inversion, on which the
abstract rule of money (and of capital) is based, in the production process under the
command of capitalists. It is in this process of class struggle that the state has acquired
the illusory-but-real mode of existence external to the capital relation between workers
and capitalists.14
While the social relations of commodity production became increasingly dominating,
the social relations of production came increasingly under the abstract rule of
reproduction governed by the rule of value by which the coercive integration of the
mass of the population into value-relations appears as natural. However, as we can see
even in 18th century Britain, this development of abstract reproduction does not
necessarily mean that political domination would automatically be separated from civil
society. Rather, 'the boundaries between the state and civil society, between public and
14 The more fetishistic the inversion is, the more real the separation. The less successful the
inversion is, the more illusory the separation is.
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private power, were by no means well-defined' (Clarke 1988, pp. 21-2). At the level of
domestic authorities, economic power of the landed class still coexisted with its political
power, without a clear division between them. On the other hand, the central
government that had often confronted the private enforcement of the separation of the
means of production from farmers, intervened in primitive accumulation through what
Marx called 'bloody legislation' and, later in securing the rule of capitalists by
prohibiting workers from unionisation in the 18 th
 and early 19th centuries. 15 It was not
until the mid-19th century, when the capital relations appeared completely established
through the emergence of large-scale industry, putting the mass of the industrial
working class under the direct command of capitalists, that this apparent coalition
between capital and the state became increasingly subjected to class struggles.
With the emergence of capital and the transformation of the vast majority of the
population into wage-labourers, the movement of inversion faced repeated suspension
of its reproduction due to the nature of the way in which social labour is organised, as
we saw above. Now the inversion of the capital relation faced the historical necessity
that it must have been developed to the greatest extent so that the apparent reality of
class relations, the material basis of which lies in the separation of the means of
production from the direct producers, the vast majority of population, did not appear as
it was. Facing the continual suspension of reproduction in class struggle, the state,
which had been historically dominated by the interest of commercial capitalists and
15 Marx describes the direct intervention of the state in the labour relations in Chapter 28 in
Capital.
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later by industrial capitalists, was now engaged in stabilising the reproduction in
increasing class struggles. However, the state increasingly found difficulty in
identifying itself with 'capital' as far as it attempted to complement the movement of
capital without provoking further challenge from the working class. Indeed, the
capitalist state could not replace either the general role of money through which social
relations appear in the form of relations between things, or the role of capital through
which class relations appear in technical relations between commodities as sources of
revenue since, if it does, it is against the movement of inversion as a whole. The state,
therefore, could react to the suspension of the smooth operation of the abstract rule of
reproduction only to the extent that its intervention does not harm the smooth operation
of the movement of the inversion of capital relations, as the principal basis of social
reproduction, the illusion of which has been the basis of the bourgeoisie's social
domination. Hence, the form of the intervention that the state actually pursued should
have been differentiated from the inversion of class relations into the equal relations
between commodities to the extent that it does not undermine the law of value but
remains as a moment of inversion of unequal social relations into abstract and technical
relations.
In consequence, the state increasingly integrated the vast majority of the population
as citizens, regardless of the fact that they, as property owners, had nothing to sell but
their labour power. Through integrating the workers into its constituent unit as citizens,
and thereby translating class relations into relations between equal citizens, without
regard to their places in capitalist class relations, the state could appear now to be
increasingly separated from capital relations but remained a moment of abstract
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domination, complementing the continual inversion of social relations and therefore
contributing to the making of the fetishistic domination of money and capital. This is the
moment of the mystified separation of the state from the civil society. Again, the
,
inversion of the asymmetric social relations of classes into technically equal relations
through the form of the political state is differentiated from the inversion of the capital
relation into technically equal relations between different sources of revenue through
the form of capital, in that the basis of the political state is atomic 'citizens' without
regard even to the sorts of commodity they own and their places in the production
relations. Capital relations appear through the state-form not to be the fair exchange
relations between money wage and labour commodity, as it does through the form of
capital, which still, however, indicates the difference between the different 'sorts' of
commodity which each class has, but to be politically equal relations between citizens
who share universal citizenship, without leaving any formal clue indicating the
difference between classes. However, this inversion through the political state is not
only a differentiated but also a complementary moment of the inversion that is ruled by
the law of value because 1) one can be a political citizen only as far as she or he is a
personified source of revenue and 2) what is subjected to the inversion through the
political form is capital relations, although the contents of the relations are not
revealed. 16
 Now through the form of the state, the unequal relations between different
16 Certainly, the emergence of the welfare state contributed to further developing the
differentiation of the state from capital relations by expanding social as well as political rights
even to those who were not able to sell their labour power. However, it does not mean a
fundamental change in the nature of the state but merely means a further development of
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social classes are inverted into relations between 'political' citizens who are dealt
equally in front of the law. The inversion through the state-form is essentially therefore
a complementary and differentiated moment of the inversion through the value-form
through which the immanently unequal relation between classes is transformed into the
form of classless relations between things, making the state appear outside the relations
of capitalist production. As a consequence, the state appears in separation from civil
society, on the one hand, and in differentiation from capital, while capital and the state
are complementary and differentiated forms of capital relations.
Concluding Remark
Apart from the superficial conceptualisation of the state as an independent set of
institutions which is dominant in the statist argument, Marxist orthodoxy, as well as the
Marxist theory of state autonomy, appeared also to fail to understand the mode of
existence of the state as well as the abstract-coercive nature of capitalist domination
reproduced through the continual movement of the inversion of capitalist social
relations. As a result, the state has been predominantly analysed in utter abstraction
from the given social relations, the reproduction process of which is inherently a
process of class struggle for-and-against the inversion. In critiques of those theories
developed above, we understood Marx's superstructure-base metaphor in a quite
different way by relating the relations between the state and civil society to Marx's
mystification, in that the state appeared to be even more separated from the class relations in
spite of increasing intervention in class relations.
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critique of the social relations of capitalist production centred on his critique of the law
of value as a social organism. According to this understanding, the dichotomy between
the political and economy, either in the form of the relations between political
superstructure and economic basis or relations between economic actors (sources of
revenue) and political institutions, results from a specifically reified image of capitalist
society. Without recognising the relations between the state-form and the totality of
capital relations, bourgeois theories of the state strengthen the reified image of society
by juxtaposing the 'political' state, which is believed to rely on the relations of political
contract between free individuals and therefore appears without regard to the economic
resources that those individuals own, against the 'economic' society, which is believed
to consist of non-political relations between different sets of individuals who own
technically different sources of revenue. Since the state again appears to be a set of
institutions which consists of state bureaucrats, the state is understood at best in the
context of the interactions between state officials and economic actors, including capital
and labour 'as' owners of different commodities. Traditional Marxist theories of the
state also did not appear to overcome the dichotomy since they understood 'capital
relations' as mere economic relations and understood the state as an institutional
superstructure existing above the economic basis, on the one hand, and saw the relation
between capital and the state as a relation between economic and political units without
considering that both are differentiated but complementary forms in which capital
relations, the totality, appear and exist, on the other. Now, through understanding the
state and capital as complementary and differentiated forms of the capital relation and
therefore the dual nature of the mode of existence of the capitalist state, the dichotomy
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between the political and economic, either in the form of the dichotomy between capital
relations and the state, or between state and capital, appears to be irrelevant as a basis of
a critique of the capitalist state.
The historical necessity of the separation between the state and capital relations
based on the law of value lies in the manifestation of the limit of the movement of
inversion of social relations, which is explained by Marx in Capital through the critique
of the law of value and commodity and money fetishism. Once it emerges, although its
functions contribute to reproducing capital relations and reifies the inversion further,
however, in the differentiated form of a political entity, the state's interventions are
limited within its existence as a moment of the reproduction process of capital relations.
The political entity, the public state, can now appear as if it is an embodiment of the free
will of individuals who are connected with one another thorough free contractual
relationships. Therefore, it can appear without regard to the immanent origin of the form
of the state, the reproduction of capitalist relations through the inversion of social
relations. It is on this basis that the whole body of uncritical theories of the mystified
state, including developmental state theory, is built up. The state as a political institution,
either captured as a committee seized directly by capitalists or an authority and entity
autonomous from capital, which appears in separation from the capital relation and in
differentiation from capital, is the state that is reified and reifies itself in the process of
the inversion of social relations. The development of the interventionist state in Korea,
which has been captured as an autonomous developmental state without critically
analysing the dual nature of it, is now to be under the critique. It is only possible to look
at state formation as a form-formation process in the development of the capital relation
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as a totality through the development of class struggle. However, before closely looking
at the real development process, firstly it is necessary to reveal the mystification in
which statists conceptualised the state in Korea as a 'developmental state', in order to
fully grasp why and how the developmental state theories could not overcome the
reified image of the state and distorted reality.
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Chapter 5: Toward a Critique of the Korean State
Introduction
In the previous chapter, we defined the mode of existence of the capitalist state as a
complementary-but-differentiated moment of capital relations, by exploring the dual —
but coexisting — aspects of the capitalist state: 1) its separation from capital relations (its
differentiation from capital) 2) its subordination to capital relations (its complementarity
to capital). This duality is the specificity of the mode of existence of the capitalist state
as a moment of the reproduction of capitalist social relations on the basis of the
inversion of social relations. The separation and differentiation is real because the state
actually deals with workers and capitalists in a differentiated way that all actors, without
regard to the commodities they own, are dealt with as citizens whose political rights are
equal. It is however an illusion at the same time because the state cannot and does not
harm the subordination of the working class to capitalists and compensates the inversion
of coercive and unequal social relations of people into naturalised relations between
things, commodities and sources of revenue by inverting the class relations into
symmetric relations between political citizens. In understanding a particular form of the
capitalist state, it is important to understand that a capitalist state exists in the tension
between both aspects of the mode of existence of the capitalist state, since ignoring its
'true' aspect leads us not to be able to understand the ways in which the state is engaged
with the reproduction of capital relations as a whole. Also ignoring its 'false' aspect
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leads us not to be able to understand the class characteristic of the state and its limits of
being a neutral organisation. It is in this sense that any particular capitalist state cannot
be understood in terms merely of autonomy.
4
The developmental state theory theorises, as we saw in the first chapter, primarily, if
not exclusively, the first aspect, i.e., the state pursuing the 'common' goal of citizens
without being caught by particular class' interest, and argue this as a determinant factor
in defining the state in Asian NICs. Therefore, the intrinsic problem of the theories of
the developmental state is that they do not consider the state as a form of capital
relations and therefore cannot understand the nature of the state. If one attempted to
argue that a state is really differentiated from society and it is 'the' nature of a given
state, then an empirical mystification must follow since the capitalist state in general
cannot exist only in separation from capital relations and consequently society. The
developmental state theory has a unique empirical mystifying process. The aim of this
section is to analyse the mystification that the developmental state develops in seeking a
relevant analytical framework for an exposition of the state in Korea.
1. The Mystification of the Korean Developmental State
Mystification as a theoretical project
If we look at the core argument of developmental state theory that appeared in their
empirical analyses of the state in Asian NICs, including the Korean state, it consists of
two parallel arguments:
Argument (1) the state is autonomous (from society)
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Argument (2) the state serves capital accumulation successfully
The argument (1) has been a core argument of the empirical literature by statists, in
which they devoted most of the space to developing an explanation of the nature of the
relations between 'private business' and 'government' (Arnsden 1989; Johnson 1982;
Evans 1995; Wade 1990). In developing their empirical studies, they firstly tend to
identify the business-government relations with relations between 'the state and capital'.
Therefore, the organisational relation between government and business appears to be
the state-capital relation. Given the looseness of the usage of concepts in many statist
literatures, this identification does not appear problematic, provoking no serious inquiry.
However, it is the completion of mystification through the second step, i.e., through
transforming state-capital relations into state-society relations by explicitly excluding
labour from their concern that we can finally recognise the distortion and implication
made though the process of identification of relations between business and the
government with the state-capital relation as being much more serious and theoretically
problematic.
To translate state-capital relations into 'state-society' relations, they now introduce a
set of arguments that can be called 'the developmental regime of labour relations'
which is described as the symptom (together with a weak capitalist class) of the weak
civil society. Therefore, Amsden described 'weak labour' as a condition of the state
domination over society (Amsden 1989, p. 147). Johnson also pointed out how weak
labour was socially engineered by government as a condition of successful state
domination (Johnson 1985, p. 75). Weiss and Hobson removed the labour question
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altogether by describing weak civil society (Weiss and Hobson 1995, P. 164). Leftwich
also argued that these 'weak civil society forces' are a condition of the strong state
(Leftwich 2000, pp. 163-5). The developmental regime of labour relations is
represented by the absence of an organised labour movement that, therefore, makes the
state free from the challenge of the working class at the beginning, on the one hand, and
by the reproduction of the peaceful silence from labour on the basis of compensation for
hard-work through highly re-distributive state policies that enable the state to keep
pursuing its economic policy, on the other. I7 The state-labour relation here appears a
completely one-way relation that presupposes the whole subordination of labour to the
state. Now that labour appears to be subordinated to the state anyway and the state has a
superior position in conducting capital accumulation, the state appears as if it is free
from societal-forces. It is in this argument that they complete the identification of the
nature of the relations between government and private businesses with that of the
relations between the state and society. While the state's freedom from labour enables
the statists to generalise the nature of the relations between businesses and government
into the state's developmental autonomy from society, the highly re-distributive nature
of the state's developmental policies play an important role in defining the nature of the
state intervention in capitalist development as a pursuit of the common interest of
nations. Mystification of the state through transforming the government's leadership
against private business into apparent 'autonomy' of the state from society is done,
17 This re-distributive nature of the state's policies is again explained only by wage increase,
the relevance of which is very suspicious.
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without explicitly showing any real contradiction, largely thanks to the empirical
absence of the social power of labour.
However, in order to find out the defect of this argument, we now have to reconsider
the first mystification of state autonomy. In fact, the first step of mystification, the
identification of 'business' with 'capital' already indicates the conceptual and analytical
(not empirical) absence of labour. Here, in the identification of the relations between
government and private business, the concept of capital now refers to 'individual
owners of a source of revenue' in the most vulgar form, without regard to capital as a
social relation, therefore without regard to labour. If they integrate 'labour' into their
analytical framework, the identification of 'business-government' relations with capital-
state relations, i.e., the identification of the two completely different stories 1) that
government has leadership against private businesses and 2) the fact that the state is
autonomous from capital 'as a whole', appears impossible. Conceptualisation of the
relations between the state and capital, in fact, presupposes a consideration of labour
because the category of 'capital' apparently indicates, as a form of capital relations, the
existence of a labouring class as its antithesis. Without considering labour, more exactly,
the effect of state intervention on relations between capital and the working class, the
nature of state-capital relations cannot be captured. If 'labour-capital' relations are
brought into question in the first place, it becomes apparent that the government's
leadership against private capitals cannot be transformed smoothly into 'state
autonomy' from capital, particularly in Korea, where the subordination of labour to
capital, i.e., the reproduction of capital relations, has been complemented to a great
extent by the state. However, the identification of capital with 'business' as an
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independent set of owners of a particular source of revenue, furthermore of state-capital
relations with government-business relations in deriving developmental autonomy as
the nature of the state shows us that, in the first stage of mystification, labour or the
working class has already been conceptually excluded from their theoretical inquiries.
By recognising the critical defects emerging from the first step of mystification, it
appears to be clear that the argument based on the 'developmental autonomy of the
state' is produced, not as a result of the purely empirical studies of state-society
relations in Asian NICs, but as a result of the systematic attempts to generalise
government-business relations (the government leadership in the development process,
which is derived from the observation of the role of government in promoting economic
development, merely within the organisational relations between business and the
government), in utter abstraction from capital relations, into the nature of state-society
relations, on the basis of the theoretical framework that conceptually removes labour
from their analysis. Instead of integrating labour into their framework and thereby
recognising the theoretical shortcoming of the first identification, the statist arguments
overcome the problem again by justifying the contradiction that occurred in the first
stage by removing 'empirically' the antithesis of capital, i.e., reducing labour to a mere
subcategory that further supports the existence of the developmental autonomy of the
state from society. This is the role of the short comments on the developmental regime
of labour relations, which appear in almost all statist arguments. They do so through
emphasising workers' subordination to the state and not talking about the nature of state
intervention extremely favouring capitalists. In doing so, they seem to successfully bury
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the inherent contradiction of this argument, which might hinder the mystification of the
state though generalising its leadership into autonomy.
However, the contradiction between these two arguments seems unavoidable. As we
trace the process of the mystification, our conclusion gets clear. No matter how they
name it through mystification, the 'developmental autonomy' of the state as the
principal concept in the argument cannot express more than the superficial autonomy at
the very surface of organisational relations between business and the government.'8
This is also the very reason why more serious attempts to integrate 'labour' into their
analyses, unless overcoming the fundamental framework of the developmental state
theory, must fail. These attempts to integrate labour into the analytical framework can
be found in literatures about the transformation of the developmental state, by those
who understand the developmental state as a specific socio-political phenomenon which,
however, has been undermined by the very successful completion of the developmental
project, including the rise of the social power of capital and labour in contrast to the
18 Evans's 'new' concept of embedded autonomy, which has been praised and extensively
quoted by scholars as `the' concept capturing the nature of the state and society in Korea, is also
confined strictly within the limit of the vulgar conceptualisation of state-capital relations as
relations between business and government officials. It also shares, not surprisingly at all, the
analytical absence of labour with other statist literatures. Embedded autonomy appears to imply
a social mechanism through which the state acquires the channel of continual negotiation and
re-negotiation with societal forces and by which the state is bound to society, indicating far
more than closely interwoven relations between state bureaucrats and business (Evans 1995, pp.
12, 50, 59). However, there is no analysis of even a single case of negotiation, let alone
continual re-negotiation, between the state and labour, while he argues that embedded autonomy
expresses the relations between the state and 'society'.
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power of the state (Kim, E. M. 1993, 1997, 1999; Koo and E. M. Kim 1992; Koo 1987,
1993, 2000).
Transformation of the developmental state and labour as a subcategory of the
transformation
Most of the 'transformation' literature focuses on the decline of 'some' social
settings of developmental autonomy. For example, with particular concerns about the
financial liquidity allowed by liberalisation policies of the state throughout the 1980s
and 1990s, Wade and Veneroso argued that the developmental state had been losing
control over the market (Wade 1998, 2000; Wade and Veneroso 1998a, 1998b). As a
result of this deregulation, the state-led model of development, the efficacy of which
had been based primarily on a high debt/equity ratio under strict state . regulation,
became vulnerable to external shocks such as a sudden out-flow of capital. Together
with this growing vulnerability of the economic aspect of the model, these deregulation
policies appear now to have caused the demise of the developmental state by
undermining the very institutional bases of the cooperation between the state, business
and banks under strict regulation by the autonomous state. While Wade explains the
reasons why the developmental state went wrong largely in terms of policy failure of
the Asian governments, it is rather an externally oriented problem, since those
deregulation policies have been provoked by external pressure from international
financial markets and the governments of surplus countries, the configuration of which
is based on the Wall Street-Treasury complex (Wade 2000, pp. 107-9). Another pioneer
of the concept of the developmental state, Chalmers Johnson, in addition to 'under-
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regulation' (Johnson 1998, P. 654), pointed out that the demise of the developmental
state was provoked largely by the disappearance of the cold-war structure of the world
economy, which, as he recognised, had not been investigated enough to estimate its
impact (Johnson 1998, p. 656).
An explanation of these 'external' reasons for the demise of the developmental state
can be found also in Jayasuriya's arguments. In an attempt to identify the necessity of
the deregulation, which, he argued, cannot be found in Wade and Veneroso, he put the
external pressure imposed on the developmental states in the context of more structural
changes in the global economy, arguing that the demise of the developmental state
resulted from a wider range of changes in global governance in accordance with the
dominance of the rhetoric of 'accountability and transparency' (Jayasuriya 2000, P. 323).
The developmental state, in his argument, appears to have been built up on the basis of
'a particular regime of international governance characterised by restrictions on capital
mobility and a regulated domestic financial sector' (Jayasuriya 2000, p. 316). Therefore,
the demise of the particular regime of global governance after the breakdown of the
Bretton Woods system and subsequent institutional undermining of domestic control
over capital flows are to be followed by the demise of certain forms of national state,
which are configured corresponding to the particular form of governance. It is 'the net
effect of these changes in global governance to make problematic the type of
developmental state', strategies of which now also appear inappropriate (Jayasuriya
2000, p. 321). The following dominant form of the state is a dualistic 'regulatory' state,
the nature of which seems to fulfil the requirement of new global governance by
refashioning the modalities of governance, i.e., by setting a strong state able to impose
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the rule of law but at the same time allowing free operation of the market (Jayasuriya
2001,p. 110).19
Although it is true that, as Wade, Veneroso and Johnson argued, the unfolding of
deregulation in the Asian region affected the trajectory of capitalist economic
development in the region significantly, these arguments lack evidence showing the
internal necessity of deregulation and the demise of the 'developmental' state. Rather,
these arguments seem to explain the demise of the state following deregulation merely
in terms of a series of contingent policy failures that were avoidable if the 'policy
makers' had not been misled by international pressures and been able to stick to their
principles, relying largely on situational evidence that could appear in any economic
newspaper, such as Kim Young-sam regime's desire to get in to the OECD while they
were in office (Wade 1998, p, 1539; Johnson 1998, p. 654). In this sense, the analytical
framework they are using in the attempt to explain the demise of the developmental
state is more or less the same as the one on which they relied when they were building
19 Although both Wade and Jayasuriya pointed out some internal socio-political changes,
neither of them seems to be able to go beyond the old framework of the developmental state, in
which the relations between the state and society appear to be confined within the fetishistic
government-business relations. For Wade, although he does not provide concrete evidence, the
shifting 'power balance between manufacturing, finance, and the state in favour of private
finance', which identified its interests with those of foreign financiers, appears to necessitate the
state to allow a great degree of liberalisation (Wade 2000, p. 108). While Wade seems to put the
state and manufacturing in opposition to financial capital and understands the internal power
shift basically in terms of competition between fractions of capital, this shift is captured by
Jayasuriya in terms of changes in the power balance between the state and business groups in
general that resulted in more independence from the technocratic elite as a part of the
democratisation process (Jayasuriya 2000, p. 318).
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up the developmental state theory. The only different thing is that here state bureaucrats
did well before, against national social actors, but not now against international
businesses. However, it is interesting that they are not talking about what happened to
,
the brilliant state bureaucrats who had once been praised by those theories for making
possible the economic miracle. In this sense, Jayasuriya's argument seems to have
better explanatory power in that he attempts to explain 'how the state forms are
embedded within the particular sets of global structures' and 'how the state structures
are being reconfigured in new global political economy' (Jayasuriya 2001, p. 102).
However, he does not seem to overcome the 'old' paradigm either. Rather, his argument
attempts to understand the demise of the developmental state, in the vain attempt to
leave the old theories intact, merely by bringing a more 'global' context into the
existing framework. Due to this, he could not resolve the question of the relations
between globalisation and the state either. It is indeed important to explain how the
removal of the control of capital affected 'the pattern of co-ordination of economic
behaviour and outcomes'. However, on the other hand, the removal of capital controls
resulted from capital's attempt to overcome the barriers to the maximisation of profit
(no matter what the form of it is), which had been confined largely within profit from
productive investment within national boundaries. Therefore, in order to understand
properly the transition of the national states in the context of globalisation, it is also
important to explain why and how national patterns of co-ordination of economic
management have been undermined within national boundaries. Furthermore, 'the co-
ordination of economic management through political-bargaining' (Jayasuriya 2001, p.
102) can not explain the 'old' nature of the state and capitalist development in Asian
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NICs, including Korea, since both 'co-ordination' and 'political bargaining' empirically
existed only between business and goverment as sets of functional individuals, not
representing the nature of relations between the state and the working class, which
should be conceptualised as 'coercive' relations without any institutional negotiation,
therefore not explaining the relations between the state and 'capital' either.
It is in Eun Mee Kim's arguments that we can find a more serious attempt to try a
rather fundamental reconstruction based on the reconsideration of 'labour' inspired by
the recent development of the labour movement in Korea. For her, 'contradictions
inherent in the developmental state are enough to instigate its own decline' (Kim, E. M.
1999, p. 41). Therefore, for her, 'external actors, institutions, and conditions merely
hasten the decline' (Kim, E. M. 1999, p. 41). The internal motivations are here
explained primarily in terms of two inherent contradictions of the developmental state.
Firstly, it is based on 'the contradiction of institution', which makes the role of the state
as the primary institution providing economic services tend to decline by allowing, as a
consequence of the successful provision of the services by the state, other social
institutions, notably the big South Korean chaebols, to enhance their ability to provide
those services by themselves. On the other hand, the autonomy of the state also appears
to have an inherent contradiction. 'The state's autonomy faces increasing erosion if it is
successful' since the successful exercise of the autonomous power also tends to
undermine its own basis, 'the underdevelopment of civil society' (Kim, E. M. 1993, p.
232). As industrialisation deepened, societal forces appeared no longer to be
subordinated to state control as much as they had been once, at the beginning of
industrialisation. In particular, labour, from the mid-1980s, seems to have significantly
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challenged the state's repressive policies, which was one of the pillars of Korea's
catching-up development (Kim, E. M. 1993, pp.234-9; Kim, E. M. 1997, pp. 203-10).
Accordingly, looking at the internal structural changes in state-society relations from
,
which the developmental state is believed to have sprung, it seems that the
reformulation of the developmental state theory in the aftermath of the crisis is a mere
part of more long-term changes. Therefore, according to her argument, although most of
the statist arguments explain the demise of the developmental state as if it were a
sudden death, the demise of the developmental state, more specifically the transition
from a 'comprehensive developmental state to a limited developmental state', is not
new but had already been widely recognised even far before the emergence of the crisis
(Kim, E. M. 1993).
It is noticeable that Kim, not following other statists' arguments, does not remove
labour from her analytical framework and therefore attempts to put the development of
a specific form of the state in the context of class formation. It is in this sense that
Kim's argument offers us a better picture of the changing form of the state. Kim shows
us the dynamics of the development of the state by tracing the historical transition from
the comprehensive to limited developmental state. She did this effectively by showing
the reformulation of the state in accordance with changes in relations between the state
and social forces, not merely between government and business but including the
changing relations between the state and labour, on the one hand, and with the
changing global condition of capital accumulation, as well as national development of
capital accumulation, on the other. However, it seems too early to judge the relevance of
her argument because she also accepts the fundamental framework of the developmental
124
state theory without recognising a conflict between the statist framework and her
attempt to integrate societal forces other than the government and business into the
understanding of the relations between the state and society and the analysis of the form
of the state. As a result, the transformation of the particular form of the capitalist state in
Korea is described as a transformation from an autonomous state to a non-autonomous
state.
The first obvious problem in her argument is that the relations between the state and
civil society are neither relations between the state and capital relations nor the relations
between the state's intervention and the reproduction of capital relations. Rather, the
relations appear to 'consist of the relations between the state and business, on the one
hand, and the state and labour, on the other. Accordingly, even in her argument, the
capital relation itself does not appear important outside the institutional relations of
labour with the state, on the one hand, and business with the state, on the other.
Therefore what is important here is not the nature of state intervention with regard to the
reproduction of capital relations as a whole, as a differentiated and complementary
moment of the mystification of capital relations, but the nature of the relations between
the state and business, on the one hand, and between the state and labour, on the other,
both of which are captured by domination of the state over each of them. In
consequence, her attempt to grasp state-society relations more fully by integrating
labour into the analytical framework still leaves the essence of the developmental state
theories, the developmental autonomy of the state from 'society', intact, without
overcoming the understanding of 'capital' and 'labour' as different sets of owners of
sources of revenue. On this basis, she manages to understand, in spite of her critique of
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the analytical limits of the statist theory in capturing the dynamics of the further
recomposition of the state (Kim, E. M. 1993, p. 244), the transition of the state largely
within the statist framework, from the birth to demise of the autonomous state.
However, it should be pointed out that both the integration of labour into the
analytical framework and the theory of developmental autonomy as the nature of a state
cannot be compatible with each other. The developmental state theories and their
concept of developmental autonomy are only sustainable, from the very beginning, with
the systematic and conceptual removal of labour (although it is decorated by the
'empirical' absence of the social power of labour). As we saw, if labour becomes a
category that must be considered in understanding the trajectory of the form of the state
and, furthermore, the relations of the state with capital relations (not with capital, on the
one hand, labour on the other), the concept of developmental autonomy can no longer
survive. Therefore, if one is willing to understand the transitional moment of the state
form through capturing labour as well as capital, developmental autonomy should be
abandoned. In this sense, Kim's argument seems merely to replace the empirical
absence of labour with the empirical 'uprising' of labour.
Koo (1993) also points out this analytical problem of the developmental state and its
consequence, arguing that it tends to 'exaggerate the autonomy and strength of the East
Asian state and to interpret economic growth in isolation from other political and social
changes'. For him 'the notion of a "developmental state," represents only one facet of
the relationships between the state and civil society' therefore 'it does not facilitate
grasping with the totality of economic, political, and social transformations that the
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Korean people have experienced in modern times' (Koo 1993, p. 7). Furthermore, he
also rightly points out the intrinsic problem of the developmental economists that they
'have rarely looked at labour as more than a factor of production or a factor of
comparative advantage' (Koo 2001, p. 4). However, he fails to develop his argument
any further than a humanistic critique of the developmental economy. Like Kim, Koo
does not reconsider the concept of developmental autonomy and argues that 'the state
clearly enjoys more autonomy from class power than is commonly assumed in Marxist
literature, and it has played an independent role in the making and unmaking of classes'
(Koo 1993, p. 5), whereas he argues that, in order to understand the state properly
without reducing state-society relations to the narrowed-down relations between
business and government, labour should be dealt with as an important societal force. He
rightly points out the distortion that the developmental state theories make but does not
recognise that the distortion is the very basis of the concept of developmental autonomy.
Since these accounts emphasising the importance of 'labour' do not distinguish
themselves from the statists by criticising the theoretical basis of the theories, those
excellent socio-political analyses of labour and the working class are easily integrated
into developmental state theory as a sub category, explaining and confirming the
autonomy of the state from society in a more humanistic way (See Koo and E. M. Kim
1992; Koo 1987, 1993, 2000). In exactly the same manner, Deyo's pioneering analyses
of labour in Asian NICs suffers from the same problem (Deyo 1987, 1989), merely
being quoted here and there as evidence of the developmental state being autonomous
from society and fulfilling the conditions of their ideal type of the state.
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2. Toward the Demystification of the Developmental State
From analysis to a critique of the Korean state
The statist explanations of the developmental state seem to rely on empirical studies
of the state apparatus and its effective intervention in economic development. Then they
derive an apparent autonomy of the state as the basis of the success of the interventions.
However, as we saw, the conceptualisation of the Korean state as well as other states in
Asian NICs, in terms of the 'developmental state' was a process of mystification of the
state by dealing with the set of empirical data in a very specific way. This mystification
process shows us a serious theoretical problem which, in statist argument in general,
identifies the leadership of the state against private business with the autonomy of the
state from society. This identification between those two concepts is however, not new
but already indicated in Evans and Rueschemeyer's essay in 'Bringing the State Back
In', when they did not explain the reason why the state appears autonomous, even if the
state leadership results in better 'capital' accumulation. Recognising the mystification,
more labour-concerned analyses attempt to focus on the development of the working
class, thereby overcoming the absence of labour in statist argument. However, the
fundamental problem does not lie merely in the analytical absence of labour. This
identification and analytical absence of labour shows us a fundamental assumption,
because of which the statist argument in essence could not grasp the contradictory basis
of the capitalist state and its relations with society, although they might succeed in
showing the contradictory basis.
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The most prominent problem that can be found in statist literature is that they assume
that the state exists essentially in separation from society. This does not mean that
statists actually argue that all the state is autonomous from society, as we can see in
Evans and Rueschemeyer's flexible conceptualisation of state autonomy or Skocpol's
obsession with the empirical diversity of state autonomy. However, it does not mean
either that each case is merely different from one another. Rather, the difference
between the autonomous state and the non-autonomous state appears for them not as a
difference between cases but a difference between 'an ideal type' of the state and state-
in-reality. While the 'empirical' autonomy of the state in reality as an organisation or
social actor appears to develop through social interactions between the state and other
social actors, the conceptual existence of state autonomy as the nature of the state
appears to be given to the state in general as an organisational potentiality, the
realisation of which depends primarily on the organisational coherence of the institution.
In this sense, state autonomy is neither a 'general' feature of the capitalist state nor a
structural feature of capitalist social relations but an organisational potentiality of the
state as a supreme set of organisations. The degree of autonomy depends on whether the
given state succeeds in concretising its inherent potentia into reality or not. Hence,
although they seem to appear not to have a general theory of the state, they do have an
ideal type of the state and this ideal state is autonomous from society and societal force,
the prototype of which can be a 'developmental state'. Given the fact, although they
argue that state autonomy is not a general feature but a conclusion of the analysis of a
specific economic development, the conclusion of their analyses seems a natural and
necessary result of their theoretical presuppositions and assumptions rather than of their
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empirical exploration. Further, even though the separation of the political from the
economic appears as a conclusion of the analysis, this is not a result of their analysis but
merely another expression of their theoretical assumption, a naturally assumed
presupposition without a critique.
The danger of this fundamental assumption of developmental state theory is that
analyses based on this assumption cannot grasp the contradictory aspects of the
capitalist state: 1) its separation from capital relations and its differentiation from capital
2) its subordination to capital relations and its complementarity to capital. This means
firstly that the state appears and exists as if it is free from the relations of subordination
of the working class to capitalists (reducing both of them to a set of citizens). What lies
behind this mystification of the state on the basis of the flourishing empirical analysis is
the abstraction of social institutions and subjects from capital relations. In this
understanding, a capitalist society appears as a sum of atomic elements that are 'capital'
as the source of means of production, 'labour' as the source of labour power and the
'state' as an institutional regulator (therefore there are no differences between capital
and business; goverment and the state; labour and employee). The ideal type of the
state is a state that could function as a political entity mediating between the equal
sources of revenue without being engaged in pursuing the interest of either labour or
capital, therefore treating them merely as sets of individual citizens, each of which has a
different economic function. In the same context, for them, a successful economic
development in Asian NICs was possible because they, the independent subjects,
maximised their own functions and especially the state maximised its role of a regulator,
not as a mere apparatus of the dominant class but as the autonomous apparatus
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'standing outside and above the class struggle' (Clarke, 1991c, p. 183). Therefore, the
characteristic of the state appears not to be formed through a formation of a specific
articulation of the forms of capital relations but to be given by its natural form and to
pertain to the state itself originally. In the end, the state is analysed ion the basis of their
appearances without a critique; as a fetish. As a result, the autonomy of the state
becomes an essential feature of the capitalist state, not an object of critique of the
mystification. There lies the origin of the misunderstanding of the developmental state.
By assuming that the state as a 'political actor', as well as economic regulator, could
stand above society and any class interest, therefore, in fact abstracting the state from
capitalist social relations of production and attributing a phenomenal feature of capital
relations, the developmental leadership of the state against individual capitals, to the
category itself, the attempt to 'bring the state back in' seems to succeed merely in
bringing the state back in the fetishised understanding of society. It is in this sense that
the statist approach shares exactly the same theoretical basis with the neo-classical
approach. The only difference between them is that the statists believe that the state
occasionally could act in favour of a whole society, while the neo-classical approaches
believe that it hardly happens.
Therefore, in the following historical analysis of the formation of the Korean state,
the autonomy of the state will be neither the starting point of state analysis nor the
essential nature of the capitalist state but an object of critical inquiry with regard to the
mode of existence of the state, which has an essentially class character as an aspect of
the social relations of capitalist production. However, this does not mean that the
following critique will be devoted to confirming the class characteristic of the Korean
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state which appeared in the form of the direct domination of the state by the capitalist
class. Rather, it will also trace a historical process through which the class character
could appear in the form of an autonomous state, which by all means attempts to
,
represent itself as the guarantor of the general interest of citizens, just like other
categories of bourgeois political economy as 'a historical reality in capitalist society, at
least a real appearance' (Wood 1999, p. 23). This is to replace 'state analysis' based on
the fetishised separation of social categories with a 'critique' of the state. Critique
means here to penetrate into the mystified forms not by looking at what they appear to
be but by looking at how they are formed as moments of the formation of capitalist
social relations. As we saw above, the state does not come from the functional necessity
of capital accumulation as capital's good fortune, which is given from outside of social
relations. Rather it develops from the very inside of the development of the totality of
capitalist social relations formed within and as a result of class struggles. It is in this
sense that understanding the development of class struggle forming the particular
composition of capitalist social relations is the most important principle of a critique of
the state.
The state in the development of capitalist social relations in Korea
The starting point of a critique of the Korean state is to understand 'developmental
autonomy' not as the nature of the state but as being based on a superficial aspect of the
development of (the reproduction of) particularly articulated capitalist social relations.
Here, 'particular articulation of capital relations' refers to the specific way in which the
relations of surplus value exploitation between the working class and capitalist are
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socially organised and reproduced. This articulation is moulded by and subjected to
class struggle, on the one hand, and conditions further class struggle by providing social
classes with the material basis of continuing class struggles. A particular form of
,
capitalist state here is understood as a particular node of a particular articulation of
capital relations, on the one hand, and at the same time as a subject of class struggle, the
result of which in turn conditions the further development of the articulation. In this
way, a particular form of capitalist state can be explained not as an entity abstracted
from capital relations as a whole, but a form in which capital relations appear and exist.
Furthermore, it is only in the context of this formation, demise and reformulation of the
particular articulation of capitalist social relations as a totality that the development of
the specific form of the capitalist state can be explained, without falling back into the
mystification of the developmental state by generalising the state's relations only to a
set of individual capitals (rather than capital-in-general as a social relation, the
conceptualisation of which must entail relations between capitalists and the working
class), which is a mere moment of the articulation.
In order to trace the trajectory of the development of the particular form of the
capitalist state, three analytical moments of the history of Korean capitalist development
will be brought into serious consideration; the relation between capitalist and the
working classes, the working class and the state, and the state and the capitalist class.
While each relation has its own trajectory of development, the relations are to be
described as forming the articulation of capitalist social relations by again being
interwoven with each other through the national unfolding of class struggle. Although it
seems true that the development of class struggle within the national boundary gives
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rise to an immanent moment of the historical development and crisis of the state, this by
no means supports a simplified general theory that a nation state is formed entirely by
the results of domestic class struggle. Certainly, the national state is a moment of
national capital relations. However, as we can see particularly in the unfolding of the
crisis of the national social relations of production as well as a specific form of national
state, the national state does not exist in separation from global capitalist development
because national capital relations do not exist independently of the other national social
relations but exist as a node of the global social relations as a whole in the interactions
among the national ones, also participating in the formation of the global entity.
Therefore, the reproduction of the capitalist state as a moment of the reproduction of
national capital relations is based on the reproduction of the national relations of
exploitation which is conditioned within the development of the global relations. The
development of the national state is, in other words, not free from global capitalist
accumulation but confined within capitalist development as whole, since the national
social relations of production only exist as a node of the global relations as a whole
(Burnham 1997, 1996; Burnham, Brown and Bonefeld 1995, Holloway 1996; Clarke
1977, 1988, 1991). In turn, global capital relations as an entity appear in the form of a
national capital relation not directly but only through the mediation of class struggle
developing in the nations. Although the development of global capital relations
conditions and confines the national development of social relations, this does not mean
that the development of global social relations of capitalist production is a given
determinant of further development of national relations. Rather, the global capital
relations come to exist and appear as national relations only through the mediation of
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the development of the national class struggles. In other words, the developments of the
global social relations are mediated, therefore determined, into a specific form of
national social relations of capitalist production and their political forms, by the
4
development of domestic class struggle occurring within and over the existing social
relations. In class struggle, the temporary results of which reproduce the national capital
relations, the state appears to compromise the national capital's interest with the
development of global capital relations in the form of the development of the in-and-out
flow of capital, monetary control, commodity trade, regional conflicts, trade conflicts,
foreign aid, foreign policies, etc, through attempts to reproduce the national relations in
favour of a more effective capital accumulation of capital in their territory.
Given the historical trajectory of the analytical moments and its articulations which
developed through national class struggle and within the context of global capital
accumulation, Korean capitalist development can be divided, only for the sake of
grasping the distinctive development as well as continuity emerging from class
struggles, into three main periods. Firstly the early formation of capitalist social
relations covers a period of the Japanese colonial regime, subsequent US military
control and Rhee Syng-man's government in the 1950s. During this period, the
elements of a particular form of reproduction of capital relations, including unilateral
labour relations at the workplace, state's control over labour and regulation of
individual capitals by the state, began to be formed through a development of class
struggle in the particular context of colonial development, liberation, civil war and
subsequent US aid at the beginning of the Cold War. However, it is since the 1960s that
the capital relation in Korea has been articulated in such a way that 'the political'
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regulated individual capitals, through nationalising banks and financial institutions and
allocating foreign loans, as well as labour, through anti-communism-based control at the
level of the immediate production process by police and intelligence agents and a
,
goverment-directed union federation. Therefore, the second period, between the
military coup by Park Chung-hee and the political crisis of the state in 1979, will be
analysed as the culmination of the development of the specific articulation of capitalist
social relations in Korea. Also, it is in this second period of capitalist development that
the state began to appear not as a mere tool of capital, as it had appeared in the form of
the immediate alliance between a few capitalists and government officials in the 1950s,
but as a 'developmental actor'. Since the state excluded the capitalists who had been
allied with Rhee Syng-man's government from politics and then put 'individual'
capitalists under the institutionalised control of the state, the capitalist class appeared to
be subjected to the authority of the state. Therefore, in spite of its extreme class
characteristic, the class characteristic of the state did not appear directly in the form of
the subordination of the state to capitalists but rather in the form of the subordination of
individual capitalists to the state, creating the image of a state independent from the
dominant class. However, the second period of the development of the articulation,
which showed the culmination of the particular capitalist developmental trajectory and a
miraculous accumulation of Korean capital, taking advantage of the expanding
capitalism in the post-war era, was also the moment that class struggle from the working
class started to undermine the very basis of the articulation. Throughout the 1960s and
1970s, the working class movement developed from scattered spontaneous resistance to
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an organised movement in the form of 'democratic trade unionism' and finally
precipitated a political crisis of the particular capitalist development of Korea.
Although it is true that each period of the development has its context in international
political economy, such as expansion of Japanese imperialism, US aid, Cold War, the
post-war boom and subsequent challenges from emerging NICs, the context of the
development of global capital accumulation is particularly important in understanding
the more recent transformation of the Korean state. The recent transformation of the
Korean state can best be captured by understanding it as a moment of the transformation
of the articulation of the capital relation as a whole, which has developed through
domestic class struggles, particularly in Korea, through the massive politicisation of
class struggle since the late 1970s and its full blown development after 1987, on the one
hand, and through increasing capital accumulation accompanying the greater
engagement of Korea's domestic capitals with global crisis-ridden capital accumulation
and growing necessity of the monetisation of the reproduction of the capitalist social
relation, on the other. Especially, after the short third period of the incomplete
reproduction of the articulation between 1980 and 1986, during which vain attempts of
the state to sustain its control over labour precipitated a massive scale of politicisation
of class struggle, the decade from 1987, at the end of which the general crisis occurred,
appeared to witness that the particularly articulated capitalist social relations have
undergone a period of demise. Also, the more contemporary development of class
struggle during and in the aftermath of the crisis and the market-based recovery from
the first general crisis seems to have led to significant recomposition of Korea's
capitalist social relations, accompanying changes in relations between labour and capital,
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between the state and labour and between the state and individual capitals, showing
particular symptoms such as the growing marketisation of labour control with regard to
the labour-capital relation, forceful institutionalisation and authoritarian management of
the flexible labour market by the state, and growing depoliticisation of the regulation of
individual capitals.
Concluding Remark
As we saw above, the developmental state theories developed on the basis of the
concept of the developmental autonomy of the state from society, relying on the false
generalisation of a superficial moment of the particular articulation, in abstraction from
other critical moments. The contradictory relation between its differentiation from and
complementarity to capital-in-general could not be explained in this framework. The
post-developmental state theories, even the socio-political analysis of the developmental
state which focuses on the question of labour as an important category, seem merely to
reproduce, or at least allow, the mystified image of the state by decorating the old
theory by a new context without seriously reconsidering the old theories. It is in this
sense that neither the transition from the developmental state to 'limited developmental
state' nor the transformation from the developmental state to the 'regulatory state' can
explain the changing form of the capitalist state in Korea. In spite of the poor
performance of the really existing so-called post-developmental states and the
problematic conceptualisation of the nature of the state, the 'developmental state' now
becomes an even more fashionable concept, widely accepted by social democratic and
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• even Marxist analysts as if it is an alternative path of development against growing
multinational capitals and gigantic financial capitals. It is important to notice that the
statist approach cannot capture either the specific form of the state or the recent
transformation of the state as far as it abstracts the formation of the state from capitalist
social relations as a whole and thereby captures one superficial aspect of the articulation
of capitalist social relations as the nature of the state itself. In the following chapters, a
historical critique of the Korean state, in which we will explore the development of the
specific form of the capitalist state in the light of the birth, development, demise and
reformulation of the particularly articulated capitalist social relations, will reveal the
irrelevance of the theories of the developmental state, by showing how the historical
facts are misused by the theories that we have seen so far, on the one hand, and
uncovering the dynamics of the development of class struggle in Korea, but without
isolating it from the context of the development of global capitalism, on the other.
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Chapter 6: The Early Formation of the Social Relations
of Capitalist Production and the State
Introduction
In previous chapters, we confirmed that the autonomy of the state is not to be the
starting point of state analysis but to be an object of critique, the aim of which is to
show the formation of the mystified form of the state in and through which the totality
of capitalist social relations are manifested. Now we are moving into an empirical
analysis of the development of the Korean state by subjecting the history of the
development of capital relations in Korea to a full-fledged critique, in which the
mystified form of the Korean state will be unveiled. In the following historical critique,
the way in which the so-called 'developmental' state emerged will be explored.
However, this will be done not only by looking at the formation of the state apparatus
itself but also, and more importantly, by tracing the historical formation of specifically
articulated capitalist social relations as a whole. The process of the early formation of
the totality, encompassing the development of the specific form of the state, will show
that a specific class composition, which was formed through specific historical class
struggles in capitalist development, led to a development of particularly articulated
social relations of capitalist production. Furthermore, this history will show how the
specific process of the reproduction of capital relations has formed, by relying most of
all on the state regulating individual capitals and the collective power of labour, the
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form of the Korean state providing a distinctive mystification into which the
developmental state theories fell back. In this chapter, the critique of the Korean state
begins by looking at the particular formation of social relations of capitalist production
,
in Korea in the Japanese colonial period, during which the colonial initiation of
capitalist development conditioned a further development of class struggle and thereby
a distinctive form of the capitalist state after the liberation.
1. The Colonial State and the Beginning of Capitalist Development
Primitive accumulation and the colonial state
Before Japan occupied Korea in 1910, Korean society was based not on the social
relations of capitalist commodity production but predominantly on pre-capitalist
relations of dependence based on lineage. Production was not dominated by 'market
activity' and therefore, 'a money economy had not yet spread throughout Korea'
(Amsden 1989, p. 31). Although petty commodity producers and locally rooted
commercial capitals existed, Korea was basically a self-sufficient agricultural society,
with a lack of development of capitalist social relations. Korean Society during the
Joseon Dynasty (1392-1910) had been based primarily on the two classes, landlord
aristocrats, called yang-ban, who had a wide range of privileges through lineage-based
class discrimination and farmers, who had been allowed to own small size lands under
state-guaranteed hereditary land ownership, and who produced for their own needs and
paid taxes to the Dynasty. Although the state and economic domination were
'institutionally' separated, the immediacy between economic and political domination
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was incarnated in the social influence of the yang-ban landlord class over the whole
society, based both on 'access to hereditary land wealth' as well as 'a close
identification with the centralised bureaucracy' (Kohli 1994, P. 1271). During the 19th
century, the increasing power of the yang-ban class, against the monarchy as well as
farmers, resulted in expansion of its land at the expense of farmers' and turned many
farmers into peasant or half-tenant farmers, decreasing the tax resources for the
monarchy. Subsequently, the state was forced to brutally exploit the peasant class who
worked to provide the consumption needs of the household and 'fulfil tributary
obligation' to those who held political, social and economic power (Amsden 1989, p.
30), in order to overcome its fiscal crisis.
Growing tension in the traditional social order appeared in the peasant rebellions
against rural aristocrats and landlords in the late 19 th century. In southern provinces,
most noticeably Chola province, peasants organised themselves under the semi-
religious nationalist reformism, Donghak, against the aristocrats who were believed to
trouble the 'benevolent kingly rule' (Lee 1984, p. 284, quoted in Cumings 1997, P. 117).
After victorious battles with the government army in Chola province, the Donghak
movement developed into a modernisation movement, asking the monarchy to remove
the whole traditional class system through 'the removal of yang-ban oppression, the
burning of slave registers, an end to the strict social hierarchy, a general redistribution
of the land' and removal of Japanese intervention (Cumings 1997, p. 118). Instead of
accelerating its own modernisation plan by taking advantage of peasant rebellions, the
monarchy understood the rebellions as an attempt to overthrow the monarchy itself and
smashed the rebellions under the auspices of the Japanese army that had defeated the
142
Chinese army which had been also attempting to intervene in the peasant rebellion in
order to strengthen China's influence over the Korean peninsular. After the defeat of the
peasant army in late 1894, Japan forced the monarchy to modernise the traditional
,
social system. Under Japanese supervision, a modern reform was implemented by the
legislation of 208 modern laws, removing slavery and inherent class distinction and
establishing a modern state organisation (Cumings 1997, p. 120). Following this reform,
the Great Han Empire (Daehan Jeguk) was established. However, the nature of the
reform was significantly different from what the Donghak movement had required. First
of all, the reform was in fact designed under Japanese control, as a bridgehead for the
colonisation of Korea, which finally happened in 1910. Indeed, land reform, which was
critical to remove the social power of the yang-ban landlord class, was not implemented.
As a result, a colonial capitalist development, which aimed to exploit Korea in the
interests of Japanese capital accumulation without harming the traditional landlord-
dominated class system, began in 1910. Now the Joseon government-general was
implanted as a modem state, replacing the Great Han Empire.
After Japanese occupation, the separation of producers from the means of
production was accelerated by 'the cadastral surveys', which were implemented with
the introduction of 'the land survey law' in 1912, immediately after the Japanese
occupation. The cadastral surveys from 1910 to 1918, which were enforced in order to
found the material basis of colonisation by the colonial rule of Japanese imperialists,
was the process that basically accelerated the deprivation of land ownership, which had
been guaranteed with nationalised land in the Joseon Dynasty but already been
undermined by the expansion of the yang-ban landlord class during the 19th century,
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from the farmers as direct producers. Restructuring the whole society by means of
creating private property rights in land, this survey resulted in an increase in 'tenant
farmers', from 37.7% in 1918 to 53.8% in 1932, who heavily suffered from the high
rate of rent for tenancy, and eventually led to the separation of the mass of the
population from the means of production and subsistence (Amsden 1989, p. 54). In
addition to the survey and reformulation of forms of property in land, the 'plan to
promote rice production', which was an important part of Japanese Imperialist policy,
also contributed to primitive accumulation. 2° This plan, which was implemented from
1920 to 1933, as a result of which 'the peasantry was squeezed to the bone' (Amsden
1989, p. 34), was for the supply of cheap rice in order to reduce the cost of labour power
in Japan, which suffered from crisis-ridden capital accumulation and emerging class
struggles after the First World War boom (Ho 1984, p. 350). These two Japanese
colonial policies consequently gave rise to a massive proletarianisation of the
population. Some of the proletarianised tenant farmers, who suffered from
hierarchically structured exploitation of agricultural labour and deterioration of income
distribution resulting from forced sale of their products at a cheap price for export to
20 Primitive accumulation by the Japanese colonial state brought the separation of the means
of production from the producers. However, while primitive accumulation was successful in
separating the land from farmers, it was not accompanied, unlike the usual primitive
accumulation in the development of capitalism, either with the development of Korean capital
or with the development of wage relations between commercialised farm owners and farmers.
The accumulation of capital in Korean's hands was very small and the relations between farm-
owner and farmers were not wage-relations but tenant relations.
144
Japan, became wage labourers in the 1930s when colonial industrialisation actually
began.
Significantly, this process was pushed forward not by emerging Korean industrial
capital seeking labour power to employ in capitalist commodity production, but initially
by the 'implanted' state, which attempted to enhance control over Korea and therefore
secure the production of cheap rice and create the cheap labour power which could be
employed by Japanese capita1. 21 The Joseon government-general, which had a Japanese
army or navy general as the governor, under the control of the prime minister of Japan,
aimed to make Korea into a sub-part of Japan, relying on overwhelming police and
military power. In order to cultivate the social conditions for the development of new
social relations and the maximum output of Japanese capital, the function of the
government-general was to 'organise, mobilise, and exploit Koreans in the interest of
the metropole' (Cumings 1981, p. 10). The 'multifunctional police system' (Cumings
1997, p. 152), which controlled every single aspect of Korean society, from factories
and schools, from cities to the rural area, became the main instrument of structuring a
new society. In addition to the police power playing the multifunction which was able to
21 In spite of these cadastral surveys and plans to promote rice production, the landlord class
in Korea did not loose their lands. It was partly because the landlord class was, contrary to the
farmers, intelligent enough to legally claim their ownership to the land. However, most
significantly the colonisation and capitalisation of Korea by the Japanese imperial regime did
not touch the traditional landlord class's social domination, especially in rural areas. Rather, the
government-general took advantage of the social domination of the landlord class in exploiting
the vast majority of Koreans for the interest of Japanese capital accumulation. In turn, the
majority of the landlord class appeared to be co-operative with the Japanese colonial state and
even attempted to strengthen their social power during the colonial period.
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penetrate tiny villages in the rural areas, the government-general had a giant body which
had some 246,000 Japanese civil servants by the last decade of the colonial period
(Cumings 1997, p. 153). In short, the colonial state, once implanted by the Japanese
Imperialist regime, played a significant role in primitive accumulation in Korea. The
state was implanted as a capitalist state not in the sense of complementary enforcement
of the rule of money and law but in the sense of establishing these forms of capitalist
domination in the process of state-implemented primitive accumulation.
Crisis of Japanese capital accumulation and colonial capitalist development
The World War boom during the 1910s led to a rapid expansion of Japanese capital.
During the War, the capacity of industrial production in the West was reduced, offering
non-competitive markets, especially in Asia, which had depended on Western products.
During this boom, Japanese capital enjoyed massive export growth both in heavy
industry and the textile industry. 22 However, the World War boom left another task for
Japanese capitals. Firstly, in order to maintain growth, Japanese capital must maintain
the expanded volume of industry, on the one hand, and introduce new methods of
production for overcoming the re-emerging competition with Western capital after the
War by reducing the cost of production, on the other. Since this boom was driven by
quantitative growth relying on extraordinary profitability in the non-competitive market
caused by the reduced production capacity of Western competitors and now the
22 In particular, export of cotton cloth marked a 185% increase from 1913 to 1918
(Lockwood 1968, p. 38).
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extraordinary conditions were gone, the introduction of new methods of production in
the expanded industries, in order to keep the position in intensified competition during
the Post-War period, demanded a huge amount of capital investment, which was
possible only through massive expansion of credit.
However, by 1919 Japan already faced inflationary symptoms induced by expanded
note issues and credit for the expansion of the volume of production during the First
World War. During the economic boom, capital accumulation could be sustained by
credit expansion, which drove the Japanese World War boom during 1910s. However,
while the credit expansion could keep the expansion of production and give individual
capitalists the growing optimism of the further accumulation of capital, 'in suspending
the barriers to accumulation, the expansion of credit gives free reign to the tendency to
the overaccumulation of capital' (Clarke 1988, p. 108). Once overaccumulation of
capital appears in the form of overproduction of commodities in a particular branch of
production and falling prices of the commodities, there is no way for individual
capitalists to keep the volume of production and accumulation except depending on
more expansion of credit, competing for availability of credit with each other. Japan
began to suffer from financial instability, which was enlarged by the liberal lending
policy of the central bank and the state, in the vain attempts to keep up the boom, in the
early 1920s. Finally, Japanese capitalist development came up against the barrier of
overaccumulation in the form of financial crisis in 1923 and 1927, which culminated in
the Great Depression 1930 to 1931, precipitated by the global crisis of 1929.
Furthermore, the dramatically increased volume of production during the boom was
also accompanied by the emergence of class struggle in the form of social and industrial
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conflicts, i.e., a 'massive outbreak of strikes and the widespread formation of assertive
labour unions' in Japan in the 1920s (Garon 1987, p. 2), raising issues of workers'
rights and re-distribution questions. The reason for this upsurge of the working class
,
movement was that, despite the growth of money income, 'the rising cost of living bore
heavily on the urban population' (Lockwood 1968, p. 41).
The financial instability and further development of class struggle engendered a
crisis of the early settlement of capital relations in Japan, which underlay absolute
surplus value exploitation that drove the boom during the First World War. Most of all,
this exploitation based on extending working days and intensified labour seemed no
longer to secure further capital accumulation due to the growing power of organised
workers following the first Factory Law legislation in 1911. Consequently, Japanese
capital sought to overcome this obstacle by introducing new means of production and
cheaper subsistence of the working class, thereby increasing relative surplus value
exploitation. The attempts of Japanese capital to overcome the crises were reflected also
in its colonial capitalisation policies from the 1920s. Japanese colonial policy in Korea
during the 1920s and afterwards was focused on cultivating commodity markets for
Japanese capital, promoting industrial investment in Korea, particularly by Japanese
zaibatsu, and promoting production of cheap rice, which could reduce housekeeping
expenses of Japanese workers and, therefore, the cost of labour power.
Sustaining the over-expanded volume of production by means of credit expansion,
Japanese capital firstly sought to solve the problem of the limited market through
integrating the colonies into capitalist commodity production, which meant a more
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expanded market for the goods produced by Japanese capital. Facing the influx of
commodities, which were produced or traded by Japanese capital, petty commodity
production in Korea was liquidated rapidly through the 1910s and 1920s. In order to
force Korean households to use the commodities, the Japanese colonial government
confiscated the means of production for self-sufficiency (Ihn 1946, p. 53, quoted in Y.
H. Kim 1983, p. 85). As the self-production of subsistence in the household was
discouraged and often prohibited and money-based taxes were introduced, households
now had to rely on exchanges in the market through money in order to sustain their
lives and pay taxes. On the other hand, as we saw above, as the colonial government
pushed the increase in rice export to Japan as a main colonial policy, farming products
were also increasingly commodified. While petty farmers sold their surplus products in
order to buy other necessaries, the massive amount of rice that landlords took from
tenant farmers as rents was wholly commodified. As a result, 70% of rice products were
for sale in 1937, showing the significant commodification of the farming industry (Kim,
Y. H. 1983, p. 87).
While Japan suffered from increasing labour costs and financial instability,
investment of Japanese capital in Korea also began to accelerate. Between 1920 and
1929, capital investment in industry in Korea increased more than three times. In
particular, in the attempts to make Korea into a military supply base for the invasion of
China, capital investment in heavy industry rose rapidly. After the popular uprising
against the imperial regime in 1919, the Japanese colonial regime sought to make Korea
'gradually' into a part of Japan by encouraging a certain degree of capitalist
development, which resembled the Japanese development strategy, and permitting and
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even selectively supporting the establishment of Korean firms. 23 Afterwards, 'Korea
was to play a part in the plan linking the metropole with hinterland economies'
(Cumings 1997, p. 163). What the government-general did to achieve this was to
implant a Japanese-like institutional economic foundation, which consisted of state-
owned banks such as the Bank of Joseon and the Korean Industrial Bank, which offered
massive loans to firms in the line of the state's economic development policy,
particularly state-owned companies such as the Oriental Development Company.
Corresponding to the increasing demands for the invasion of China, capital investment
and industrialisation further developed, through this tripartite system which consisted of
state bureaucrats, state-owned banks and private capital, to a significant extent from the
mid 1930s, locating the means of production for heavy industries in the northern Korean
peninsula and Manchuria and mobilising labour power for production, which caused
23 A mass demonstration on the 1 g March 1919, led mainly by liberal nationalists, demanded
withdrawal of the Japanese army and the immediate independence of Korea. However, this
March 1st movement did not achieve its aim. Facing the superior military force of the Japanese
army, the principle of peaceful demonstration resulted only in a massacre in which over 7,000
Koreans were killed and 45,000 were arrested. This movement was a turning point both for
Japanese colonial policy and the Korean independence movement. Firstly, the communist and
socialist independent movement separated themselves from the nationalist movement,
criticising the nationalist leaders who initiated the movement but later attempted to calm down a
further development of struggles. After this event, those left movement groups concentrated on
developing their own organisation and succeeded in establishing the Joseon Communist Party in
1925, that however failed to integrate some communist groups, such as Korea Communist
League, into the party. In the 1920s, the Joseon Communist Party appeared to have significant
influence over workers' and peasants' organisations, such as the Joseon General Federation of
Labour. Although the Party itself was soon paralysed by the Japanese police, by the end of the
1920s communists 'were leading the Korean resistance movement' (Cumings 1997, p. 159).
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swift urbanisation in those areas. 'With minimal business taxes' and most of all cheap
labour and the government-general's unlimited support for labour control, Japanese
zaibatsu such as Mitsui, Nissan and Sumitomo had 75 percent of total capital
investment by 1940 (Cumings 1997, p. 168). Meanwhile, the embryonic form of the
Korean capitalist class also emerged from the traditional landlord class, supported by
credit from the state-owned Korean Industrial Bank.
The brutality of colonial development and the development of class struggle
The immediate consequence of the planned primitive accumulation and colonial
industrialisation was a significant increase in the number of the wage labourers, firstly
in trade, transportation and construction sectors in accordance with colonial policy in
the 1910s, and later in heavy industries such as metal, chemicals and electricity in the
1930s, when Japan sought to make the Korean peninsula a military supply base. The
number of workers employed in industry increased from 384,951 in 1932 to 1,321,713
in 1943 (Cumings 1997, p. 170). The total number of the working class in late 1944 was
reported as over two million (FKTU 1979, p. 224).
This massive increase of the working class was accompanied by a specific
development of the method of organising labour power, creating a specific trajectory of
the development of the social relations of capitalist production in Korea. Although
labour power was organised for capital accumulation, individual workers were hardly
'free labourers' but personally bound to the capitalist by vulgar violence of the capitalist
at the work place and semi-feudalistic labour contracts, which had no guarantee of wage,
maximum labour hours, and of the duration of employment. It was not difficult to see
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contracts that forced workers to pay a deposit for the job and to get permission from the
employer to quit the job. These two forms of labour control featured the colonial
formation of the social relations of capitalist production as the coercive subordination of
individual workers to capitalists. Under this form of labour control, Korean workers
suffered from excessive working hours, usually over 12 hours a day, and extremely low
wages, the average of which was less than half of that of Japanese workers in Korea
(FKTU 1979, p. 37). This form of labour control, which sought to subordinate
individual workers, who had been by and large peasants, to capitalist production
naturally caused class struggle, often in the form of revolt against Japanese managers. In
the early industrialisation, the primary form of class struggle was, however, to escape
from the workplace in the attempt simply to avoid the unbearable working conditions.
In addition to the coercive control of labour by individual capitalists, what should be
pointed out with regard to the method of subordination of workers to capital is the
state's control of workers' collective actions. The fact that the workers escaping from
their workplace were often captured and sent back by the police (KFTU 1979, p. 237)
shows us the relation between the state and individual capital and the form of the
colonial state. There was virtually no collective action that did not cause intervention of
the colonial state, primarily in the form of direct intervention relying on police and
military power. Facing grass-roots development of an organised labour movement and
trade unionism in Korea from the 1920s, the state intervened in the everyday activity of
trade unions as well as their strike actions. Annual or monthly meetings and lectures of
trade unions could be held with police inspections and permission. Firms that had strong
trade unions had branches of police stations in the firms. Trade unions' claims in strike
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action were to be firstly checked by police. In Pyunyang, which was one of the most
industrialised cities in Korea in the 1930s, the police department asked individual
capitalists to immediately inform them if they employed or dismissed workers,
,
increased or decreased the wage, changed the facilities for workers and noticed any kind
of signs of collective action of workers (Kim, G. I. 1992, p. 484). In Jinju, Busan,
Ulsan, the state sought to hinder the establishment of trade unions and break existing
trade unions by force, after trade unions began to emerge seriously in the 1930s (Kim, G.
I. 1992, p. 482). Otherwise, as we can see in Jeonbuk province, police organised quasi-
workers' organisations, so-called security unions (Boanjohap), which usually played the
role of breaking unions, and exercised violent measures against union members under
the auspices of the police department (Kim, G. I. 1992, p. 483).
In spite of a firm control of labour by the state, workers' attempts to organise
continued. A grass-roots form of nation-wide workers' organisation, the Korean
Labourers' Mutual Aid Association (KLMAA), was established in 1920. The Joseon
General Federation of Labour, established in 1924, was the first organisation which
emphasised, in public, the class interest of workers against capitalists and the Japanese
Imperialist regime. This federation developed into two separate organisations later in
1927: The Joseon General Federation of Labour and Korean Farmers' Union. In the
early formation of the organised workers' movement, labour conflicts arouse mainly at
the enterprise level. However, in some specific sectors and industrial areas in which
Japanese capital was intensely invested, the regional and industrial level of struggle also
developed throughout the 1920s, such as the Busan Dockers' Strike in 1921 and the
Yung-Hueng Workers' General Strike in 1928, which lasted for several months with
153
anti-capitalist and anti-Japanese slogans. This development of struggle from the early
1920s culminated in the Won-San General Strike. The Won-San General Strike in 1929
was the largest general strike in the history of the Korean labour movement under
Japanese occupation, even though it was limited regionally. This strike lasted for four
months, raising national issues in the organised workers' struggle and inspiring the anti-
Japanese movement.
In the meantime, in rural areas, tenancy disputes between peasant and landlord
increased. Based on the privileges through which landed property remained as the
source of social and political power, during the 1920s, landlords kept increasing rents
and expanding their land by taking over the land of half-tenant farmers, who could not
manage to pay for their tenancy. Living condition of the peasant class, who got their
living from small tenant lands and suffered from the double burden of the forced sale of
their rice products to the colonial state and increasing rents, swiftly deteriorated. In
1930, half of the farming households were starving (Moon and Song 2000, p. 146).
Many peasants, who were the vast majority of the Korean population, chose to leave
their hometowns to become wage labourers in urban areas or coal fields and immigrate
to Manchuria, Japan and the northern part of the Korean peninsula. However the
peasant class also often challenged this semi-feudalistic social domination through
tenancy conflicts. In many provinces, radical organisation of farmers emerged and
developed throughout the 1930s.
Those workers' and peasants' movements were supported by the independence
movement, which was led by two groups that were often antagonistic with each other:
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the communists and liberal nationalists. Communist independence movement groups
established the Joseon Communist Party in 1925, which influenced labour and peasant
organisations and played a critical role in organising a nation-wide anti-Japanese .
demonstration on 10 th of June 1926. After the breaking-up of the Joseon Communist
Party by Japanese police in 1930, communist groups went underground and contributed
to radicalising workers' and peasants' movement through organising 'red-circles' in
factories and regions, in attempting to re-establish the Communist Party. On the other
hand, communists in exile in Manchuria and Russia established their own communist
parties, joined the Chinese revolution or led armed struggles in Manchuria. 24 Liberal
nationalists and some mid-left wing nationalists set up a provisional goverment
(Daehanminguk Imsijeongbu: 1919-1944) at Shanghai in 1919, resisting the Japanese
colonial authority in China and Manchuria through 'bomb-throwing exercise' (Suh
1967, p. 132, quote from Cumings 1997, p. 159) and supporting the independence
movement in the Korean peninsular. Inside Korea, `Singanhoe' (1927-1931), a
nationalist movement organisation, which included liberal nationalist as well as some
communists groups, was established and appeared to be the most influential nationalist
organisation with 138 branches and over 30,000 members across the nation, supporting
'studies of Korean language' and 'more freedom of expression' (Cumings 1997, p. 156).
The anti-workers policies and forced mobilisation of the labour force was
strengthened when Japan went into war against China and subsequently the U.S. During
24	 •Kim 11-sung, the ruler of North Korea after liberation was one of the leaders in the armed
struggle in Manchuria.
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the war, the colonial state sought to integrate Koreans into the Japanese War
mobilisation by means of various forms of national movement based on the ' naisen ittai
policy', encouraging nationalism based on the idea that Japanese and Korean are 'one-
body' (ilche) and organising '3,245 youth organisations at all levels, with a total
membership of 2.5 million' (Cumings 1997, p. 177). On the other hand, the colonial
state became more suppressive toward any form of organised workers' and peasants'
movement, increasing the number of police, that reached over 35,000 in 1942, which
was 50% more than in 1932, and creating the Korean Anti-Communist Association
which 'had branches in every province, local offices in police stations and associated
groups in villages, factories, and other workplaces' (Cumings 1997, p. 177). In order to
supply labour power, the government-general declared the National General
Mobilisation Law in 1938 that forced Koreans to work in factories and construction
sites in Manchuria, Northern Korea and Japan, creating millions of emigrant workers.25
All anti-Japanese movements had to go underground from the late 1930s, since the
colonial state introduced emergency measures for the war. Workers' and peasants'
struggles often appeared to threaten the colonial state and colonial development.
However, what withered the colonial state away was not the people's struggle but the
25 While trade unions and other organised form of workers' struggle were practically
prevented and suffered from a heavy-handed intervention of the colonial state, the natural form
of resistance kept occurring by the 1940s noticeably in the form of widespread absenteeism.
After the state began to mobilise workers into factory and construction sites by force according
to the National General Mobilisation Law, which was legislated for the invasion of the continent,
the rate of absenteeism reached 20% in manufacturing and 25% in the mining industry in 1942
(FKTU 1979, p. 236).
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Japanese defeat in the Second World War. This would open another phase of the
development of the state in Korea, which would again not be under the control of
Korean people.
The Japanese colonisation and its legacy in the further development of social
relations in Korea
Japanese colonisation initiated capitalist development in Korea by accelerating the
separation of means of production and subsistence from farmers, turning traditional
land-ownership into capitalist private property rights and commodifying the products of
labour and labour power. However, while the colonisation largely brought capitalist
development in general, it took a specific form, due to its colonial features and
immaturity, the consequence of which offered the basis for the further specific
development of capitalism in Korea. First of all, the limits of the early formation of
capitalist social relations throughout the primitive accumulation are to be considered.
Although the separation of producers from the means of production and subsistence was
significantly achieved, the integration of the mass of the population into capitalist wage-
relations was very limited. By the end of colonisation, the vast majority of people still
remained in rural areas, not as agricultural wage-workers but merely as surplus
population, who were getting their living from cultivating small tenant lands owned by
landlords. Although the majority of the products from the land owned by landlords were
for sale as commodities, the relations between land-owners and direct producers were
not wage-relations, while wage labour existed, as a secondary source of income, merely
in the form of seasonal jobs in agricultural, construction and mining sectors, especially
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during the winter (Paik 1987, pp. 75-6). Also, as we saw above, those who left rural
areas and became industrial workers in manufacturing sectors were not free labour, in
the sense that they had free contracts with their employers by their will. On the contrary,
many wage-workers were mobilised and allocated by the colonial state and state agents,
often with feudal-like labour contracts and surveillance. Also, the majority of wage-
workers were employed in handicraft-based industry while large-scale industry
developed only in a few specific sectors run by Japanese capital. This shows another
aspect of colonial development, that is to say, immature development of Korean capital
and the capitalist class. Although a significant amount of capital was invested in Korea
and means of production located in Korea, there was little accumulation of 'Korean'
capital during the colonial period. The Japanese colonial regime barely allowed the
landed class to become industrial capitalists, discouraging the establishment of Korean
firms and securing profit from landed property much higher than industrial investment
and, therefore, making industrial investment less attractive for Korean landlords (Suh
1991, p. 61). Although some Korean capitals could survive by collaborating with the
government-general's industrialisation policy for military demands, the fact that '91%
of the total capital reported by factories was owned by Japanese' in 1939 (Ho 1984, p.
374) shows the weakness and immaturity of Korean capital and the capitalist class.
Furthermore, small and medium size Korean firms were forcibly closed after the
government general's Readjustment of Company Act (Kieopjeongbiryung) in 1940.
Therefore, in spite of the initiation of the capitalist development of Korea, the reality of
the Korean capitalist class was far from a dominant social power in Korean society in
the first half of the 20 th century.
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The pre-capitalist feature of colonial development appeared also in the development
of the colonial state itself. By 1945, Japanese colonisation had initiated the separation of
political domination from economic domination since the direct relations between
economic and political domination, the immediacy of which was incarnated in the yang-
ban landlord class, were largely weakened by the establishment of the colonial state in
which 'career bureaucrats took over official functions' and replaced landlord
bureaucrats (Kohli 1994, p. 1277). In addition, the traditional ownership of land had
been replaced with capitalist property ownership. However, on the other hand, the
colonial state did not remove the social power of the landlord class because the colonial
state attempted to control the Korean agrarian sectors, and thereby the majority of the
Korean population 'by involving the land-owning classes as ruling partner' (Kohli 1994,
p. 1277). Instead, the state secured their land-ownership, albeit with the disappearance
of the traditional basis of land ownership, by force and, moreover, incorporated them
into local governance and let them play a significant role in maintaining control over
rural villages (Kohli 1994, p. 1277). Therefore, the significant social power of the .
landlord class often nullified the separation of political from economic domination and
allowed the landlord class to exercise unilateral power in ruling rural villages as well as
tenant farmers.
Hence, although it is true that the colonial state actually dominated the process of
primitive accumulation, it does not simply mean that the colonial developmental state
'stood above the society' (Cumings 1984, p. 487) or individual capitals were
subordinated to the 'overdeveloped' state. Rather, the colonial state existed as a moment
of colonial development of capitalist social relations, in which the boundaries between
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political and economic domination was not yet defined, i.e., the boundaries between the
political state and civil society were not yet clearly defined. During colonial primitive
accumulation, the colonial state was directly subordinated to the interest of Japanese
capital. The economic power of Japanese capital was equated with the political power
of the colonial state. On the other hand, the landlord class, although it could not
dominate the state apparatus directly, still remained the dominant power economically
as well as politically in a large area, since landed property was still a major source of
social domination over the vast majority of the population. In consequence, there was
no such mystification of the way in which social relations took the form of the political
state.26
Therefore, the Japanese legacy in the further development of Korean capitalism lies
not in the fact that, as many argued, colonisation built up a well-organised body of state
apparatus. Rather, the legacy comes from the feature of colonial primitive accumulation
which brought a specifically unbalanced development of capitalist social relations.
Massive proletarianisation coexisted with limited creation of wage labour. Capital
accumulation did not accompany the development of the social domination of a Korean
26 Therefore, albeit the phenomenal similarity between the developmental state in the 60s and
1970s and the colonial state in terms of the state's control over money through state-owned
banks and labour through direct intervention, it is important to bear in mind that there is a clear
discontinuity between the colonial state and the so-called developmental form of the state,
particularly in terms of the way in which the dominant social class took a political form. This
distinction between two forms of the state was often ignored by the statist arguments, due to
their one-dimensional arguments about the relations between business and the state. In this
sense, as we will see later, the state during the 1950s was closer to the colonial state, rather than
to the so-called developmental state in the 1960s and 1970s.
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capitalist class. Capitalist property relations were mingled with land ownership of a pre-
capitalist landlord class. The strong state apparatus developed without clear distinction
from civil society. All together, the feature and limits of primitive accumulation led to
particular social conditions and class composition from which particularly articulated
early capital relations could emerge after the liberation. While Korean capitalists lacked
social domination, the means of production which had been owned by Japanese capital
were handed over to the state after liberation, allowing the state to create a capitalist
class through the sale of state-vested property, including land and means of production.
Furthermore, colonial development, in which the dominant classes, noticeably Japanese
capitalists and landlords as well as Korean landlords, took the form of vulgar
domination through the undifferentiated relations with the colonial political power,
contributed to radically politicised class struggle from dominated classes, such as
peasant and workers, which threatened the reproduction of social relations after
liberation. Such a development, after liberation, caused state intervention in the
relations between capital and labour as well as landlord and peasants. The challenge
from workers created the manner in which the state intervened in labour disputes at the
workplace level by anti-workers legislation, pro-capitalist unions and direct forces while
the peasant struggles later brought the swift demise of the landlord class by forcing the
state to implement land reform. Without doubt, these social consequences of colonial
development, together with the development of the state apparatus itself, affected the
early formation of capitalist social relations. However, this does not mean that the
realisation of colonial legacies into the particular development of capitalist social
relations was necessary. This development needed the more specific historical
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development of capitalism in Korea, mainly through the further development of class
struggles after liberation.
2. The Early Form of the Korean Capitalist State 	 1
Liberation and the crisis of reproduction of capitalist social relations
The liberation from Japan produced not only national independence but also a
serious crisis of the further development of capitalist production in the aftermath of the
liberation. Firstly, the crisis was caused by the withdrawal of Japanese capital, which
was over 90% of total paid-up capital in Korea during the Japanese colonial period.
Although the means of production were abandoned and remained in Korea after
liberation, only a few of them could keep producing because the withdrawal of Japanese
capital meant the absence of a provider for materials, skilled-workers and parts for
machinery. In addition to these problems, there was also a massive movement of the
working population from the workplaces to their hometowns, since the large portion of
the workers in industrial sites had been employed and organised by force by the colonial
regime. Also, the division between south and north Korea contributed to the crisis by
creating a lack of labour power in the north and a lack of raw material in the south. As a
result of all this, only half of the manufacturing firms could survive in the south in 1946,
employing little more than 110,000 workers which was also merely half of those in
1943, and producing only a quarter of the industrial products in 1943 (Kim, H. G. 1988,
p. 154; Cho and Lee 1995, pp. 170-1). The effect of liberation was serious not only for
the amount of production but also for the form of industry. Facing the lack of capital,
162
skilled workers and raw materials, large-scale industry stopped performing and national
industry by and large fell back into manufacture and domestic handicraft industry (Kim,
H. G. 1988, p. 155).
Further capitalist development was threatened also by organised labour and peasant
movements which emerged swiftly after liberation. Together with the strong influence
of left-wing political groups, which effectively organised the 'Committee for the
Preparation of Korean Independence' soon after the liberation in August 1945 and
declared the 'People's Republic of Korea' in September 1945, workers and peasants
attempted to put the previously Japanese-owned factories and land under their control.
This workers' control movement later became one of the principle strategies of the
Korean National Council of Trade Unions (Jeonpyeong), established in 1945 with 16
industrial unions and approximately 500,000 members.
The U.S. occupation and the defeat of the workers' movement
The U.S. military government played the most significant role in overcoming the
crisis after liberation. Immediately after a provisional U.S. military government was
established in Korea in September 1945, the military government initiated the
reconstruction of capitalist social relations through establishing the Korean government
and reformulating the capitalist class by suppressing the labour movement and
redistributing state-vested property. The state bureaucracy was filled up with
'collaborators' who had experience in bureaucratic bodies under the colonial regime or
landlords and landlord-entrepreneurs, who together organised the Korean Democratic
Party since 'American occupation authorities usually required that Koreans have
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experience in the colonial apparatus before employing them' (Cumings 1984, P. 479).
This continuity between the colonial state and the new Korean state, pursued by the U.S
military government, appeared also in the establishment of the Korean army and police
force. Most of the high-ranking positions in the police department were occupied by
those who had served in the colonial police force (Cumings 1997, pp. 200-1). The
Korean army was also organised in the same way.
Even after the establishment of the first Korean goverment, it was the U.S. that
enabled the Korean state to continue to play its significant role in the formation of
capital relations by supplying the resources and forces. Contrary to the U.S. occupation
policies in Japan and Germany, which initially encouraged the trade union movement
and thereby regulated individual capitals which had collaborated with the Fascist
regimes, the U.S. seems to have conceived, facing the increasing tension between the
U.S. and Soviet Union around the Korean peninsula, the existence of strong socialist
influence as the most critical obstacle for the establishment of an anti-communist
regime in South Korea and, furthermore, for the reconstruction of global capitalist
development under the U.S. hegemony. Hence, the U.S. authorities more directly
attempted to break down the radical labour movement by illegalising unions' strike
activity in December 1945 and later the Jeonpyeong itself. On the other hand, the U.S.
military also put all private property having been owned by Japanese capital under the
direct control of the U.S. authorities as state-owned property, thereby confronting the
workers' control movement. Although the labour movement attempted to organise
several nation-wide general strikes in order to fight back against the U.S. military
government, including the September Strike in 1946, February 7 th Strike and May 8th
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Strike in 1948, the radical labour movement could not cope with the overwhelming
military force of the U.S. authority. By the end of the 1940s, the right wing pro-
capitalist trade union federation, the Korean Labour Federation for Independence
,
Promotion (KLFIP), overpowered the communist-led trade union movement, in spite of
a lack of support from the shop-floor. In the meantime, the U.S. military government,
which had run the factories by appointing U.S. Army officers as managers since early
1946, began to hand over managerial authority to Korean managers. Those Korean
managers, who had worked mainly for Japanese capital as sub-managers and skilled
workers, or had run small businesses during the colonial period, were also given priority
in purchasing the state-vested properties, the sale of which began from March 1947.
This was the starting point of the process that 'the state power artificially formed capital
as the subject of enterprise management at the enterprise level' (Kim, H. G. 1985, p. 55).
Backed by the U.S. military government, the liberal political groups, which had been
overwhelmed by the left-wing political groups in the aftermath of liberation, could now
overshadow the socialist influence by the late 1940s, dominating the bureaucratic body
of the provisional government. In spite of conflict between the landlord class's Korean
DemocratiC Party and liberal nationalists, such as Rhee Syng-man, an alliance between
those two political groups against the communist movement became a major political
influence that dominated the state apparatus and parliament. Most of all, both of them
shared an interest in tackling the emergence of the communist movement, including the
People's Republic (Inmingonghwaguk) and the Korean National Council of Trade
Unions (Jeonpyeong), which threatened both the social domination of the landlord class
and the reproduction of capitalist order in Korea. Although the Korean Democratic
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Party, the favourite political partner of the U.S. authority, failed to achieve a majority
by itself, the first general election in 1948 was largely a triumph of anti-communist and
pro-American political groups, including that of Rhee Syng-man, the first President of
the Republic of Korea. Those liberal nationalists fully succeeded in excluding any form
of political opponents against the reproduction of capitalist social relations in South
Korea. The political domination of liberals was completed also by weakening the
political power of both the middle left-wing and middle right-wing nationalist groups,
the leaders of which, such as Kim Gu and Yo Un-Hyung, who claimed that
independence and the unification of both Koreas were superior to capitalist reproduction,
were murdered.
The crisis of capitalist development, which was caused by the end of colonial rule,
seemed to be overcome by the defeat of the workers' and peasants' movement by the
U.S. military force and state-led reformulation of capitalist social relations. However, in
fact, the Korean peninsula was still in turmoil. Even when the Republic of Korea was
constitutionally established in 1948, political struggles that denied the legitimacy of the
republic persisted, in the form of armed revolts and partisan struggles in southern
provinces, killing more than 100,000 people even before the war. This shows the
incompleteness of the social basis for the reproduction of capitalist social relations in
South Korea. Putting capitalist development on the right track needed a more complete
recomposition of the classes, which would be achieved by a more disastrous process,
the civil war.
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The Korean War, reconstruction of capitalist social relations and the state
The Korean War was a distorted class war between Stalinist North Korea, which
argued that the war was for the emancipation of South Korean workers, and South
Korea, which argued that the war was a holy war for democracy against totalitarian
communism. However, it is hardly true that the war was a holy war either for
democracy or for the emancipation of workers, having seen what those two Korean
states did during the war. The clearest result of that was a total decomposition of the
working class in both Koreas. The workers' and peasants' movements were completely
destroyed during and as a result of the war, which also created an extreme anti-
communism in South Korea that was later utilised by the state as a primary method to
brutally suppress the collective power of the working class, and thereby to subordinate
the working class to capital. On the other hand, the state apparatus developed through
the three-year war, both in terms of size and strength. Indeed, the legitimacy of the state,
which had been questioned in the aftermath of liberation, now appeared to be fully
recognised through the war against the 'communist threat to freedom'.27
27 The legitimacy of the state formed throughout the war was based firmly on brutal violence.
In both Koreas, to recognise the state legitimacy or not was the question of survival during the
war. People should express by all means their willingness to collaborate with the 'existing'
authority when the North and South Korean army in turn occupied their villages. Otherwise,
they are recognised not as civilians but as enemies to be removed through massacres. This
process incarnated the brutal nature of the relations between people and the state force. (see
Kim, D. C. 2000). This war became the moment that created the long-lasting method of
reproducing the subordination of labour to the state authority as well as to capital.
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During and in the aftermath of the war, the landlord class also declined swiftly.
Already in the aftermath of the liberation, the social power of the landlord class had
been significantly challenged by the radicalised peasant movement, criticising the
collaborating characteristic of the landlord class during the colonial period. Now, facing
the struggles of the peasant class, who made up over 80% of the population, and a
revolutionary land reform in North Korea that inspired peasants in the South, a land
reform appeared to be necessary in South Korea as well. Although land reform was
designed, through parliaments still occupied largely by the landlord class, to give the
landlord class a certain priority in purchasing state-vested means of production that
Japanese capital had left, the result turned out rather disastrous for the landlord class
(Suh 1991, pp. 65-7). Firstly, it caused a decline of the vast majority of landlords who
owned so little land that they could not purchase the means of production with the
compensation from the state. Secondly, the value of the bond that the government
issued for compensation was initially a lot cheaper than the market price of land and
later even massively decreased due to inflation during and in the aftermath of the war.
In addition, the political alliance between liberal nationalists and the landlord class was
largely weakened since the liberal nationalists gained their own political power by
establishing Rhee Syng-man's Liberal Party, whereas many landlords lost their
economic resources through the devastating civil war. As a result, a relatively
revolutionary land reform was implemented during the war, causing a significant
change in class composition in South Korea by removing the traditional social
dominance of the landlord class. Instead, it created a significant semi-proletarianised
rural population, which owned small-sized farms for their own living.
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During the post-war period, economic development was obviously based on foreign
aid from the U.S., which reached more than $4 billion, including economic and military
aid, and financed more than 70% of imports throughout the 1950s (Koo and E. M. Kim
1992, p. 123; Haggard 1990, p. 55). The tremendous foreign aid given to South Korea
reflected the U.S.'s attempts to resume capitalist development in Korean. The priority
was given to sustaining overwhelming military power in the Korean peninsula and
removing the immediate causes of social instability, in order to stop communist
expansion in Asia at the beginning of the Cold War. Contrary to the U.S. policy that
emphasised the supply of consumer goods and stabilisation on the basis of 'sound fiscal
and monetary policies', Rhee Syng-man's goverment attempted to invest into capital
goods in order to launch a more aggressive import substituting industrialisation.
However, despite the ambition of the Korean government, foreign aid focusing on
supplying consumer goods looked inevitable. 28 The state expenditure, especially in
expanded military expenses for over 600,000 armed forces, relied heavily on the
'counter fund', which was financed by the sale of aid-based imported goods in the
domestic markets, under the control of the Combined Economic Board created by the
Agreement between the Republic of Korea Government and the Unified Command
28 This does not mean that Rhee Syng-man government had a clear development policy.
Rather, policies were concentrated merely on maximising the foreign aid through an overvalued
exchange rate and securing economic success of the Liberal party supporters through privileged
access to cheap U.S. dollars and aid materials (Koo and E. M. Kim 1992, p. 124). Although the
Rhee Syng-man government announced a comprehensive plan for economic restoration and
established the Ministry of Reconstruction in 1955 and Economic Development Council in 1958,
no major development plan was actually implemented.
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Concerning Economic Coordination. Therefore, it seemed more or less inevitable, with
the given amount of aid, that the state allocated the financial resources to the import of
consumption and some intermediate goods, domestic demand for which could be
sustained steadily, therefore securing the source of state expenditure, rather than capital
goods. As a result, the majority of foreign aid was allocated to imports of consumer
goods and intermediate goods that did not require much additional processing within the
country (Kim, K. S. and J. K. Kim 1997, p. 14).
During this period, capital accumulation in Korea depended on the development of
domestic firms that could 'purchase raw materials supplied as a part of the U.S. aid
program at an overvalued official exchange rate' and succeeded in realising the
produced value in non-competitive domestic markets (Haggard 1990, p. 57). Reflecting
raw materials given by foreign aid, capital accumulated merely in the light industries
such as sugar manufacturing, the milling and cotton industries. In order to secure
exclusive allocation of raw materials and loans, it was necessary for the capitalists to
attract Rhee Syng-man's government, which exclusively controlled aid and imported
grains, by providing kickbacks to the Liberal Party (Haggard 1990, p. 57). Those
domestic firms, which had mutually beneficial relations with the state, also had an
opportunity to purchase means of production and land owned by the state at extremely
low prices. Many Korean chaebols laid the basis for accumulation in this period.
Hyundai, Samsung, the largest individual capitals in Korea, could begin accumulation
by purchasing means of production and real-estate from the state while LG and others
chaebols could laid the foundations through acquiring a certain portion of the foreign
aid from the state.
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In both allocating raw materials provided by the U.S. aid and redistributing the state-
vested means of production and other properties, the state could formulate the capitalist
class. However, accumulation based on the foreign aid and its distribution by the state
to a few domestic firms that financed Rhee Syng-man's Liberal party could no longer
be sustained by the end of the 1950s. Since capital investment was concentrated
intensively on some specific commodity production which could be produced with the
raw materials from the U.S., the domestic market could no longer absorb the
commodities and, therefore, a massive shut-down of operations in those industries
appeared inevitable (Park 1999, p. 136). Also, the U.S. began to decrease foreign aid to
Korea, imposing increasing pressure on the Rhee Syng-man government that took
advantage of anti-Japanese sentiment in sustaining its legitimacy and thereby did not
satisfy the U.S. policy pursuing more effective regulation of capital accumulation in
Asia under U.S. hegemony by establishing normalised relations between Japan and
other Asian economies. This made it hard for the individual capitals to find resources in
order to open up new industries. With increasing difficulty in making profit out of
industrial investment, a large portion of surplus value from the capitalist production was
invested in speculation, which worsened the conditions for capital accumulation,
precipitating inflation. Individual capitals attempted to overcome this depression at the
expense of the working class by intensifying labour and extending working hours,
causing the worsening of income distribution and mass unemployment. Growing
poverty and inequality also raised questions about the relations between a few
individual capitals and government, in the form of mass struggles against corrupt
relations between them. The Liberal Party responded to the struggles with vulgar force
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and benign political rhetoric, merely inspiring people further to demand more
democracy. By the end of the 1950s, the regime could not be legitimated either by
economic achievements, which can integrate labour into capitalist accumulation by
raising living standards in spite of exploitation, or by mere formal democratic reforms,
which were postponed by the government with the excuse of the confrontation with the
communist North Korea. The state, which led the reconstruction of capitalist social
relations, now became the target of people's struggle. Eventually, the student movement,
which struggled for formal democratic reforms against the corrupt government, ended
the regime in 1960.
The development of class struggle
The working class's movement established an alternative labour federation, the
National Council of Trade Unions, which confronted the KLFIP's pro-capitalist
character, in 1959. The establishment of the NCTU resulted from the struggle that
showed the existing labour federation was nothing but a state apparatus, which
guaranteed the subordination of the working class to capital by sheer force. Although
the working class suffered from low wages, extremely long working days and capitalist
violence, the working class movement could not re-emerge in any form during the
1950s. It could be understood in terms of the total decomposition of the working class
through the war. The trade union leadership of the KLFIP played an important role as
an institutional basis to confine the working class struggle to the individual or at best
workplace level, enjoying their privileged positions economically and politically.
Therefore, although there were an increasing number of conflicts at shop floor level
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throughout the 50s, there were few significant struggles organised by trade unions.
However, this does not mean that workers did not attempt to overcome the suppressive
labour control by the state and capitalists, on the one hand, and by the pro-capitalist
trade unions, on the other. The struggles in the 1950s were focused mainly on wages,
especially back wage problems and mass dismissal. Despite the pro-capitalist leadership
of the labour movement, some struggles succeeded in forcing the trade unions to
confront the capitalists and the state and showed the possibility of the revitalisation of
the working class movement. The workers' struggle in Joseon Textile Company in
Busan during the war is one of the cases. The struggle succeeded in provoking the
issues of working conditions and workers' rights, developing workers' struggle in a firm,
which demanded the resolution of the back wage problem, the freedom of union activity
and stopping dismissals, into nationwide social and political issues. Workers' struggles
continued for a few months. This struggle forced the pro-capitalist federation of trade
unions to confront the state and capitalists, making the National Assembly investigate
the struggle and later enact laws regarding labour relations, such as the Labour Union
Law, Labour Standard Law, Labour Committee Law and Labour Dispute Regulation
Law (Kim, N. J. 1982, p.172). In the late 1950s, the KLFIP's legitimacy as a
representative of the working class movement was again seriously undermined by the
struggle in the Daehan Textile Company in Taegu, which clearly revealed the pro-
capitalist character of the federation and was followed by the establishment of an
alternative union federation, the NCTU, which included 311 trade unions and 140,000
members (CKTU 1997, p. 6). The struggle in Daehan Textile Company indicated a new
form of trade union movement, called 'democratic trade union movement' (Minjunojo
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Undong), in denying the leadership of the pro-capitalist trade union leaders and the
federation in the process of struggles. During the struggle, rank and file workers
distrusted and changed the president and executive of the union, who attempted to
compromise with the state and capitalist according to the policy of the KLFIP, playing
an important role to set a basis for the anti-KLFIP trade union movement (Kim 1982, p.
207). However, although the early form of a democratic trade union movement had
emerged, it was clear that the working class movement as a whole remained
undeveloped. Workers attempted to solve labour disputes through making a plea to the
state for generous state intervention and turning the issues of exploitation into issues of
morality and humanity. Also, the working class movement was unable to organise
themselves at national or industrial level in order to change the brutal nature of the
reproduction of early capital relations.
The early politicised formation of capitalist social relations and its limits
Although capitalist development was very limited, owing to poor capital
accumulation and industrialisation, the consequence of the development of capitalist
social relations in the 1950s appeared to be significant for further capitalist development
in Korea. The development in the 1950s, after the civil war, began with a specific class
composition in which the working class was decomposed, capitalists undeveloped and
the landlord class declined swiftly. In the aftermath of the war, it was the state that
could lead a further capitalist development through exercising a well-organised
bureaucratic body and centralised power with overwhelming military and police force,
on the one hand, and its absolute authority to allocate foreign aid and distribute state-
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vested property, on the other. In the meantime, the newly emerging capitalist class had
to rely on and take advantage of the state, because the source of capital investment and
initial accumulation depended on attracting the state, which controlled and allocated
foreign aid and loans as well as state-vested means of production. Throughout the 1950s,
the state artificially created the capitalist class, suppressed the re-emergence of the
collective power of the working class and gradually undermined the social power of the
landlord class through land reform. In short, the capitalist development of the 1950s
showed the beginning of the politicised formulation and reproduction of capital
relations, in which the state regulates the collective power of labour as well as
individual capitals.
However, even if the 1950s founded a particular form of capitalist development, it is
also important to understand the limits of the capitalist development in the 1950s.
Capitalist industrialisation was so limited that, in spite of massive proletarianisation of
the population, only a minority of the population was employed as wage workers and
the majority of the population remained `proletarianised rural poor'. On the other hand,
the traditional immediacy, incarnated in the existence of the landlord class, between
economic and political domination significantly disappeared throughout the 1950s.
However, political and economic domination were, in fact, not clearly distinguishable
since the immediacy between political and economic domination largely remained in
the form of direct and personal relations between the state and newly emerging
capitalist class. In other words, the traditional immediacy between political and
economic domination in the form of traditional social domination of the landlord class
was merely replaced by the immediate alliance between the state and individual
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capitalists. In fact, most of the state-vested means of production was allocated to the
supporters and members of the Rhee Syng-man's Liberal Party. Indeed, the ruling party
invested directly in private projects receiving U.S. aid (Haggard 1990, p. 57). Even if
the state became the sole and holy protector of people from brutal communist threat
through the war, the way in which capitalist social domination took the form of the
political apparatus was not yet mystified at all. This immediate relation between the
political and economic finally provoked the crisis of the state in 1960.
Although the state had largely been successful in suppressing the emergence of the
collective power of labour through control over the pro-capitalist federation and by
police force, the working class movement re-emerged from the workplaces in the early
form of democratic trade union movement. Those struggles against the pro-capitalist
KLFIP culminated in the attempt to organise an alternative union federation, i.e., the
NCTU in 1959. Nevertheless, the working class movement still remained marginal and
could not seriously undermine capitalist domination. Rather, it was the student
movement that questioned the nature of the early development of capitalist social
domination and finally overthrew the Rhee Syng-man regime in 1960. However, the
student movement seems not to have questioned capitalist development itself. It was the
form of manifestation of capitalist social dominance that was questioned by the student
movement. In other words, the antagonistic nature of capitalist development was
recognised merely in the form of corruption, the immediate relations between capitalists
and the state. The fact that, throughout the April Struggle in 1960, the essential nature
of antagonistic social relations behind the specific form of manifestation was not
questioned at all shows the limits of the early development of class struggles. As a
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result, the crisis of the reproduction of the social relations of capitalist production
provoked by the student movement in 1960 merely appeared and ended in the form of a
political crisis of a regime. The crisis became another beginning of the reconstruction
,
and stabilisation of the social relations by the military government, which came into
power by military coup in 1961.
Concluding Remark
The early formation of capitalist social relations in Korea had three historical
moments: Japanese colonisation and liberation, the subsequent US control over Korea,
and the Korean War. While Japanese colonisation initiated a serious capitalist
development in Korea by separating means of production and subsistence from farmers,
turning traditional land-ownership into capitalist private property rights and
commodifying the products of labour as well as labour power, it also accompanied
specific colonial features. The integration of the mass of the population into capitalist
wage-relations was so limited that the vast majority of the population still lived in rural
areas, not as wage-workers employed in commercial farming, but as surplus population
earning their living within tenant-landlord relations. Wage relations in manufacturing
sectors also in many cases featured feudal-like labour contracts, backed by surveillance
and violence by police and security unions. This colonial development also determined
the immature development of the Korean capitalist class, due to the lack of
accumulation in the hands of Koreans during the colonial period. On the other hand, in
spite of the weakening of its social power, the landlord class survived on the basis of the
177
alliance between the colonial state and the landlord class in controlling rural areas.
Since the colonial state served directly the interest of Japanese capital and landlords as
well as guaranteeing the interest of Korean landlords, there was not such a distinction
,
between the state and dominant classes.
During the post-liberation period, the U.S. military government and the subsequent
Rhee Syng-man Korean government played the most significant role in overcoming the
crisis caused by the highly politicised movement of workers and peasants that had
developed against colonial exploitation on the basis of feudalistic capital relations and
tenant-landlord relations. The state founded a further development of capital relations
by redistributing state-vested property to selected Korean entrepreneurs and
overpowering the labour and peasant movements. However, it was during and in the
aftermath of the Korean War that capitalist development in Korea took shape. The
Korean War produced a particular class composition, which consisted of the
decomposed working class, critically declining landlord class, and an immediate
alliance between the state and a few capitalists. Again, it was the state that had the
ability to reconstruct capitalist development with the absolute authority capable of
allocating means of production and raw materials. In this sense, the 1950s marked the
beginning of the politicised formation and the reproduction of capital relations, through
which the state regulated individual capitals and the working class. However, the early
politicisation of the formation of capital relations appeared, rather than offering a basis
of the mystification of the state in separation from dominant class, in the form of an
immediate alliance through which a few capitalists funded Rhee Syng-man's Liberal
Party and in return enjoyed highly exclusive allocation of raw materials from the U.S.
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aid. This form of accumulation based on foreign aid and the immediate alliance between
the state and a few domestic firms, could not be sustained for long. As industrial
production concentrated intensively on some specific sectors, relying on particular sorts
,
of raw materials from the U.S., came up against barrier of limited domestic markets and
the foreign aid from the U.S. decreased from 1958, individual capitals and the state
attempted to overcome this problem by speculative investment and intensifying labour'
and extending working hours. Suffering from growing poverty, massive unemployment
and high inflation, the labour movement began to re-emerge. Eventually, the
reconstruction of capitalist development, based on the immediate alliance between a
few capitalists and the state, was overthrown by the student movement, which struggled
for formal democratic reforms against the 'corrupt' government, in 1960.
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Chapter 7: The Development and Crisis of Capital
Relations and the Korean State
Introduction
Massive struggles against the vulgar form of an immediate alliance between the state
bureaucrats and particular capitalists, emerged in April 1960 and succeeded in bringing
the Rhee Syng-man government to an end. However, the struggles did not threaten the
given necessity of capitalist development itself, but only questioned the way in which
the social power of capital took the form of the political state, which appeared to be an
immediate alliance, therefore 'corrupted' personal relations, between politicians and
individual capitalists. Indeed, the extreme form of anti-communism, which had made it
possible for Rhee Syng-man's Liberal Party to suppress the working class, was not
questioned at all. While the people's struggle ended the early settlement of capital
relations in the form of the 'immediate alliance', the limit of the struggles also defined
the nature of the newly emerging form of capitalist domination. 29 After Park Chung-
hee's military coup, individual capitalists, particularly the early chaebols, were
29 Park Chung-hee, ironically, enjoyed the semblance between the agenda of the April
Movement and that of his military coup, arguing 'the unavoidable historical task in this decade,
as initiated in the course of the April and May Revolutions, is the modernisation of the
fatherland in all fields — political, economic, social and cultural... I therefore propose a great
reform movement to materialise our national ideals as demonstrated by the April 19 and May 16
Revolutions' (Park 1970, p. 286).
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excluded from the area of politics by force. The political state now went into a
significant transition, initiated by the military government whereby the members of the
state [military officers] did not belong to the dominant class and individual capitals
could not be directly involved in political matters. Now exercising its force not only
against labour but also against individual capitals ih promoting capital investment in
specific industrial sectors, particular export sectors, that could satisfy economic
development strategies designed by the state, the political appeared to be separated from
the immediate dominant class. It was through this transition that the immediacy between
political and economic domination appeared to be significantly resolved. The military
government got support from many on the basis of its extremely nationalistic dedication
to modernisation and economic development, and indeed, its real achievements. It was
in this way that the state became a moment of the inversion of capital relations,
contributing to the formation and reproduction of capital relations by translating the
relations of exploitation into neutral classless relations between 'Korean' political
citizens, i.e., translating the impossibility of class neutrality of the capitalist state into
possibility. 30 However, the mystification of the state contributing to the reproduction of
capital relations from the 1960s was far from stable. The state has increasingly
undermined the very basis of mystification since the early 1970s, by exercising its
30 The 'legitimate' or relatively smooth reproduction of the capitalist state is based on this
capacity of translating the impossible of being class neutral to the possible while the
reproduction of capital relations is also based on the continual translation of the impossibility of
classless capital relations into the imaginary possibility of that. The important thing is that the
possibility becomes 'reality' through this continual translation.
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power in response to the grass-roots struggle of the working class and provoking the
politicisation of class struggle against the state's control over labour. The politicised
class struggle, which appeared in the form of the democratisation movement as well as
the early development of 'democratic trade unionism' eventually led to the first crisis of
the politicised reproduction of capital relations, which took a particular form of the state,
at the end of the 1970s.
1. The Form of the State in the Politicised Formation of Capital Relations
in Korea
Politicised formation of capital relations and the paradox of the 'autonomous' state
After Park's military coup in 1961, the state suppressed the collective power of the
working class, which suffered from violent discipline and patriarchal hierarchy on the
shop floor, by various methods legitimated by the anti-communist agenda and then
enabled individual capitals to exploit the working class in the labour process without
resistance. Park's regime, which had banned the labour movement in the aftermath of
the military coup, later established the FKTU (Federation of Korean Trade Unions),
which was, in fact, not a trade union but a government organisation, attempting to
regulate the collective power of labour, which had re-emerged during the political
turbulence between 1960 and 1961. The new trade union federation, created and
organised by the KCIA (Korean Central Intelligence Agency), provided the way in
which the state controlled workers effectively from the national to the workplace level
through government approval of leaderships, subsidies and surveillance (Haggard 1990,
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p. 64). Also, the state tried to secure the control of the state over labour at workplace
level through establishing 'joint labour-management conferences' in individual firms in
the 1970s. The labour-management conference began to play an important role in
'preventing industrial conflicts and raising productivity' at the work place (Kim, D. H.
1988, p. 66). However, most of all, the working class's struggles were still dealt with
directly by the national security agencies and police. At the workplace in individual
enterprises, individual capitals did not usually have a specific department of labour
control or management, leaving labour control in the shop-floor to the traditionally
structured workplace hierarchy based on seniority as well as discrimination between
manual workers and non-manual workers in accordance with their educational
background, and on pro-capitalist trade unions. Indeed, the Bureau of Labour Affairs,
which was formally and legally supposed to be a prime state apparatus with regard to
labour regulation, had a relatively small role in regulating labour, limiting itself as a
supplement to regulation by police and national security agencies. 3I The state's control
over labour in the form of direct intervention by police and national security agencies
seems to have worked well, looking at the numbers of industrial conflicts in the
successful accumulation till the late 1960s, effectively eradicating the possibility of the
emergence of an organised labour movement. This created an aspect of the
contradictory form of the Korean capitalist state, i.e., the extreme class characteristic of
the state.
31 The fact that 7 out of the first 10 directors of the Labour Administration had been from
important positions in the police department since its establishment in 1963 (Kim, D. W. 1988,
p. 40) shows that labour regulation relied on direct intervention based on force and surveillance.
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However, in spite of its extreme class characteristic, what is important is that the
class characteristic of the state did not appear directly in the form of subordination of
the state to capital but rather in the form of the subordination of individual capitalists to
the state, creating the image of a state independent of classes. In other words, the
capitalist class also appeared to be subjected to the authority of the state since the state
also put individual capitalists under the control of the state, which argued repeatedly
and fanatically to be pursuing not the interest of a particular class or business but the
common-goal of the nation. One of the most effective methods of subjecting individual
capitalists to the state's leadership was through nationalised banks and financial
institutions. First of all, the military government put the domestic commercial banks
under the state's control by confiscating the privately held shares of domestic banks
from individual capitals in the aftermath of the military coup (Haggard 1990, p. 65).
While the state was now a primary shareholder, holding up to 31% of the total shares of
all commercial banks (Kim, S. 0. et al. 1997, p. 265), it also dominated the
management of the commercial banks by legislating 'the law of temporary measures
about financial institutions' that prevented private heavy shareholders from exercising
their voting rights in managerial boards. Managerial authority of the government over
commercial banks was again strengthened by the Bank Act amendment in 1962, by
which the MOF (Ministry of Finance) now appointed presidents of the commercial
banks. In addition, the military government subordinated the Bank of Korea to the MOF
by amending the Bank of Korea Act in 1962, monopolising the authority to regulate
foreign exchange and domestic financial flows. The state's control over individual
capitals was also enhanced significantly by establishing new state-owned banks, such as
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a Medium Industry Bank and the National Agricultural Cooperatives Federation, on the
one hand, and by setting up a new government organisation, the Economic Planning
Board (EPB), which took over the 'planning function from the Ministry of
Reconstruction and budgetary functions from the Bureau of the Budget in the Ministry
of Finance' (Haggard 1990, p. 65). The authority to approve foreign loans was
monopolised by the Bureau of Foreign Capital, later the Bureau of Economic
Cooperation, within the EPB by the amendment of the Foreign Capital Inducement Law
in 1961. By putting financial flows under its strict control and thereby forcing
individual capitals to invest in those preferred sectors, which had been argued as
delivering a better life for all, the state appeared to be distinguished from the dominant
class in spite of its extreme class characteristic that appeared in anti-worker state
policies. This provoked the other aspect of the contradictory basis of the Korean state,
i.e., the extreme autonomous-looking state from the dominant class.
The conditions and results of the early configuration of capital relations
During the 1960s, Korean economic development, based on the fast growth in
exports, was momentous enough to be called 'an economic miracle'. However, it was
not until the mid-1960s that either the particular formation of capital relations, through
which the state exercised its power in boosting export-based industrialisation by
allocating resources to individual capitals and controlling labour relations in favour of
capital, or the mystified autonomous state appeared in concrete forms. At the beginning,
Park's government emphasised construction of a self-reliant economy, rather than
export-driven economic development. As almost the sole supplier of financial resources
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to Korea, the U.S.'s response to the initial development plan designed by Park's
military goverment was highly sceptical. As we saw above, the U.S. began to pursue,
from the late 1950s, a Japan-centred developmental strategy in East Asia, which aimed
at releasing the U.S. from the heavy financial burden of foreign aid without, however,
harming either the further capitalist development or the U.S. influence in Korea and
East Asia. Park's initial development plan, therefore, caused conflicts with the U.S. As
the U.S. decreased its foreign aid to Korea, in an attempts to pressure Park's
government to withdraw its initial aid-based developmental strategy toward self-
reliance, from $225 million in 1960 to a mere $71 million in 1965, the Park Chung-hee
government, the legitimacy of which relied on its pursuit and virtual short-term result of
modernisation through industrialisation, now desperately sought an alternative source of
capital investment (Hart-Landsberg 1993, pp. 141-3). It was in this context that the
Korean state switched its development strategy from the pursuit of self-reliant economic
development to an export-oriented development strategy and normalised its economic
relations with Japan, which also benefited greatly from this relation by obtaining a
secure regional market, particularly for Japanese means of production. In turn, Japan
guaranteed over $800 million financial support in the form of public and commercial
loans and grants (Hart-Landsberg 1993, p. 145).
Following the early institutional developments enhancing state control over money,
some crucial reforms designed to promote export-oriented development were
subsequently introduced after negotiations with the U.S. authorities. These reforms
included the dramatic devaluation of the currency in 1964, which 'significantly
improved Korea's external competitiveness' (Krause 1997, p. 110), the interest rate
186
reform in 1965, which promoted domestic saving and attracted foreign capital for
investment, and tax reform for increasing government expenditure. These reforms,
together with the allocation of foreign loans for capital investment mediated by the state,
,
enabled the state to establish the so-called Korean way of development. Through
screening and allocating foreign borrowings, the EPB now began to function as the
institutional basis of the so-called 'selective promotion of industrial investment by the
state' in which the state arranged foreign loans to some specific individual capitals
which could satisfy the goverment-planned developmental strategy. Once approved by
the EPB, repayment of commercial foreign loans was guaranteed either by the Korean
government or by state-controlled commercial banks (Kim, E. M. 1997, p. 110).
Domestic funds mobilised by deposit monetary banks were also allocated to specific
sectors or firms though the so-called policy-based lending, the interest rate of which
was significantly lower than usual and therefore functioned as a major measure to
attract individual capitals to preferential sectors, mainly the exporting sector (See Cho
and J. K. Kim 1995). 32 Capital investment, largely relying on foreign borrowing
guaranteed by government or state-owned banks, was concentrated most of all on
infrastructure and manufacturing sectors. It was through this capitalist development on
the basis of export-based industrialisation that the state could maximise its
32 For example, the interest rate for export sectors was fixed at 6% between 1966 and 1972
while the general interest rate of bank loans was usually more than 20%. Those sectors given a
preferential rate varied throughout the 1960s and 1970s. The state directed domestic loans to
those sectors by imposing a strict regulation of loans from commercial banks by the Monetary
Board, which was under the control of the BOK and MOF.
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developmental leadership in nurturing the capitalist class as well as controlling labour
without facing serious challenges undermining political stability. Likewise, the state
achieved political as well as economic support from the U.S., that overlooked various
restrictions on free-market and the state's authoritarian intervention at the expense of
stable capitalist development. (See Hart-Lansberg 1993, p. 143).
In addition to the suppressive control over the collective power of labour, the state's
agricultural policies also contributed to establishing the basis of early capital
accumulation in Korea by guaranteeing the smooth supply of labour from rural areas.
Park's government kept lowering the grain price through imports and strong regulation
in order to prevent inflation caused by wage increases. Less investment in rural areas
and agricultural sectors also contributed to supplying cheap labour. During the first and
second five-year economic development plans (1962-1971), contrary to the early
populist policy toward the agricultural sector, only half of the planned goverment
spending on the agricultural sectors was actually spent (FKTU 1979, p. 560). As a result,
a massive rural population, particularly of the young generation, whose families earned
their living from small land holdings, migrated to urban areas looking for jobs, causing
a large-scale rural exodus (Koo 1990, p. 673) and a massive increase in the number both
of wage workers and manufacturing workers in the 1960s. 33 Capitals consequently
enjoyed a practically unlimited supply of labour power as well as an extreme degree of
33 The total number of wage-workers increased from 2,414,000 in 1960 to 3,787,000 in 1970.
Particularly, manufacturing workers appeared to lead this by doubling its size between 1960 and
1970 (417,622 in 1960 to 995,981 in 1970) (Koo 1990, p.673).
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surplus value exploitation, since those workers who came from the areas where the
average income of a household was merely 37% of that of urban household in 1960
(Choi 1997, p. 65) endured low wages and extremely long working hours. 34 The
unlimited supply and abundant reserve of labour became the primary basis of the
unilateral labour relations based on paternalistic discipline and hierarchy, together with
continual surveillance by police forces and intelligence agencies. On the other hand,
produced surplus value appeared to be realised smoothly by the massively growing
export of light goods, industries for which benefited most from the state policies.
Maximising the developmental leadership of the state, the state-led industrialisation
gave rise to a structural switch of national industry from 1ST (Import Substituting
Industrialisation) to EOI (Export Oriented Industrialisation) (Cummings 1987, p. 69),
showing both a remarkable 8.45% average annual GDP growth rate and 35.5% export
growth rate for the 1961-1970 period. Korea's miraculous capital accumulation in the
1960s resulted from the development of this particular way in which surplus value was
produced and realised in the particular context of class relations as well as capitalist
development in East Asia in the 1960s. The politicised regulation of labour disputes was
remarkably successful through anti-labour policies, the legitimacy of which was firmly
based on anti-communist propaganda penetrating every single aspect of the everyday
life of the people and super-constitutional laws based on the anti-communism. Again,
34 Those migrated workers from rural areas in labour intensive industries, particularly textiles,
were predominantly young women workers, who were regarded by-and-large as a surplus
labour force in rural families.
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the politicised regulation of financial flows was successful since capitalist social
domination had not developed fully yet. Those particularities of formation of capital
relations and their reproduction, i.e., political regulation of labour as well as individual
capitals, in which the political appeared to be separated from the capitalist class, on the
one hand, and also appeared to be an agent of the capitalist class, on the other, built up
the paradox of state autonomy, which caught the eyes of the developmental state
advocates. For many, the state, despite its extreme class characteristics, appeared to be a
public guarantor of the national interest, not a class apparatus. Nevertheless, it is
important to notice that this early configuration of capital relations, the reproduction of
which relied on the politicised regulation of labour and individual capitals, also
provoked the increasing politicisation of class struggle, the further development of
which eventually led to a further crisis of the state in the late 1970s. As the
capitalisation of social relations developed further and created a mass working class, the
very basis of the particular fetishisation of the social relations came to be undermined
by the politicised class struggle and capital accumulation itself.
Class struggles and the limits of the politicised formation of capital relations
The early reforms, although they led to a very remarkable capital accumulation
through founding export-oriented development till the late 1960s, soon came up against
their own inherent limits. In the late 1960s, urban poor uprisings occurred in the form of
riots attacking police stations and government buildings, revealing the substantively
inherent contradiction of economic growth in the 1960s (Haggard and Moon 1993, p.
74). On the other hand, workers' struggles for independent unions re-emerged as
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industrialisation deepened and the military government tightened suppressive control
over labour.35 Most of the struggles for organising labour unions at the enterprise level
were ignited by impromptu resistance against intolerable working conditions, delayed
payment and extremely long working hours, which were usually more than 12 hours a
day during the 1960s. While the Labour Standard Law was completely ignored at the
workplace, trade unions were largely understood as a sub-department of managerial
authority, the activity of which were largely unknown by their members (KNCC 1984,
pp. 108-22). In many cases, those who attempted to organise trade unions or confront
the existing hierarchical authority of the unions had to risk confinement, beating and
even assassination (KNCC 1984, pp. 86-91). Once workers succeeded in organising a
strike and other embryonic forms of collective action, with or without the union's
approval, it was also usual that the regional police department warned an employer to be
prepared and, if that was not enough, the police directly mediated negotiation between
workers and employers, often with the threat to arrest involved workers unless the
workers accepted those offers made by police officers and employers. Although these
'promptly organised' resistances often ended up bitterly with capitalist violence, lockout
35 Beginning with workers' struggles in Muyung Industry and Seeheung Mine, in Jokwang
Textile, Mulgeum Mine, Lucky Chemistry, Lucky Gold Star, Korea Special Industry, Geunsin
Industry, Miwang Industry, and Donyang Machine Industry, workers' struggles took the form of
'an independent or democratic union movement' from 1961 (KNCC 1984, pp. 64-5, also see
FKTU 1979, pp. 740-52). Following these, struggles for independent labour unions occurred
also in foreign-invested electronic firms in 1967 and 1968. However, it is hard to say that these
independent union movements formed a trend in the 1960s when most of the working
population did not even recognise the existence of labour unions in their own firms.
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and subsequent mass dismissal of those who were involved in the unions, workers'
struggle developed slowly but continuously. Particularly, it was in the struggles in the
textile industry that the re-emerging working-class resistance began to publicise issues
on working conditions and capitalist control over labour as well as the state's
suppression. Amongst many struggles of textile workers, Chun Ta-il's self immolation
and subsequent establishment of the symbolic democratic union in the history of
working class struggle in Korea, the Chong-gye Clothing Trade Union, revealed and
publicised the intolerable working conditions and working days which prevailed in the
textile industry, as a daily news paper described.36
36 The struggle, which was later the example for democratic labour unionism throughout the
1970s and 1980s, began with a small group organised by a tailor, Chun Ta-il in Pyunghwa
market, where small-size textile firms were heavily concentrated. The group called for state
intervention in these working conditions, visiting and writing letters to the Bureau of Labour
Affairs. However, 'no one in a position of power responded to Chun's pleas' (Koo 1993, p. 138).
Again, Chun attempted to ask the state to correct the working conditions according to the
Labour Standard Law, which was formally legislated in 1953, but had never worked, by
submitting a 'petition for the improvement of the working conditions of clothing workers in
Pyunghwa Market' to the Minister of the Bureau of Labour Affairs, which provoked massive
discussions and was covered by major newspapers. However, the struggle in the form of pleas
did not succeed in forcing the state to improve working conditions. Rather, those attempts ended
merely with the deception of the state, which instead strengthened surveillance by the police.
After several attempts to organise demonstrations against the employers and the state failed,
Chun Ta-il set himself on fire in a demonstration organised with his fellow workers on 13'1'
November 1970 (Koo 1993, p. 139). Following Chun's death, the Chong-gye Clothing Trade
Union was accepted and finally became the first 'recognised' democratic trade union through a
vehement struggle by his family and fellow workers in Pyunghwa Market.
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Young girls are working in a small room as long as 16 hours a day, with
extremely low wages and even industrial disease. Shame on the labour
standard law... There are four hundred garment manufacturers in the Peace
Market. The workplaces, which are smaller than 8 sq m, are so packed with
15 workers, sewing machines and other machinery that people can hardly
move. Indeed, the room is vertically divided in the middle, so the ceiling is
just 1.5 meters, making the workers not able to stretch their waists...
According to Peace Market workers - ChunTa-il and his colleagues - they
are working 13 to 16 hours a day in this environment.., with two days off
only on the first and third Sunday (Gyunghyang Daily News, 27 October
1970, italics by author).
The importance of Chun's struggle lies not only in the dramatic and extreme form of
struggle but in the influence of the struggle, which shook the whole Korean society and
inspired the intellectual and student movement as well as the trade union movement.
This struggle indicated the re-emergence of the struggle of organised labour, in and out
of the state-controlled trade union movement, under the slogan of 'democratic trade
union (Minjunojo)'. In the aftermath of the struggle, the number of industrial conflicts
dramatically increased from 165 in 1970 to 1,656 in 1971 (KNCC 1984, p. 123),
including conflicts over wages and establishment of unions. Also, the student movement
began to support the labour movement through organising demonstrations in
universities, indicating a further development of student-workers' solidarity which
contributed to radicalising workers' struggle and marked a further development of
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workers' struggle in the 1980s. 37 Now, workers began to undermine the early
configuration of capital relations by publicising labour issues in more organised and
continuing struggles, without relying on the existing federation of trade unions or being
trapped within the image of the autonomous state, which was revealing its class
character by deploying more and more coercive means of controlling labour. At least
for Korean workers, the fantastic image of the state as a bearer of a common good
began to be broken from the early 1970s.
2. The Politicised Reproduction of Capital Relations and the Crisis of the
State
Politicised reproduction of capital relations and heavy industrialisation
As we saw above, Korea's miraculous economic development in the 1960s was
based on a particular formation of domestic capital relations, which had been made
through a specific history of class struggle and had developed a particular form of the
state that in turn had been actively participating in the reproduction of capitalist social
relations through repressing the working class. However, from the dawn of the 1970s
and afterwards, the development of this early composition of capital relations appeared
to be challenged, showing pre-crisis symptoms. While the state-led development began
to suffer from the development of class struggles undermining the power of the state
37 In this context, Chun Ta-il's struggle enabled the student movement to begin to overcome
its limitation, which had appeared in the April movement in 1960.
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subordinating labour to capital, the changes of the conditions of capital accumulation at
the global level also appeared to threaten the smooth capital accumulation in Korea.
The export-drive based on the expansion of foreign borrowing guaranteed by
nationalised banks and the Korean government resulted in an extremely high level of
foreign debt, the total of which increased more than ten times, from 200 million dollars
in 1964 to 2.922 billion dollars in 1971 (Hart-Landsberg 1993, pp. 174-5), while
allowing individual capitals to keep producing on the basis of credit expansion. On the
other hand, although the export of consumer goods was increasing continually, this
growth accompanied an increasing importation of the means of production, the result of
which appeared in the growing deficit of trade, $574 million in 1967 to $1,045 million
in 1971. As global capital accumulation went into a slow-down period, newly emerging
protectionism in the advanced economies also threatened further capital accumulation in
Korea. In particular, after the trade balance of the U.S. went into deficit in 1971, light-
industry-based export appeared to reach an impasse especially due to the increasing
protectionism in the U.S. market that 'forced South Korea to sign a bilateral trade-
restraint agreement on textile' (Hart-Landsberg 1993, p. 175), which made up 38% of
total exports. With gloomy prospects on the global market, Korea's export growth also
slowed, after the peak of 42% growth in 1967, 37% in 1969, 34% in 1970 and 28% in
1971. Park's government attempted to encourage exports and discourage imports, by a
12.9% devaluation of the Korean won in June 1971. However, devaluation appeared
rather to result in increasing repayment pressure on Korean firms that raised almost half
of their external funds from foreign borrowing. Conservative lending policies of
commercial banks in order to slow-down high inflation also resulted in worsened
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repayment pressure. In order to release financial pressure from foreign debt, individual
capitals rushed into the informal curb market for short-term loans and, as a result,
suffered from the re-payment of high interest corporate debt to the informal credit
market. As a result of these difficulties, 'more than 2000 firms were forced into
bankruptcy by 1971' (Hart-Landsberg 1993, P. 175).
So as to overcome these problems, the state directly intervened in the economy by
liquidating the less efficient individual capitals from May 1969. As a result, 30 large
and medium size companies were forced to shut down by the government (Park 1999, p.
168). In addition, the state attempted to support relatively efficient capitals through 'a
devaluation, a cut in domestic interest rate, and a bailout of financially troubled firms'
(Amsden 1989, p. 97). A gigantic bailout project was implemented by the state in 1972,
by 'placing an immediate moratorium on all loans in the informal credit markets and
reduced the bank loan rate from 23% to 15.5% annually' (Cho 1998, p. 15). However, it
was in heavy industrialisation that the developed role of the state in revitalising
capitalist development by controlling labour and financial flows showed its
culmination.38The state, beginning with President Park's public announcement of the
38 Park's government argued that heavy industrialisation was the only way of overcoming
dependency on the advanced economies not only in terms of economic development but also in
terms of military defence. Heavy industrialisation was believed to bring less dependency of the
production of the means of production and technology on Japan and the U.S., therefore
enhancing the balance of payments, on the one hand, and to make it possible to avoid growing
trade conflicts with the U.S., on the other. It was also conceived as the only way of resolving the
increasing tension in the Korean peninsula induced by the change of U.S. foreign policies in
accordance with the Nixon Doctrine that decided to withdraw an entire combat division (the
Seventh Division, with a force of twenty-four thousand) from South Korea (Haggard and Koo
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Heavy and Chemical Industry Plan in 1973, attempted to push heavy industrialisation
through direct funding, allocating foreign loans, lowering interest rates and offering
incentives and tax-cuts. Foreign and domestic loans were highly-selectively allocated to
heavy and chemical industries through the so-called policy-based lending by the
nationalised banks throughout the mid and late 1970s. Regarding Korea Industrial Bank
alone, about 80% of total loans to manufacturing were concentrated on heavy industries
from 1973 to 1980 (Choi 1999, p. 101). Also the state established a massive National
Investment Fund that 'mobilised public employee pensions and a fixed portion of all
bank deposit' and 'channelled them into designated projects and sectors at highly
preferential rates' (Haggard 1990, p. 132). About 67% of investment from this fund was
allocated to heavy industries in the same period. In addition, 14 important industries
enjoyed more than 50% of domestic tax cuts as well as more than 70% tariff cuts. It was
at this time that Korean chaebols, benefiting from these favourable conditions, rushed
into heavy industries, such as ship-building, automobiles, machinery, refinery, steel,
petrochemical, etc., and found a new basis of capital accumulation.
While the big chaebols benefited most from the heavy industrialisation in the 1970s39,
this development was accompanied by more repressive policies against labour. In other
1993, p. 75), in spite of growing tension between North and South Korea. In order to avoid the
growing protectionism and adjust economic development to the changing international division
of labour and prepare self-reliance, the heavy industrialisation plan, as an alternative, seems to
have been prepared from the late 1960s.
39 The number of sub-companies owned by the largest 30 chaebols increased from 126 in
1970 to 348 in 1979, due to new investment in heavy industries.
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words, the reproduction of capital relations, which had been formed in a particular way
through the early politicised formation of capital relations, presupposed state policies to
secure the subordination of labour to capital in favour of further capital accumulation as
the trade-off, together with financial benefits, that could attract individual capitals to
follow state economic policies. This politicised reproduction of capital relations marked
the further development of capital relations in Korea during the 1970s, provoking,
however, a further politicisation of class struggle. As we saw above, the working class
movement in . the early 1970s mainly focused on the attempts to organise new
independent unions against forced labour, delayed payment, extremely long working
days and capitalist violence, which were sustained by the state and the pro-capitalist
federation of trade unions. Against the pro-capitalist unionism of the FKTU and its
affiliated unions' undemocratic approach toward rank-and-file workers, those new
independent unions called themselves 'democratic unions', building up a common
identity among them. Now the democratic union movement (Minjunojoundong)
represented the Korean workers' movement in the 1970s and 1980s. While the tensions
between the growing working class and the state's labour controls developed, symptoms
of the pre-crisis of the existing capital relations appeared also in the presidential election,
in which President Park narrowly defeated the opposition candidate, Kim Dae Jung in
April 1971. Facing them, the early configuration of capital relations, which was the very
basis of the reproduction of the state itself, could be reproduced this time only by
extreme political repression such as, enactment of the Law Concerning Special
Measures for Safeguarding National Security following the garrison decree of October
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1971, Yushin (revitalisation) Constitution in 1972 and subsequent National Emergency
Measures in 1974 and 1975.
In consequence, the attempt of the state resulted in the secure, at least temporarily,
reproduction of the state on the basis of the reproduced decomposition of the working
class. It was only through the state's immediate involvement in class struggles,
nullifying all existing workers' legal rights and illegalising any kind of political and
social resistance by supra-constitutional legislation, that Korea's capital relations, in
favour of further capital accumulation in the context of growing difficulties in export,
were finally reproduced. However, this reproduction indicated a serious flaw in the
early settlement of capital relations. These emergency measures were effective enough
to enforce a short-term mobilisation of capital and labour and, therefore, result in a
massive transformation of the industrial structure. Nonetheless, • these measures
appeared to critically undermine the basis of the mystification of the state. By limiting
the political rights of its citizens and paralysing any sorts of formal democratic
procedure, these measures revealed the class character of the state far beyond the extent
that it could possibly be mystified as an autonomous regulator. The result was clear.
The democratisation movement (Jeyaundong or Minjungundong) began to gather
massive support from all around country, while workers at the workplace began no
longer to tolerate suppression.
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Text box (1) — The state's labour control under the emergency decrees
The state's more aggressive attempt to decompose the working class appeared well
before the serious launch of heavy industrialisation in the 1970s. In early 1970, 'the
Extraordinary Law on Trade Unions and Labour Disputes Adjustment for Foreign
Invested Company' was introduced. This law resulted from the need to attract foreign
capital to begin heavy industrialisation. For that, the state had to , stabilise increasing
labour disputes in the foreign invested firms in Korea in the late 1960s. According to
the law, the establishment of trade unions and their activities in the foreign invested
firms must be under more direct control of the state, which encompassed restrictions on
the unions' rights of collective actions and collective bargaining (Kim, D. W. 1988, p.
27). The law clearly showed the state's first attempt, which was eventually completed
with the emergency decrees in the early 1970s, to decompose the working class in order
to reproduce the capital relations in adjusting national capitalist accumulation to global
change. The Subsequent enactment of the 'Law Concerning Special Measures for
Safeguarding National Security', following the garrison decree of October 1971,
provided President Park with an exclusive authority to 1) control matters regarding
'economic order' including consumer prices, rent, and wages, 2) mobilise labour and
resources, and 3) restrict collective action of workers that 'would' undermine national
security. According to Article 9 of this law, unions had to ask for the arbitration of the
government and follow the result of arbitration before exercising the right to collective
bargaining and collective action (KNCC 1984, p. 737). Under the same article,
collective actions of trade unions of the enterprises, which were supposedly related to
the public interest, were prohibited. Again, the Measure Dealing with Collective
Bargaining under National Emergency, enacted in March 1972, 'expanded the range of
enterprises defined as belonging to the public interest' (Koo 2001, pp. 29-30).
Furthermore, from 1973, all work stoppages became illegal (Cumings 1997, p. 358).
The Yushin Constitution in 1972 allowed the president to 'designate one-third of the
National Assembly', 'to suspend or destroy civil liberties' and 'to issue decrees for
whatever powers that the Yushin framers forgot to include' (Cumings 1997, p. 358) and
established the 'National Conference of Subjectivity of Unionisation', in which 600
representatives, under the leadership of President Park, were bestowed a super-
constitutional authority capable of controlling parliament. Worse still, emergency
decrees in 1974 allowed the police to arrest people without court warrant and put them
on military trial. As a labour dispute was regarded as undermining national security,
labour disputes came to be dealt with as criminal activities by police and security
agents. Consequently, apart from the usual involvement of police and security agents in
the surveillance and suppression of the labour movement, more than 57% of labour
disputes provoked 'direct' intervention of police and security agents between 1977 and
1979 (Kim, D. W. 1988, p. 40). 
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Capital accumulation and domestic class struggle
The state's attempt to launch heavy industrialisation aimed to adjust the national
industrial structure aggressively to the changing conditions of global capital
,
accumulation, which appeared in the form of the declining competitiveness of Korean
capital in global competition and diminishing geographical superiority, by taking
advantage of its regulative power over individual capitals and labour, that guaranteed
easier access of Korean capitals to the market. The heavy industrialisation in the early
1970s is, therefore, to be understood not as a mere economic policy by the class-
autonomous state for the national interest but as the politicised reproduction of capital
relations, in which each element of the earlier composition of capital relations in Korea
in the 1960s, i.e., unilateral labour relations at the workplaces, state's control over
collective labour, and the state regulation of individual capitals, developed further in
response to the increasing difficulties in competition in global markets. Given the
economic development of the 1970s, it seems that heavy industrialisation, which had
been conceived as far too speculative, was successful at least in offering a further basis
of accumulation for Korean capitals. Through the 1970s, despite a slight slow-down
during the mid 1970s caused by the first oil shock, the economic growth was impressive.
After the first oil shock, the economic growth rate soon recovered, showing an average
of 12.33% growth from 1976 to 1978. In spite of massive foreign loans for new
investment, which were accompanied by inflation, capital investment concentrated on
the heavy industries appeared profitable. Electronics, steel, shipbuilding and other
assembling-manufacturing industries seemed to enjoy price competitiveness in the
global market, leading to export growth of heavy industrial products. Heavy
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industrialisation also could substitute the production of the small-scale means of
production. The rate of imported general machinery to the total supply of general
machinery fell from 75.3% in 1970 to 59% in 1980 and 41.3% in 1985 (Jeong 1990,
quoted in Lim 1998, p. 30). The production of small-scale general machinery did not
suffer from limits of the domestic market because it had almost wholly relied on
imports. Indeed, relatively successful labour control in heavy industrial sectors
throughout the 1970s, 4° was enough to take advantage of cheap labour. As a result of
the development of heavy industries, the rate of supply of the means of production
depending on imports also fell from 29.9% in 1973 to 24.5% in 1980 (Jeong 1990,
quoted in Lim 1998, p. 30). In addition, the construction boom in the Middle East and
the Vietnam War contributed to the growth.
However, although capitals in the newly emerging heavy industries appeared to
enjoy peaceful labour relations at the workplaces, it is not true that labour control over
collective labour was entirely successful during the mid and late 1970s. Although it
might be true that 'for the first time, the rate at which nominal wages was rising
exceeded the rate at which productivity was rising' (Amsden 1989, p. 101), inflation
was high enough to keep the real wage down throughout the 1970s. Also labour
relations on the shop floor, which obviously relied on barrack-like and patriarchal
labour regulations, were intolerable enough to keep the shop floor labour relations
unstable. Since labour control in the 1970s relied on those emergency decrees which
40 In large-scale firms in heavy industrial sectors, there were only 4 labour conflicts between
1974-1979 (Lee 1999, p. 107).
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declared that all industrial conflicts must be controlled by the state, growing workers'
struggle began to collide more politically and directly with the state. On the other hand,
the existing trade unions and labour aristocracies also appeared to be a barrier to
workers' struggle more clearly as the FKTU had increasingly intervened in labour
conflicts at enterprise leve1. 41 With its authority as the only umbrella organisation, the
FKTU could control the nature of the unions in enterprises through intervening union
elections and mediating the conflicts between individual capitalist and workers as well
as between the state and workers. It was in particular in the textile industry that the
FKTU revealed its anti-worker characteristics as the National Textile Trade Union,
affiliated to the FKTU, repeatedly played an important role in hindering the emergence
of an independent union in the mid and late 1970s. However, these pro-capitalist unions
in enterprises and the FKTU faced growing resistance from below against their
authority.
41
It is worth looking at an announcement with regard to the emergency decree, in order to
understand the reality of the national federation of trade unions in the 1970s.
FKTU, preserving the glorious tradition of anti-communist patriotism, is
seriously concerned about the suspicious movement of the North Korean
puppet regime, which is mad about preparing war and declares unification by
force. Also we had already been claiming the collective security of free
nations and continually appealing to the nation-wide strengthening of the
security posture... we strongly agree with the national emergency decree of
6th December 1971 and declare like below, assuming a tight stance of
'construction, on the one hand, and defence, on the other' for the nation and
calling for cooperation of army, government and people for the settlement of
security and self-restraint... (KNCC 1984, pp. 233-4, my translation)
203
The crisis of the politicised reproduction of capital relations and the crisis of the state
The democratic unionism continually developed in the textile industry, in line with
Chun Ta-il's struggle in the early 1970s, and now in the second half of the 1970s
confronted the state's labour control based on the subsequent emergency decrees. In the
attempts to incapacitate the continually emerging resistance, such as Dongil Textile
workers' strike 42 and Chong-gye Garment workers' struggle, the state utilised
increasingly violent measures — police surveillance, assault and torture, while the FKTU
took advantage of its bureaucratic authority to disturb the struggle for a democratic
union and organised 'save-the-company-squads'. During the months-long struggles,
mainly organised by young women workers, the brutality of the state's response to
workers' struggle and the pro-capitalist nature of the FKTU were clearly revealed.
These struggles led to more serious nation-wide discontent with the Park regime,
42 The struggle in Dongil Textile Company was provoked by the disapproval of the newly
established democratic union. Workers in Dongil Textile elected Lee Yung-Sook, who was a
democratic candidate, as the president of the trade union in 1976. The state tackled the newly
democratised union by arresting the president elected by the workers. Meanwhile, pro-capitalist
delegates elected a new president while the workers were confined to their accommodation in
the factory. Rank-and-file women workers later occupied the factory and began a sit-down
strike while the water and electric supply was cut by the company. After 3 days, 400 workers
were arrested brutally by police, although they attempted to resist with naked struggle on 25th
July 1976. However, workers did not give up the democratic union. Rather, they forced the
Ministry of Labour Affairs to promise to guarantee a democratic process of trade union election,
by continual struggles. Even though the democratic trade union was re-established in 1977
through the election, eventually the union was destroyed by inhuman violence by pro-capitalist
workers and police in 1978 and 124 workers were fired.
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precipitating anti-government struggles organised by intellectuals, students, churches'
organisations and opposition political leaders.43
Worse still, the impact of the second oil shock and subsequent global-scale
,
depression appeared to be particularly critical in the late 1970s. The concentrated capital
flow into heavy industries in the late 70s turned out to have been increasing the trade
deficit over the mid-1970s as the early stage of heavy industrialisation still relied
heavily on imported large-scale means of production and parts required in growing
assembling-manufacturing. The skyrocketing oil price worsened the trade deficit,
particularly in heavy industrial sectors, while the export of heavy industrial products
also began to decrease with the emergence of the depression. 44 Although Park's
goverment attempted to overcome this crisis by tightening its repressive control over
the democratisation movement as well as the growing trade union movement, on the
one hand, and forcing structural adjustment in heavy industries, the state appeared no
longer to be able to do it in the way it could in the early 1970s. Instead, the state faced
43 It is in this sense that the origin of the first crisis of the politicised reproduction of capital
relations lies in workers' struggles well before the emergence of crisis in 1979. The
conventional wisdom that the labour movement in Korea emerged seriously only between 'the
assassination of President Park Chung-hee in October 1979 and the assumption of power by
General Chun Doo-hwan in May 1980' (See, Amsden 1989, pp. 101-2) is, therefore, simply not
true. Class struggle in the form of re-unionisation of workers, against the military-like labour
control by capitalists, pro-capitalist union and the state emerged from the beginning of
industrialisation and developed through the 1970s.
44 Chaebol-owned heavy industrial factories appeared to stop operating, showing merely
39% operating rate in 1980 (Lee 1999, p. 139).
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uncontrollable nation-wide anti-government struggles after the YH workers' struggle45
in 1979 during which the riot police attacked workers occupying the headquarters of the
first opposition party, New Korean Democratic Party, with 1000 police, beating workers
,
and MPs of the opposition party and eventually killing a 21-year-old woman worker in
the invasion. The violence against the YH workers in Seoul incited riots as far away as
Masan and Pusan (Ogle 1990, p. 92). President Park was finally killed by his closest
and most loyalist fellow, Kim Jae-kyu, who later claimed that he did it to save the
nation from a blood bath that Park intended to rain down upon Masan and Pusan' (Ogle
1990, p. 92; Cumings 1987, p. 79).
With the dramatic collapse of the Park regime, which had been exercising brutal
force to sustain the effectiveness of the early formation of capital relations, the
politicised reproduction of capital relations faced its first general crisis. After the
assassination of President Park, emerging class struggle could no longer be controlled
by the state. Nation-wide demonstrations demanding political democratisation were
held, while over 700 strikes against violent labour control were organised in the few
months during early 1980, providing an expectation of political democratisation as well
as of the demise of the repressive labour relations. The state, which again fell under
45 YH workers' struggle initially occurred after the employer shut down the factory without
securing employment because of financial difficulty provoked by over-investment in different
industries. Workers began to struggle, demanding the right to live through the succession of
employment. The struggle seemed to finish when the company promised to withdraw the plan to
shut down the factory in the labour committee mediated by the Ministry of Labour Affairs in
April 1979. However, the employer shut down the factory as he planned in August and the state
did nothing (YH Trade Union 1984).
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military control by General Chun Doo-hwan after another military coup in May, and the
political aspiration of the people against the existing forms of capitalist domination
eventually collided in Kwang-Ju, a southern city of Chola province, in the form of the
first armed struggle, after the liberation in 1945, organised by workers, students, house-
wives and others. Despite the first armed struggle, which manifestly illuminated the
increasingly apparent class character of the capitalist state, struggles for reconstructing
capital relations in favour of the growing working class ended up with the massacre of
thousands of people in May 1980. However, even though the new military regime was
successful enough to grasp political power, the previous way of organising capitalist
production, under which the state enjoyed unfettered regulative power against the mass
of the working population, could no longer be reproduced in the way it had been, but
was now increasingly subject to continual struggle and the crisis-ridden development of
global capitalism. In this sense, further politicised reproduction of capital relations by
another military regime was incomplete and partial, even more than it had been during
the Yushin period.
3. The Growing Instability of the Politicised Reproduction of Capital
Relations
Stabilisation policies and resumed accumulation
During the crisis between 1979 and 1982, the government introduced stabilisation
policies. The stabilisation policies and subsequent economic readjustment policies
aimed to overcome the barriers against which the state came up. In other words, the
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policies aimed to revitalise, by redeploying the political methods having been used by
Park's regime, the central elements of the early configuration of capital relations, the
articulation of which had been centred around regulation of the state over individual
capitals and labour and had begun to be threatened by the development of domestic
class struggle in the form of re-unionisation of workers at the shop floor, growing
people's inspiration toward democratisation and the development of an increasingly
competitive export market.
Facing accelerated inflation, the rate of which peaked at 28% in 1980, a strong fiscal
restraint, including cutting subsidies, recomposing government organisations and
eliminating public funds, was pushed by the state during this period. Also, in order to
tighten monetary and credit control, the interest rate of commercial bank loans was
increased repeatedly and reached at its highest 24% in early 1980. Further reforms
included the readjustment of heavy industries through liquidating less efficient capital
and supporting some individual capitals to absorb the liquidated capital. From 1980 to
1981, in an attempt to resolve repeatedly emerging overproduction problems in
particular industrial sectors, the government introduced plans for the realignment of
investment to which a total of six industrial sectors, such as automobile, copper
smelting and electric facilities, and twenty-five large-scale firms were subjected. Those
chaebols which followed state policy by merging, selling and buying their sub-
companies could enjoy extremely favourable financial conditions as well as a monopoly
in the specialised industrial sectors. The restructuring plan also emphasised the
transformation of industrial structure, which had caused trade deficit problems, from
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traditional industries to strategic high technology industries, such as semiconductors,
computers, telecommunications and aerospace.
On the other hand, the stabilisation aimed to repress the growing power of the
,
working class by means of as income policy and renewing the labour law which was
focused on decentralising the union movement, strengthening the role of the state in the
mediation of labour disputes and tackling the involvement of student and church
organisations (Haggard and Moon 1993, p. 82). After those subsequent stabilisation
policies and recovery of the global conditions of capital accumulation, Korean
economic development appeared to be on track again. As a whole, economic
development in the 1980s after the crisis seemed to create even another miraculous
moment. However, it is wrong to relate the recovery of capital accumulation
immediately with another heyday of the politicised reproduction of capital relations.
The pressure on the existing way of reproducing capital relations, despite successful
capital accumulation during that period, continually grew with the more radicalised
class struggles, on the one hand, and with the development of a more competitive global
market, which imposed increasing pressure on Korea's export drive and pressure of
liberalisation on the domestic market of Korea, on the other.
Further development of the working class movement
Throughout the 1980s, the labour movement undermined the power of the state as
the protector of individual capitals from workers' collective actions. The tension
between capital and labour in the form of the unionisation struggles was growing,
inspiring and also inspired by the democratic movement, called the `Minjung
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movement', and showing a clear continuity with the development of class struggle in
the 1970s. Whereas the number of unions and overall union density decreased during
the early 1980s due to suppressive labour policies, thousands of college students, who
were inspired by the workers' struggle in the 1970s and studied radical ideas in student
movement groups, disguised themselves as ordinary workers and entered into factories,
beginning to radicalise unorganised workers and making a specific tradition of the
workers' movement which was called 'No-hak Yondae' (workers-students alliance) (See
Koo 1993, pp. 148-151). Also, the democratisation movement began to develop more
seriously with the traditional left wing, including religious and intellectual groups,
forming a nation-wide alliance. Facing this increasing tension, the state attempted to
resolve it by introducing political relaxation, including relaxed control over workers'
collective actions from the mid-1980s. However, this relaxation could not satisfy the
growing aspiration of the workers, allowing instead workers to organise 200
independent trade unions (Koo 1993, p. 150) and to develop regional solidarity between
the unions. Two struggles in the mid 1980s, the strikes in Daewoo Motors and Kuro
Industrial Park, represent the development of the workers' struggle in the 1980s and its
continuity with that of the 1970s.
The former struggle in Daewoo Motors showed the newly emerging pattern of trade
unionism in big chaebols, which were the most heavily invested, however, relatively
less organised, indicating the extremely militant struggle by male workers in the sectors
in heavy industry which came to lead the workers' struggle after 1987. The so-called
disguised workers' attempts to radicalise trade unions played an important role in
organising the strike with elaborate preparation, showing solidarity with the 'real'
210
workers. The strike, in which rank and file workers effectively overpowered pro-
capitalist union leadership by setting up 'the Committee for Normalisation of the Trade
Union', became a model case of democratisation of trade unions. Meanwhile, the Kuro
,
strikes, which escalated, beginning with a strike in one firm, into solidarity strikes in the
Kuro Industrial Park, supported by student and dissident organisations (Koo 1993, p.
151), showed the possibility of an alternative current of the trade union movement
against the existing pro-capitalist federation by developing regional solidarity between
grass-roots independent unions. This strike was initiated by the state's attempts to break
the democratic unions in Kuro Industrial Park, which were established in the early
1980s. After police arrested union leaders in Daewoo Apparel, due to their 'illegal
activity in collective bargaining', workers in Daewoo Apparel immediately went on
strike. Other democratic unions in the industrial park, Hyosung Products, Sunil Textile,
Karibong Electricity and Chong-gye Garment Workers' Union had a meeting and
decided to call for a 'solidarity strike' on 24 th June 1985. The solidarity strike lasted for
6 days. Meanwhile, other democratic unions in Kuro Industrial Park, Buheung,
Namsung Electiricity, Sejin Electron, Rom Korea and Samsung Medicine also
participated in the strike. During the strike, solidarity between the Minjung movement
and workers as well as student-workers alliance also developed a step further.46
46 While students brought food and medicine through the police line and organised a
solidarity demonstration, democratisation movement organisations, including religious and
youth organisations, also held demonstrations by occupying the headquarters of the New
Korean Democratic Party and other places.
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Liberalisation and the development of individual capitals
On the one hand, the state's leadership against individual capitals seemed to be
sustained throughout the early 1980s. The state intervened in industrial restructuring,
after the plans for realignment of investment, by introducing rationalisation plans, such
as shipping industry rationalisation in 1984 and 1987, foreign construction
rationalisation in 1986 and readjustment of insolvent firms in 1986. In so doing, the
state allowed sounder firms to take over small and insolvent firms by offering 'financial
incentives to creditor banks to write off debts and extend debt maturity and replace
existing debt with a longer-term debt at a more preferable rate' (Cho 1998, p. 16) and
by providing massive tax cuts (readjustment plan alone, about 1,739 billion won). The
state again, through the BOK, delivered more than 1.8 trillion Korean won (about $2.6
billion) to relieve the financial burden on creditor banks, at the extremely low rate of
3% (Cho 1998, p. 16).
However, on the other hand, the state's control over financial flows, which had been
a major method of sustaining its leadership against individual capitals and thereby
conducting economic development, seemed to be gradually decreasing. In overcoming
the crises in the early 1970s and 1979, during which individual capitals had relied
heavily on the informal curb markets rather than heavily regulated commercial banks, in
order to release short-term financial pressure, a doubt about the efficiency and capacity
of the financial markets based on state-regulated commercial banks spread widely
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among individual capitals. 47 Accordingly, capitalists, particularly the FKI (Federation of
Korean Industries), continued to argue for the necessity of financial liberalisation in
order to enhance the efficiency of the financial markets (Suh 1991, pp. 132-41). In an
attempt to meet the increasing demands for credit and respond to the pressure from
capitalists, the state introduced partial liberalisation of the financial market by loosening
the direct control of commercial banks and entry restriction on financial industries,
although the overall credit control by the state still remained strong. Consequently,
although the state was still heavily involved in the management of commercial banks,
particularly in appointing higher-rank managers in banks, commercial banks were
privatised by the end of 1983 by selling government shares to civil share-holders, each
of whom was now allowed to own bank stock within the limit of 8% of the total share.
The amendment of the Bank Act in 1982 also loosened the state's control over banks by
removing the comprehensive directing authority of the Office of Bank Supervision and
'the Law Concerning Temporary Measures on Financial Institutions', which had been
established to prohibit large private shareholders from exercising their voting rights in
managerial boards. In addition, the interest rate of loans by commercial banks was
partially deregulated.
Most of all, although the gradual decrease in the scale and scope of the policy-based
lending also contributed to weakening the government's control over the credit market
47 In 1972, the total amount of credit that individual capitals utilised through the informal
curb market was reported to amount for 30% of the total credit provided by commercial banks
(Son 2001).
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(Cho and J. K. Kim 1995, p. 35), it was the development of the capital market and non-
bank financial institutions (NBFI) that allowed individual capitals gradually to be free
from the state's control over financial flows, that was basically relying on its relatively
strong influence on commercial banks. NBFIs, which had firstly appeared in 1974 as a
method of attracting funds from the informal curb market, were again significantly
liberalised in the early 80s, now providing individual firms, particularly big chaebols
which practically owned those institutions, with more than 20% of total external funds
in 1985, while their dependency on commercial banks decreased. Direct fundraising
through issuing corporate paper, bonds and stocks also increased quickly, from a mere
15.1% to 30.3% of the total external funds between 1970 and 1985 (Lee 1998, p. 16).
Furthermore, foreign loans guaranteed by the government also decreased quickly
enough to make them almost meaningless to individual capitals.
Therefore, while the further development of workers' struggles was clearly
undermining the sustainability of the politicised reproduction of the capital relations, the
relations between individual capitals and the state also appeared significantly to be
changed. As a 'more market-oriented style of economic management', including the
liberalisation of the financial sector and opening of the domestic commodity market,
was introduced (Haggard and Moon 1993, p. 83), the state seemed no longer to be able
to impose an absolute guideline on individual capitals thorough the regulation of
financial flows and sustain the methods Park's regime had used for capitalist
development. The liberalisation of the market was not limited to allowing individual
capitals to seek investment capital without mediation of the state. Restrictions on the
operation of foreign banks were also relaxed and the closed commodity market, which
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had been attacked by the U.S. since the late 1960s, was gradually undermined by import
liberalisation, the development of which became more and more salient after repeated
trade friction between U.S. and Korea and the Uruguay Round in 1985. The continual
i
development of the working class's struggles and gradual liberalisation of financial and
commodity markets showed that the early formulation of capital relations, which had
been based on tough regulation of labour and individual capitals by the state, now
reached an impasse of its reproduction. In the second half of the 1980s, class struggles
of the working class culminated in the massive emergence of democratic independent
trade unions. This development of the struggle continually challenged the politicised
reproduction of capital relations, indicating a more radical transformation of Korean
society.
Concluding Remark
In this chapter, the history of Korean capitalist development during 25 years from the
emergence of the Park regime has been described as a crisis-ridden process of
politicised formation and reproduction of capital relations, in which, through the import-
substituting, export-oriented, heavy industrialisation and stabilisation, capital relations
in Korea were articulated in a specific way, in responding to the global capitalist
development as well as the domestic development of class struggle. The early
configuration of capital relations in Korea emerged on the basis of the leadership of the
state against individual capitals, the state's control over collective labour, and unilateral
labour relations at the workplace. The state's dedication to capitalist development and
215
its control not only over labour but also over individual capitals contributed to naming it
a 'developmental state', which is still believed to be a state autonomous from society.
Since the 1970s, the Korean state, at the centre of the struggle, has sought to push the
early development far further by actively intervening in crises, suppressing labour and
exercising its leadership against private capitals by its well-developed institutional
channels and forces. As a result of heavy industrialisation, national capital relations
appeared to be 'reproduced' in a form that was more appropriate, at first sight, to the
changes in the global conditions of capital accumulation, by achieving a fast
transformation of industrial structure pursued by the state. The big chaebols developed
throughout the 1960s and 1970s through this process, dominating the national economy.
However, it was also at this time that the state appeared not at all free from the crisis-
ridden capitalist development and it faced problems of reproduction that were caused by
its direct involvement in class struggle in overcoming those crises. The particularity of
capitalist development in Korea, the big chaebols, militant trade unionism and the
state's leadership in economic development (far from being autonomous, as we saw)
were therefore to be understood as the forms taken by the politicised formation and
reproduction of capital relations. The subsequent development of national class
struggle shows us that the state, while succeeding in leading the reproduction of
capitalist social relations of production in Korea, could not resolve the contradictions
inherent in capitalist development. Labour, not satisfied with the relatively better life,
immanently began to confront state regulation. While the state could not regulate the re-
emerging class struggle, individual capitals also no longer willingly followed the state's
strategy of development. The decade from 1987 was marked by the resurrection of the
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working class movement and declining state power in terms of regulating individual
capitals.
4
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Chapter 8: The Development of the Crisis of the
Politicised Reproduction of Capital Relations
Introduction
The symptoms of the deconstruction of the early configuration of capital relations by
the further development of the politicisation of class struggle and further capital
accumulation with growing involvement in the crisis-ridden global capitalist
development appeared even before the 1980s, particularly in the form of the crisis of the
state in 1979. Whereas the subsequent military government, which came into power
after the massacre in Kwangju in 1980, attempted to continue to exercise its power in
suppressing the collective power of labour and regulating individual capitals, the overall
role of the state in reproducing capital relations and promoting capital accumulation
seemed not as effective as it had been during the period of the early formation of capital
relations. During the period between 1987 and 1997, this deconstruction of the early
settlement of capital relations accelerated, witnessing the • increasing liberalisation of
financial and commodity markets, in accordance with the growing demands of
individual capitals for unregulated financial markets and international pressure over the
regulation of commodity markets, on the one hand, and the organised labour movement
challenging both unilateral labour relations at the workplace and the state's suppressive
labour policies, on the other.
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In this period, individual capitals, particularly the chaebols, the form which had been
taken by the specifically politicised formation of capital relations since the 1950s,
became more reluctant to follow the industrial policy favoured by the state. While
,
taking further steps toward the liberalisation of financial and commodity markets, the
state repeatedly attempted to regulate labour by sustaining its authoritarian control over
collective labour and institutionalising flexible measures introduced by individual
capitals toward a restructuring of the labour market, in favour of further capital
accumulation. The organised labour movement, on the other hand, developing its
domination over individual workers at the workplaces after the Great Workers' Struggle
in 1987 and finally establishing a nation-wide confederation of the democratic trade
unions, confronted managerial authority at the workplace and the state's anti-labour
policies, thereby not allowing a smooth transformation of capital relations at the
expense of the working class. The fall of the early configuration of capital relations and
the contested transformation of the configuration, amalgamated with the growing
tendency to overaccumulation in the global markets, finally expressed themselves in the
form of a general crisis of the reproduction of capital relations, in which a massive
amount of capital was devalued. This chapter will examine the transformation of the
form of the Korean state by looking at the process of the deconstruction of the early
configuration of capital relations in Korea and the development of the tendencies to a
general crisis of overac cumulation.
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1. The Development of General Crisis and the Social Form of Capitalist
Production
The miracle brought into question
From the early 1990s, Korea's economic development already began to show the
symptoms of a serious recession, with the increasing deficit of the balance of payments
and foreign debts, particularly in the form of short-term foreign loans that made Korean
capitals constantly suffer from re-payment pressure. Also, it had been clear since the
great workers' struggle in 1987 and subsequent development of the labour movement
that the early cheap-labour-based industrial development was no longer compatible with
the growing power of organised labour. Whereas the specific trajectory of capitalist
development in Korea already faced its demise, Korea's development trajectory and the
strategies of the Korean state began to be focused on as a model of catching-up
capitalist development (World Bank 1993). It was not until the emergence of the
general crisis in 1997 that the so-called miracle model of Korean capitalist development
was brought into serious reconsideration.
It was neo-liberals that reacted most quickly to the emergence of the general crisis,
taking advantage of the crisis to confirm the effectiveness of the mighty markets versus
state-led development 'strategies. For neo-liberals, the origin of the East Asian crisis lies
in cronyism, which can be symbolised as 'the lack of transparency about the ties
between goverment, business and banks' (Fischer 1998, p. 3). Economic development
based on cronyism is marked by political interventions in the market which should
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consist only of 'economic matters'. Although state-led development gave Asia 'rapid
overall economic growth', 'there was an inevitable limit to how far this specialised
Asian economic regime could develop' (Greenspan 1998, pp. 2-3). Even though state-
led development seems to have worked well for export-oriented development so far,
unprofitable investment has been repeated because banks and non-bank financial
institutions offered loans not to profitable corporations but to firms having good
connections with government. This expansion of 'irrationally' allowed credit meant that
massive financial turmoil could always be caused in the era of free capital in-and-out
flow. In short, for neo-liberals state-led development inevitably produces a distorted
financial system and it could cause a serious crisis of the national economy.
On the contrary, for statists the crisis occurred not because of the over-intervention
of the state but because of the lack of government control over financial markets as a
result of the over-liberalisation of the market, i.e., because of the demise of the
developmental state regulating the flow of capital. The origin of the crisis, for them, is
not the specific form of development but the subordination of the form of development
to the power of speculative money, which turned the specific path of development into
the vulnerability of the Asian economy. Asian vulnerability, for them, means 'high
ratios of bank deposits and loan inter-mediation to GDP, and of corporate debt to
equity' that 'makes the financial structure vulnerable to shocks that depress cash flow or
the supply of bank or portfolio capital' (Wade and Veneroso 1998a, p. 7). However, a
higher debt/equity ratio is not a sin itself. Rather, it naturally developed as a specific
path of capitalist development featured by the high ratio of bank deposits and, most of
all, the need for large amounts of resources, both of which have been necessary to
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assault major world industries. The origin of the Asian crisis, for them, lies not in the
high debt/equity ratio itself but in the lack of institutional regulation of credit expansion,
the result of which was an unusually high dependency on short-term loans and flight of
I
speculative money capitals.
Although both approaches seem to make some valid points in analysing the crisis,
there are still some fundamental questions which have never been asked by either of
them. In spite of the different analyses of the 'origin' of its problematic nature, it seems
that both neo-liberals and neo-institutionalists understand the financial dimension of the
unfolding of the crisis, i.e., the massive credit expansion, whatever the reason fOr it was,
as problematic enough to trigger the massive crisis, which destroyed in a few months
the most successful model of capitalist development. Furthermore, both of them rely on
the same presupposition that the origin of the massive credit expansion, which triggered
the 'financial' crisis, lies in the state-market relation, the problematic nature of which,
in their approach, follows from somewhere outside the social form of capitalist
production itself, either from the lack of regulation of the state over the financial market
(by neo-institutionalists) or from the non-transparent political arrangement of credit (by
neo-liberals). Due to this presupposition, the deeper origin of the crisis, which lies in the
very social form of capitalist production, has not been questioned at all. Worse still,
since they attribute the origin of the crisis to something outside of the social form of
capitalist production, the socio-historical process of the realisation of the tendencies to
crisis, which are inherent in the social form of capitalist production, into a real general
crisis has also not been investigated, while the unfolding of the crisis has been
abstracted from the real development of capital relations through class struggles. The
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result is that they both failed to see the general crisis in Korea in 1997 as a crisis of the
reproduction of capital relations. In order to penetrate the development of the deeper
causes and development of the crisis, we need to overcome the one-dimensional
approach to the crisis, in which the crisis appeared to be a mere financial crisis without
regard to the crisis-ridden reproduction of social relations of capitalist production as a
whole.
The social form of capitalist production and the crisis of capitalist accumulation
For Marx, the possibility of the emergence of a general crisis is inherent in the
contradictory social form of capitalist production itself, which shows up in different
forms in different stages and forms of capitalist development. In developing the theory
of value in his Capital Vol. I, Marx investigated the antagonistic social relations in their
most abstract form, the social relations of value-producing labour, the relations of
alienated labour. Labour activity, in these exchange relations between producers,
becomes abstracted and exists merely as a part of the social labour in order to be
exchanged and appropriated as private property, without any concreteness and personal
• character. However, even in this simple exchange-relation, there is no guarantee that the
individual producer's labour embodied in a commodity can be realised according to the
amount of labour she or he expended. The produced commodity always exists in the
possibility of a crisis of realisation of the labour embodied in the commodity unless the
producer meets the socially necessary labour time which, as a part of social labour as a
whole, is supposed to be spent on producing the commodity. In developed capitalist
production, value-producing relations appear in the social form of capitalist production
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in which production for social needs is subordinated to the production of surplus value.
In this relation, 'the driving motive and determining purpose of capitalist production is
the self-valorisation of capital to the greatest possible extent, i.e., the greatest possible
production of surplus value, hence the greatest possible exploitation of labour-power by
the capitalist' (Marx, Capital Vol. 1, 1990b, p. 449). The contradiction between this
subordination of social production to the production of surplus value and its realisation
based on social needs appears in the form of 'overproduction' (in the arena of direct
production), on the one hand, and in the form of competitive pressure for the realisation
of surplus value produced (in the arena of exchange), on the other. However, the
competitive pressure and over-production are different aspects of the same phenomenon
with regard to the reproduction of capital as a whole, taking the form of the vicious
cycle between overproduction and increasing competition. The contradiction between
the production of surplus value and its realisation, in other words over-production, is the
phenomenal origin of the dynamism pushing individual capitals toward the
development of the forces of production to the greatest possible extent, on the one hand,
and the crisis, on the other hand. This origin is rooted in the specific social form of
capitalist production in which the production of things is subordinated to the production
of value (Clarke 1994, p. 285).
Facing the tendency to overproduction and competitive pressure on capitals,
individual capitals attempt to overcome the barrier of the market not by meeting the
amount of social need but by introducing new methods of production, intensifying
labour and extending the working day, so putting more commodities onto the market
with the perspective of occupying a superior position in the competition, which can
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guarantee further production and realisation of surplus value and even appropriation of
surplus profit for the most efficient capital, who can reduce his cost below those of his
competitors through introducing more productive methods of production (Clarke 1994,
p. 281). In doing so, the efficient capitals do not confine their production within the
limits of the market but attempt to overcome it by expanding the market, creating new
social needs and dominating the existing market. For the less efficient capitals, the
increasing competitive pressure is harder to overcome than for the efficient capitals.
However, it does not mean that the backward capitals would immediately respond to the
limits of the market by liquidating their capital at the expense of surplus value
production. It is impossible because 'a substantial portion of their capital will be
immobilised in stocks, fixed capital and work in progress' therefore can be liquidated
only gradually (Clarke 1990, p. 455). Also, they do not immediately reduce the amount
of production planned, which has already absorbed a certain amount of capital invested
for employees, fixed capital and raw materials in stock. A certain degree of immediate
reduction in production and liquidating capital is the capitalist's last option because
reducing the selling prices can cause creditors to rush to ask the capitalist to repay the
short and long term credit before further collapse. Furthermore, it is likely to cause a
sharp decrease in the price of their stocks and fixed capital. Therefore, at first, the less
efficient capitals also try to confront the limits of market by 'expanding their borrowing
to continue in production and seeking to dispose of their stocks through aggressive
marketing', keeping their selling price and mass of production of commodities and
hoping that the fierce competition could be overcome without massively harming their
surplus value production (Clarke 1990, p. 456). However, this only confirms and
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reproduces overproduction as the general tendency of capitalist production. The
superior position of the efficient capital must disappear sooner or later, increasing the
mass of commodities in the process of competition. This process is marked also by the
uneven development of the forces of production between individual capitals and
branches of industry, which is also a general tendency of capitalist development in
which production for social need is subordinated to the individual capitals' attempts to
produce and appropriate more surplus value. This is the rule of capitalist competition
and also the origin of the further overproduction which, by intensifying competition,
keeps reproducing the tendency to overproduction.
The general tendency and its realisation in a reproduction crisis
However, the general tendency does not have to appear as a devastating general
crisis of capitalist accumulation all the time. The sustained accumulation of capital,
despite the general tendency to overproduction, relies most of all on 'the ability of
capital to suspend the contradiction inherent in the social form of capitalist production'
(Clarke 1990, p. 459). Credit expansion is one of the key methods to suspend the
realisation of the possibility of a general crisis. Through expanding credit, capital could
compensate the general tendency of the development of capitalist accumulation by
continually revolutionising the means of production through developing technology,
creating new needs, expanding the world market with massive development of trade,
without regard to the limits imposed by the competitive pressure and immediate need to
realise the produced surplus value. Especially in the economic boom, the massive credit
expansion can guarantee capital to temporarily overcome 'the barrier to the
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accumulation of capital through providing finance for new ventures, and sustaining
unprofitable capitalists through periods of difficulty' (Clarke 1990, p. 461).
The expansionary development of Asian economies, particularly from the late 80s,
,
including that of Korea, has been based on this credit expansion from financial capitals
in the developed countries. The demise of the Bretton Woods system in the 1970s
marked the end of capital accumulation based on the social relations sustained by
Keynesian development, which has been formulated by a certain development of class
struggles between organised labour and the capitalist class in the form of a corporatist
system in developed countries. The end of the Keynesian era was also accompanied by
the emergence of huge money capital, which 'flows in search of speculative, often very
short-term means of expansion' rather than stick to productive investment within the
mother-nations suffering from greater exploitation costs and growing competitive
pressures in the commodity market (Holloway 1996, p. 132; Bonefeld 1996). The
existence of the huge speculative money capital shows us 'the supply side of the credit
expansion' and thereby how the massive expansion of credit, which was 'available at
rates of interest that were below domestic rates' and even encouraged by international
monetary institutions till the last moment of the onset of the crisis, was possible
(Patnaik 1999, p. 59). The private capital inflows to Asian NICs, which had continually
increased in search for more profitable and often speculative investment since the 1980s
and enabled individual capital in the region to continue to attempt to overcome the
limits of the market, shows nothing but international money capital's struggles for a
better deal.
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Then, it seems true that, during the unfolding of the general crisis in 1997, the
dependency on short-term loans to a great extent accelerated the development of the
Korean crisis by very quickly smashing the availability and accessibility of further
credit expansion. However, this does not mean either that the massive credit expansion
with its speculative feature is the 'origin' of the crisis or that therefore the crisis was a
mere financial crisis. Rather, credit expansion is one of the prime measures by which
capitals could avoid a realisation of the development of general tendencies to crisis into
a real general crisis. Indeed, however, although credit expansion can 'suspend' the
emergence of the contradiction, it does not mean that credit expansion can 'resolve' the
contradiction and prevent its emergence in a 'more devastating crisis in the future'
(Clarke 1991b, p. 126). Through suspending the emergence of contradiction in the form
of crisis and through confining the tendency to overproduction within the limits of
sustainable capitalist accumulation accompanied by relatively smooth liquidation of a
certain part of capital, most of which are backward capitals, capital is continually
accumulated and necessarily and continually takes the form of overaccumulation. In the
process of suspending the emergence of the contradiction of the social form of capitalist
production in the form of the general crisis, the possibility of the crisis could increase
and the width and depth of the emergence of the contradiction in the form of the general
crisis could even grow.
The effectiveness of the measures designed to mobilise countertendencies to a
general crisis, such as credit expansion, the introduction of new means of production,
creation of new needs, aggressive marketing, slow liquidation of less efficient capitals
and, most of all, tightening of labour control, is mediated by the process of the
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reproduction and restructuring of capital relations. That is to say, attempts to overcome
the crisis tendencies by mobilising measures for counter-crisis tendencies, including
credit expansion, are accompanied by and realised only through the development of
class struggle. Here, it is in this sense that the development of the crisis cannot be
abstracted from the development of class struggle. When the class struggle of the
working class develops to the extent that it threatens the smooth reproduction of capital
relations in favour of capital accumulation, the continuous attempts of the state and
capitals to restructure capital relations, through taking appropriate measures to promote
further capital accumulation, could face more explicit forms of class struggles, rather
than establishing a new basis of accumulation that could possibly overcome the
unfolding of the tendency to crisis. The period between 1987 and 1997 was marked by
these more explicit forms of class struggle, rather then by a successful reconstruction of
the basis of capital accumulation.
What the development of the general tendency to the crisis of overproduction and
overaccumulation on the basis of credit expansion shows us is the growing 'possibility'
of a general crisis, not a necessity. In other words, even though it is right that the
possibility of a general crisis is inherent in the social form of capitalist production and
the contradiction inherent in it appears in the form of the general development of
overproduction and competition between individual capitals, the possibility does not
explain the specific necessity of the crisis in Korea. In other words, the realisation of the
general tendency to crisis into its emergence in given nations or regions is not
immediately given by the general economic law but necessarily mediated by the
historical development of capitalist social relations, the continual reconstruction of
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which aims to avoid the realisation of the possibility of a general crisis. Indeed, it is in
this sense that the massive credit expansion in Korea, in spite of the visible risk coming
from its speculative nature, is to be understood as an expression of the development of a
reproduction crisis, during the development of which Korea's capitalist development
suffered from both growing class struggle from the working class and the development
of the tendency to overaccumulation in the global market. In order to understand fully
the development of the crisis, therefore, we must understand it in the context of the
development of the reproduction of the social relations of capitalist production as a
whole rather than understand it as a product of the conflicts between capitals or that of a
mechanical development of the tendency to overproduction and overaccumulation. In
short, the development of the (economic) possibility into the (social) necessity needs a
closer look at the reproduction of the social relations of capitalist production though
class struggle, which conditioned and mediated the relation between the possibility and
historical necessity of the crisis. In order to understand the unfolding of Korea's general
crisis in 1997, it seems necessary to go back to the further development of the
politicised reproduction of capital relations in Korea in the 80s.
2. The Deconstruction of the Politicised Reproduction of Capital
Relations
Democratisation and the second crisis of the state
The transitional period between 1987 and 1997, marked by intense struggles between
capitals, the state and labour around the further development of the configuration of
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capital relations, began with the second crisis of the state in 1987. In the mid-80s, Chun
Doo-hwan's Fifth Republic faced increasing challenges, not only from industrial unrest
by the workers' movement, but also from resistance led by students, the Minjung
movement and the political opposition that demanded political liberalisation. Growing
aspirations for democratisation appeared in the general election in 1985, in which,
despite an obvious lack of transparency in the election process, the New Korean
Democratic Party, led by two outstanding opposition leaders, Kim Dae-jung and Kim
Young-sam, successfully became the first opposition party, by aggressively arguing for
political liberalisation through renewing the constitution that had prohibited the mass of
the Population from exercising their voting rights in presidential elections since the
Yushin Constitution. While the new opposition party, after the successful general
election, attempted to push forward the amendment of the constitution through political
negotiation with the Chun Doo-hwan government, Chun's government began to tighten
its heavy-handed suppression over the student and Minjung movement that tried to
achieve democratisation through more radical struggles, by arresting and torturing the
leaders of those movements. 48 In January 1987, struggles against the military
goverment were accelerated after a university student, Park Jong-chul, was found
tortured to death by security police. In spite of the growing aspiration of people for
48 The best example of the extreme suppression can be found in attacks on a demonstration,
held in Geonkook University in October 1986, by more than 8,000 riot police. Over three days
of occupation struggle in Geonkook University, more than 1,200 students were arrested and
prosecuted.
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democratisation, President Chun Doo-hwan announced on 13 th April that there would be
no amendment of the constitution before the Seoul Olympic Games in 1988.
The military government's final blow, in continuing to utilise its suppressive
measures on the mass of the population, prompted a massive democratisation movement,
reminiscent of the last days of Park's regime in 1979 after repeated emergency
measures. Now the two oppositional leaders, Kim Dae-jung and Kim Young-sam,
established a new party, the Reunification Democratic Party, by splitting from the New
Democratic Party, the official leadership of which still wanted to resolve political
tension through negotiation with the military government, and joined the student and
Minjung movement. In June, over five million citizens occupied streets, attacked city
and town halls and disarmed riot police on the street in all major cities and towns, in
spite of Chun's government's warning of military intervention. Finally, on 29 th June, the
leader of the ruling party, the Democratic Justice Party, Roh Tae-woo, announced that
the government had decided to admit the demands for democratisation by allowing a
direct presidential election in the year of 1987, liberalisation of political activities and
media, independence of universities and amnesties for those arrested and imprisoned
during the democratisation struggles.
Whereas the first crisis of the politicised reproduction of capital relations in the form
of the crisis of the state was stabilised by the emergence of another military regime in
1980, overcoming of the second crisis of the state in 1987 required at least a formal
democratic reform, showing the degree to which the politicised class struggle developed
in spite of the repression by the military government during the early 1980s. Indeed,
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although a formal democratic reform could stabilise the nation-wide democratisation
movement by the end of June 1987 and, therefore, enabled the state to avoid the
development of its crisis into a more devastating phase, the crisis of reproduction this
time did not appear only in the form of political crisis. Rather, it developed into a more
dramatic transformation that was provoked by the subsequent workers' struggles in the
summer of 1987, during which the whole basis of unilateral labour relations at the
workplace, and, therefore, the social settlement of capital accumulation which had
developed in the 1960s and 1970s, was critically undermined. It is important to notice
that the working class' struggle in the summer of 1987 was distinguished from the
democratisation movement, in which resistance against the forms of capitalist social
domination appeared in the demands for formal 'citizenship' and political rights of the
working class as individual citizens. The massive explosion of the democratisation
movement in 1987 was itself a direct result of the politicisation of class struggle that
had developed on the basis of the early configuration of the capital relations, the
reproduction of which relied heavily on the state's suppressive regulation of the
working population. Now, the heyday of the early settlement of the capital relation had
ended because of the very same nature of the reproduction of capital relations that had
brought at the beginning a fast and effective capitalist development and capital
accumulation. The crisis of reproduction, in the form of the crisis of the political regime,
itself appeared to be overcome by a formal democratic reform. However, the more
significant consequence of the politicised class struggle was that it offered at the end a
perfect opportunity by creating a massive political unrest, out of which class antagonism
could explode. Struggles in the summer of 1987 showed the antagonism between capital
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and labour for the first time as class antagonism per se, neither as a human-rights issue
nor as a democratisation issue, as the struggles provoked by labour issues had been
since the 70s. It is in this sense that the struggle of the summer of 1987 was a critical
moment of the transformation of capital relations in Korea.
The Great Workers' Struggle and emerging crisis
The Great Workers' Struggle in 1987 began, not in Seoul, the political heartland, but
in the southern city of Ulsan, the most intensive heavy industrial town in Korea. From
the mid-1980s, workers' attempts to establish democratic trade unions had already
begun with organising small reading groups and fraternal circles in heavy industrial
firms, such as Hyundai's heavy industry enterprises in Ulsan and Daewoo Ship-building
in Geoje Island (CKTU 1997; Lee 1994). Now, while the democratisation movement
reached its peak in the second half of June 1987 and resulted in the weakening of the
overall effectiveness of the state's role in regulating labour relations, workers in
Hyundai's heavy industry firms began to accelerate their attempt to organise democratic
trade unions. Facing those attempts that were initiated in the Hyundai Engine Industry,
Hyundai management, in a vain attempt to prevent the struggle from spreading into
other firms, shut down factories, established 'paper unions' in Hyundai Heavy Industry
and Hyundai Motors Car, employed save-the-company squads and utilised other attacks
on union leaders. However, the more the Hyundai management deployed extreme
methods to stabilise the situation, the more explosive the struggles became. The city of
Ulsan was overwhelmed by Hyundai workers mobilising mass demonstrations and
occupying the factories and city hall, over a period of one month from mid-July. The
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government was so flustered that it lost its control over the city. Through the intense
struggle against the management, all Hyundai's firms, including Hyundai Engine
Industry (le July), Hyundai Ship-building (17 th July), Hyundai Heavy Industry (19th
August) and Hyundai Motors Car (28 th July), succeeded in establishing democratic
unions with the dramatic support from rank-and-file workers, within less than two
months, after over 30 years of non-union history at Hyundai even if the president of
Hyundai repeatedly declared its no-union policy as a supreme principle of management
(Yu 2001, p. 95). Workers' struggles quickly spread into other industrial areas all over
Korea. A total of 3,311 labour disputes occurred during the three-month period from
July to September 1987 and over 1.2 million workers took part in the struggles (Rho
1997, p. 186).
While the primary demand of workers in the struggles of the summer of 1987 was for
pay rises, in all labour conflicts, at least four other issues of workplace labour relations,
such as inhumane treatment and discrimination between manual and non-manual
workers, were raised together with an increase in wages (CKTU 1997, p. 162; Kim, D.
C. 1995, pp. 101-3). Those various issues reflected the nature of workplace labour
control that prevailed in the heavy industrial sectors and included a reduction of
working hours, liberalisation of dress code and hair style, elimination of compulsory
morning exercise and the termination of arbitrary job evaluation by foremen (Koo 2001,
p. 160). In many cases, workers did not negotiate before calling for collective actions. It
was very usual that a labour dispute took the form of strike-first-talk-later during the
summer of 1987 (Kim, D. C. 1995, p. 107), involving strategies of walkout, occupation
and demonstration without regard to the legal process, either because employers did not
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recognise the representativeness of the unions or because the leadership of strikes and
other conflicts was often different from the union leadership. Due to this nature of
labour conflicts, during the summer of 1987, only 5.9% of all labour disputes were legal
and 94.1% of the disputes occurred without regard to the legal process (CKTU 1997, p.
164). Many unions were established, therefore, not before but in the middle of the
development of labour disputes, often accompanying rank and file's distrust of the
existing union leadership. Neither individual capital's control nor state power seemed to
be able to stop the explosion of labour disputes and workers' aspiration for democratic
trade unions in the summer of 1987. The state could not respond to the labour struggle
in the same way it had done before. During the summer of 1987, the state hesitated to
Intervene in labour disputes, unprecedentedly emphasising 'resolution by negotiation
between employers and employees' and arguing that 'forced labour-employer
agreement by government intervention could not bring an ultimate resolution for the
labour disputes' (Interview with Labour Minister, Donga Daily Newspaper, 13 th August
1987). Capital also appeared to recognise that it was necessary not to deny the existence
of trade unions and accept workers' demands to a large extent in order to resolve the
imminent problems at the workplace (Korean Federation of Businessmen, Jungang
Daily Newspaper, 11 th
 August 1987).
The Great Workers' Struggle firstly was a watershed of the quantitative development
of the workers' movement, which appeared in the increase in number of unions and
union members that respectively increased from 2,658 to 7,883 and 1,036,000 to
1,932,000 between 1986 and 1989 (Koo 2000, p. 231). Noticeably, the number of trade
union explosively increased from 2,742 to 4,103 during the Great Struggle in 1987,
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accompanying the increase in union density from 14.7% to 17.3% in the same period
(Kang and Cho 1997, p. 32). However, even these extraordinary figures underestimate
the qualitative development of the working class struggle by ignoring the changing
nature of labour relations at the workplace before and after the struggles. As seen above,
those newly established unions were organised in the process of the struggles against
the pro-capitalist unionism of the FKTU and against the state's interventions in
workplaces. Reflecting this characteristic of the new independent unions, industrial
disputes sharply increased after the struggle. The annual average number of industrial
disputes for a decade since 1987 was five times as many as for the decade before 1987,
from 174 between 1977 and 1986 to 846 between 1987 and 1996 (Koo 2000, p. 231). In
addition, after the summer of 1987, workplace labour relations showed 'a significant
shift in the balance of power on the shop floor' (Koo 2000, p. 232). Collective
bargaining, which had been largely ignored or conceived as a merely formal procedure
between pro-capitalist union leaderships and capitalists, now became a necessary
procedure that capitalists had to go through in order to implement managerial decisions.
The result was that capitalists could no longer exercise the maximised managerial
authority 'to make unilateral decisions about wage and employment conditions' and
now had to reach agreements with the trade union through collective bargaining (Koo
2000, p. 233). In so doing, trade unions began to penetrate the managerial decision-
making process through increasing 'union involvement in various type of personnel
management policies', including 'discharge, discipline and transfer' (Jeong 1997, p. 60).
This union's encroachment on managerial authority appeared in the unions' attempt to
take a portion of seats on the board of personnel management and discipline and to
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undermine the organisational structure and hierarchy at the workplace by enhancing
unions' workplace organisational structure and juxtaposing it with the one of capital
(See Rho 1995, pp. 42-3). What these unions' increasing encroachment on managerial
,
power subsequently caused was the beginning of the demise of the barrack-like labour
control on the shop floor, which had developed through a military-like organisational
structure and system of command and discipline, under the condition of direct control of
the state over the power of collective labour (Rho 1995, p. 42. See also Park 1996).
By the end of the 1980s, neither capital nor the state was able to return labour
relations to their form before the struggles of the summer of 1987. As many unions
succeeded in achieving record-breaking wage increases as well as favourable working
conditions, the cost of exploitation also sharply increased. This means that the
development of the labour movement after 1987 led to a swift deconstruction of the
politicised reproduction of capital relations in Korea. A smooth reproduction of capital
relations, as we saw above, basically requires the smooth operation of the movement of
the inversion of the social relations of capitalist production between antagonistic classes
into technical relations between different sources of revenue through capital-forms. This
inversion, drawing on the abstract nature of capitalist domination, is the primary form of
the reproduction of capital relations and, however, can become problematic when the
working class finds itself increasingly being exploited and questions the legitimacy of
the inverted social relations. As a moment of inversion of the social relations, the
capitalist state contributed to the possible smooth operation of the inversion of the social
relations by translating the unequal relations between classes into political relations
between equal citizens, on the one hand, and suppressing the working class, if possible,
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within the legitimated boundaries through enforcing laws, on the other. As we saw
above in the early politicised formation and reproduction of capital relations in Korea,
the reproduction of capital relations appeared to be relatively smooth, in spite of the
unilateral labour relations at the workplaces and the state's strong anti-labour policies,
on the basis of the specific resolution of the class conflicts over the Korean War and the
nationalistic government dedicated to the nation's modernisation, regulating both
individual capitals and labour. However, this also accompanied the politicisation of
class struggle, in which the state had to intervene directly in response to the increasing
resistance of the working class. In the late 1970s and 1980s, we witnessed the
increasing difficulty in the operation of the inversion of social relations and therefore in
the reproduction of capital relations in favour of further capital accumulation. The first
expression of this difficulty of reproduction was the crisis of the state in 1979, in which
the so-called developmental state faced its apparent limit. The first crisis of
reproduction, which had been temporarily overcome by another military coup in 1980,
was however followed by the continuous development of the organised labour
movement while the early settlement of capital-state relations also began to crack. The
upsurge of labour in 1987 now confirmed that the difficulty of the reproduction of the
early settlement of capital relations, which was manifested for the first time concretely
in the crisis of 1979, was not a mere temporary one but an expression of the
development of a more fundamental problem.
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The State, capital and labour: toward new forms of labour control
In spite of the swift declining of the unilateral labour relations at the workplaces after
1987, the deeply developed crisis of reproduction of capital relations did not appear
immediately in a general crisis of capital accumulation largely due to Korea's so-called
three lows (low oil price, low value for the South Korean Won and low international
interest rate) boom, creating a massive profit in exports and bringing a record-breaking
current account surplus, $4.709 billion in 1986, $10.058 billion in 1987, $14.505 billion
in 1988 and $5.360 billion in 1989. This export boom enabled individual capitals to
afford the increasing investment in fixed capital, which grew 341% between 1984 and
1987 (Lim 1998, p. 47), and to cover the massive increase in wages. However,
expansion in this boom was marked by a massive increase in the volume of production
of commodities through investing a large part of the surplus in the quantitative
expansion of the means of production, which occupied almost 70% of total investment
in plant and equipment, rather than by introducing new means of production for
improving productivity and decreasing employment (Lee and Ryu 1993, p. 64).
It was at the end of 1989 that symptoms of crisis appeared. To sustain the enlarged
scale of the production of commodities and cover the increasing cost of exploitation,
individual capitals continually needed capital to invest in their reproduction. However,
this continual reproduction also presupposes the continual realisation of the produced
commodities, the successful realisation of the surplus value in competitive markets.
However, what Korean capitals faced from late 1989 was increasing competitive
pressure in global markets as well as growing pressure from increased wages, both of
which functioned as barriers to the export growth necessary to sustain the enlarged
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production scale. This increasing competitive pressure in the market was accelerated by
the newly industrialised nations (NICs) and subsequently China, and growing
protectionism in developed countries, particularly in the US, which, after suffering from
the massive trade deficit with Korea during the boom, began to attempt to protect the
commodity market through 'employing the newly created Super 301 section of its
Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988' and pointed to Korea as 'unfair
traders' (Burkett and Hart-Landsberg 2000, p. 157). Also, 'the upward revaluation of
the South Korean Won by almost 16% in 1988' again harassed Korean capitals (Hart-
Landsberg 1993, pp. 237-8). The result appeared firstly in the decrease in exports. The
export growth rate fell from 28.4% in 1988 to a mere 2.8% in 1989 and 4.2% in 1990.
This again caused a balance of payments problems, with a growing deficit on current
account, $2 billion in 1990, $8.3 billion in 1991, while foreign borrowing also began to
increase again from 1990.
Facing these barriers, individual capitals, recognising it was no longer possible to
overcome the slowdown only at the expense of the working class, began to accelerate
the introduction of new means of production, which could change the labour-intensive
character of the industries to a more capital-intensive one and thereby enable individual
capitals to 'avoid being involved in massively growing labour conflicts from 1987'
(Song 1998, p. 268), through the import of capital goods for both existing major
industries and newly emerging hi-tech industries. Also individual capitals attempted to
change the items of exports, which could avoid the trade conflicts, and brought more
capital investment in hi-tech industries, such as the semi-conductor industry.
Accordingly, the investment in fixed capital was focused on investment in introducing
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new products, the automation of the labour process, including computerised control, and
R&D rather than the quantitative expansion of equipment. As a consequence, while
investment in the quantitative expansion of equipment grew only 14.3% between 1988
and 1991, investment in developing new production (142%), automation (120%), and
R&D (73.4%) grew massively in the same period (Korea Development Banks 2001). A
large part of the surplus realised in the boom was invested, avoiding the growing
difficulties in making profits thorough exporting industrial products, also in land
speculation, which was also an effective means for making it easier to get credit from
financial capital, and in the short-term finance market (Hart-Landsberg 1993, pp. 239-
40; Yu 2001, p. 160).
In addition to labour-saving automation, individual capitals also attempted to recover
their managerial authority on the shop floor by introducing new labour regulative
measures. First of all, individual capitals began to either establish or strengthen
managerial departments and specialised teams dealing exclusively with labour-related
problems in their firms. In 1989, more than 69% of firms had a department specialised
in labour regulation, in contrast to a mere 53 % of firms in 1987, while the influence of
the department on managerial decisions was also substantially enhanced (Kim, H. G.
1997, p. 163). Furthermore, employers began to introduce a 'new personnel
management strategy', which aimed at isolating newly established trade unions by
promoting cooperative employment relations. New personnel management emphasised
'human relations' and 'company culture', which were designed to promote a common
identity based on the company as a community, among the workers (Park 1995).
Regular consultation meetings between personnel managers and individual workers
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were set up at various hierarchical levels, in order to make it possible for management
to notice the problems in the workplace before the trade unions do (Park and Cho 1989,
p. 57). Small-group discussions, in which individual workers could make suggestions
J
for workplace welfare as well as productivity enhancement to shop-floor managerial
authority, were also activated while various educational programmes, with particular
emphasis on the nationalist agenda, anti-communism, national economic hardships, and
the relative superiority of the firm to other companies, were introduced in many firms
(Park 1995, pp. 14-5). Likewise, it was at this time that the Korean chaebols, in an
attempt to replace the seniority-based wage and promotion system with a merit-based
wage and promotion system (Kim, Y. C. and Moon 2000, p. 57), began increasingly to
experiment with the 'ability wage and promotion scheme' in which, although pay rises
and promotion were based mainly on seniority, evaluation of individual job-ability
determined a significant portion of the pay rise as well as eligibility for promotion (Park
1995, p. 7). These new forms of workplace labour regulation were widely spread,
especially in the electronic-electrical industry, e.g., at Goldstar, Daewoo Eletronics,
Samsung SDI (KLISP et al. 2000).
While those new management strategies were focused on integrating individual
workers into managerial decision making processes and thereby separating them from
the newly established democratic unions, they also included policies against the newly
established democratic unions. In order to hinder workers' involvement in unions'
collective actions, 'no work, no pay' became a principle of labour-management in large-
scale firms, such as Daewoo Shipbuilder (Kim, Y. C. and Moon 2000, p. 57; Park and
Cho 1989, p. 75). If labour disputes occurred, employers often boycotted collective
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bargaining and hired substitute workers during the labour disputes, rather than faced
union leaders. However, whereas employers ignored democratic unions and attempted
to discourage workers from being involved in union activities, this does not mean that
they completely ignored the existence of unions. Rather, they encouraged more
cooperative workers to take over the union leadership by offering them financial and
organisational support. Therefore, those cooperative workers could enjoy privileges and
mobilise anti-union organisation while democratic union leaders were suffering from
surveillance and discipline.
While individual capitals introduced various labour-management strategies for the
first time since the start of capitalist development in Korea, the state began to confront
the labour movement more aggressively after the presidential election in December
1987, in which Roh Tae-woo, the successor of Chun Doo-hwan, narrowly won against
two oppositional candidates, Kim Dae-jung and Kim Young-sam who separately
attempted to win the presidential election after splitting from each other in the process
of 'candidate unionisation'. The state's first aggressive attempt, after 1987, to again
tighten its control over the labour movement appeared in its fast and violent response to
the strikes in Pungsan Metal Industry (January 1989) and Hyundai Heavy Industries
(December 1988 — April 1989), following President Roh's special statement on public
security on 28th December 1988, which made it clear that his administration would not
hesitate to intervene in matters disturbing national security and public order. In the
aftermath of the statement, the state began systematically to re-deploy suppressive
measures against the labour movement. On the one hand, Roh's government attempted
to stop the further development of the labour movement at national level by setting up a
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'national security investigation headquarter' dealing with labour disputes (Yu 2001, p.
200) and subsequently exercising a veto against the proposed bill by parliament for a
new labour law, which was likely to reflect the developments after the summer of 1987
by removing some of the notorious articles, such as prohibition of third party
intervention, prohibition of political activity of unions and ban on the unionisation of
public servants. On the other hand, the government also attempted to strengthen its
control over enterprise unions at the individual enterprise level, by offering financial
subsidies to individual capitals, which effectively stopped further development of labour
disputes, and tightening daily surveillance on the unions in 158 targeted firms (Yu 2001,
p. 201). In the following year of 1990, Roh's government succeeded in founding a
firmer political basis for more aggressive labour control by obtaining a majority in
parliament as a result of the establishment of the Democratic Liberal Party through a
three-party merger. Having seen all of them, it was apparent that the state's labour
policy was returning to one based on direct and suppressive labour control, which had
marked the early formation of capital relations.
However, although the state's labour policies aimed to intervene directly in labour
disputes by utilising authoritarian measures, this does not mean that the effectiveness of
the politicised reproduction of capital relations was resumed. Quite the opposite, the
resumed authoritarian control over collective labour appeared rather to contribute to the
growing militancy of the democratic unions, than stabilise it. In spite of this policy
return from 1989, democratic unions were now establishing and developing regional
and national-scale solidarity among them. After the Great Workers' Struggle, newly
established or 'democratised' enterprise unions, often seeking help for very practical
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reasons, such as information about collective bargaining procedures, or developing
solidarity struggles on a regional basis, began to develop regional solidarity among the
firms in the same industrial towns and cities. Beginning with the establishment of the
,
'Council of Unions in Masan and Changwon' in December 1987, a total of 11 regional
trade union councils were organised by the end of 1989 (CKTU 1997, pp. 347-86),
including a quarter of a million workers. At the same time, workers in the health service,
media, banks, schools, utilities, construction, publication and universities established 13
occupational leagues, comprising 173,000 members (Yu 2001, p. 174). Moreover, 14
regional councils and 2 manufacturing occupational leagues (publication and
construction) finally established the Council of Korean Trade Unions in January 1990.
This council represented 'the democratic trade union movement as opposed to the
yellow trade unionism of the Federation of Korean Trade Unions' (Kim, S. K. 1994, p.
1) as a symbolic centre of the democratic trade union movement. While the CKTU
represented the development of democratic trade unions in small and medium size
companies, workers in big conglomerates (chaebols) established their own umbrella
unions, e.g., the GFHTU (General Federation of Hyundai Company Trade Unions) and
the CLCTU (Council of Large Companies Trade Unions). Also, non-manufacturing
occupational leagues succeeded in establishing the NCTF (National Conference of
Occupational Trade Unions). Those organisations again succeeded in establishing the
National Conference of Trade Union Representatives in 1993, as a bridgehead of
organising an united federation of democratic trade unions, including 1,145 democratic
trade unions and some 400,000 union members (Kim, S. K. 1994, p. 5). In this period,
in spite of a decreasing number of labour disputes, the struggles of militant unions
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developed organisationally and strategically and in a way in which the individual
capitals found themselves in increasing difficulty to reorganise labour in accordance
with newly introduced personnel management strategies. In spite of the policy return,
,
the further development of the labour movement also made it clear that the state found
itself in transition by losing its effectiveness in suppressing labour and thereby
contributing to the reproduction of capital relations in favour of capital accumulation.
3. Deepening of the Deconstruction and the Emergence of the General
Crisis
Growing competitive pressure, liberalisation and credit expansion
During the slowdown from 1989, individual capitals attempted to overcome the
barrier of exports aggressively by investing in new means of production, developing
new products and R&D. However, those attempts were not successful. While the import
of capital goods for new investment continued, export growth continually slowed,
showing mere 2.8% growth in 1989 and 4.2% in 1990. Although the growing domestic
market, in accordance with the increasing income of the working class, contributed to
sustaining economic growth, it also caused a rather massive increase in the import of
consumer goods, which more than doubled between 1988 and 1991. As a consequence,
the current account returned to deficit from 1990 and reached $8.317 billion deficit in
1991, which was the worst in decades. After a short retreat between 1992 and 1993,
during which overall economic growth was the lowest after the Second Oil Shock,
Korean capitals again aggressively attempted to overcome the already well developed
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crisis, inspired by a short brisk market, which brought a slight current account surplus,
largely due to the low Japanese Yen and decrease in imports, in 1993. During and in the
aftermath of the boom in the mid-1980s, individual capitals managed to increase capital
investment to sustain the enlarged mass of production of commodities in the traditional
industries and launch new industries such as semi-conductors, on the basis of the
massive surplus in the boom. However, further aggressive investment by Korean
capitals after 1993, the total of which grew 56.2 % in 1994 and again 43.5 % in 1995,
was possible only through massive credit expansion based primarily on foreign-loans,
which grew 78.6 % in the same period, through various financial institutions. It was at
this time that the state's leadership against individual capitals, which had developed as a
moment of the politicised reproduction of capital relations since the 1960s, finally
appeared to melt down.
As we saw before, the state's leadership against individual capitals relied practically
on its overall role in guaranteeing the subordination of the mass of the working class to
capital through its repressive control over collective labour, on the one hand, and its
control over financial flows through nationalised banks and financial institutions, on the
other. As the crisis of the early configuration of capital relations and of the politicised
reproduction of capital relations developed further, by the early 1990s, the overall role
in reproducing the subordination of the working class to individual capitals was
seriously damaged so that individual capitals no longer relied on the state's control over
the working class, rather developing other measures to regulate the collective power of
labour. Another symptom of the decline of the early settlement of capital relations
appeared in the fact that the influence of the state on financial flows appeared to be far
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weakened as individual capitals now attracted external funds primarily through direct
funding, such as stocks and bonds. In 1992, this direct funding already accounted for
more than 40 % of the total external funds (Cho 1999, p. 10). Furthermore, funding
through commercial banks, which were still by and large under the influence of the state
intervening in the managerial process, decreased continually to a mere 15.1 % of the
total external funding of the individual capitals in 1992. By contrast, the chaebols
successfully increased their domination over financial flows by controlling the non-
bank financial institutions, such as short-term investment finance companies and
merchant bank corporations, which provided capitals with more than 21.1 % of their
total external funds already in 1992 (Cho 1999, p. 10). Noticeably, more than 43.6 % of
total borrowing from these NBFIs in 1992 was provided to the 30 largest chaebols (Kim,
S. J. 1998, p. 96). Foreign borrowing subject to government's guarantee also now
appeared not to be meaningful, occupying a mere 5% of the total funds (Lee 1998, pp.
25-6). All of these meant that the state's control over financial flows, as the basis of its
leadership against individual capitals, virtually disappeared as the financial flows under
government control were already only slightly more than 20 % in the early 1990s.
In order to meet the massive demands for external funds in the attempts of capitals to
overcome the growing hardship through aggressive investment, financial liberalisation
was even accelerated in the mid-1990s by Kim Young-sam's civilian government, in the
pursuit of Segehwa (globalisation) policies, by allowing a further relaxation of control
on foreign borrowing, through liberalising the establishment of private merchant banks
and finance companies, and practically abandoning control over the exchange rate and
investment co-ordination, which had been a feature of the selective promotion of
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industries (Chang 1998, pp. 226-7). Moreover, Kim's government pledged
'deregulation of interest rates in almost all areas from 1993 to 1997, starting with
deregulating interest rates on all loans except for policy loans, all long-term deposits,
and corporate bonds and so forth in 1993' (Lee 1998, p. 22). These liberalisation
policies finally allowed a steep increase in foreign loans, which more than doubled
between 1993 and 1996, showing particular dependence on short-term loans which
reached 58.3 % of total external borrowing in 1996 (Cho 1999, p. 15).
However, in spite of the aggressive investment on the basis of massive credit
expansion, it was not likely that Korean capitals could recover from the recession.
Although economic growth recovered slightly with the help of credit expansion,
showing 8.6 % of GDP growth in 1994 and again 8.9 % in 1995, the deficit on current
account reached $8.5 billion in 1995 and $23 billion in 1996, following devaluation of
the Yen which followed from the agreement between the U.S. and Japan in 1995 (Lee,
B. C. 1999, p. 123). Now, the ratio of net income to sales in manufacturing fell to a
record-breaking low 0.53 % in 1996 largely due to the increasing pressure of repayment
(Korean National Statistics Office 2002). It was at this time that the dependence of
capital investment on foreign loans, which grew from $31.7 billion in 1990 to $104.7
billion in 1996 with a high dependence on short-term loans, reached a critical point.
Class struggle in the deepening crisis
In the meantime, in a desperate attempt to restructure labour relations by retaining
the effectiveness of controlling labour, Kim Young-sam's civilian government also
launched a range of quasi-corporatist measures to restructure labour relations. Firstly,
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the state attempted to implement income policies, not through the unilateral 'guide-
lines' which had been used by the military governments, but through a form of social
contract between labour and capital. As a result, social wage contracts between the
FKTU and the KBF (Korean Businessmen Federation) were introduced in 1993 and
1994. However, the social contract policy was soon to be abandoned since 'many
companies and enterprise unions ignored the targets or circumvented them by restricting
their application to the basic salary, but not observing them for the bonus or other
special allowance' (OECD 2000b, p. 58). Instead, those two organisations together
announced a declaration for industrial peace in 1995, 'promising co-operation for
national economic development' (Gyunghyang Daily News, 31 March 1995).
However, the fact that the state attempted to integrate trade unions into a corporatist
social contract did not mean that the state gave up violent regulative measures. In fact,
forceful suppression by the state appeared again as the main measure to regulate labour.
Beginning with the violent intervention in the strike in Apolo Industry in 1993, forceful
direct interventions smashed major strikes of the militant unions, e.g., the KLC (Korean
Locomotive Workers Council) strike in April 1994 and the Seoul and Pusan Subway
Trade Union, Kumho Tires, Daewoo Machinery and Electronics, Shinil Steel, Pusan
Marinol Hospital and the Korean Telecom Trade Union strike. 49 Meanwhile, the state
and capitalists emphasised that the national economy was in crisis and took advantage
of this as an effective ideology to force unpaid labour by means of nationalistic
49 In particular, Korean Telecom workers' strike was alluded to as an attempt to overturn the
nation by President Kim Young-sam in a special media conference in 1995.
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movements, e.g., 'the national movement for 30 minutes more working' and 'campaign
for 10% increase in national competitiveness'. However, in spite of the state's forceful
control, the CKTU finally succeeded in establishing a confederation of democratic trade
unions, the KCTU (Korean Confederation of Trade Unions), merging with the NCTFU
and integrating the unions in chaebols. In so doing, unions established on the basis of
'democratic trade unionism' have been unified under a single leadership of the KCTU,
for the first time in the history of the Korean labour movement.
Meanwhile, the state also initiated its attempts to reconstruct labour relations by
pursuing the flexibilisation of labour, which was believed to be the critical method of
overcoming the declining competitiveness of exports. Initiated by the Ministry of Trade
and Industry in 1990, discussion about labour law reform was focused on enhancing the
flexibility of hiring, dismissing and scheduling labour forces, through allowing the
dispatch of workers, the substitution of labour during industrial conflicts and
introducing flexible working hours arrangements. Indeed, at the same time, it attempted
to introduce more strict restriction on union's collective actions by 1) setting up a list of
legitimate reasons for which unions can go on strike, so that, if they are not adhered to
by unions, the central labour committee could order unions to stop labour disputes, 2)
prohibiting involuntary involvement in union activities, 3) restricting the eligibility of
the union leadership and 4) prohibiting strike action unless more than three-quarters of
the membership agreed. Most of these measures were included in the revised bill
proposed by the Ministry of Labour in 1991. In addition, the proposed bill included
introduction of the so-called 'total wage system' which was designed to more
effectively slow down pay rises by regulating all forms of payment as a total so that pay
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rises caused by increase in different parts of the wage, for example bonus or extra pay,
could be centrally regulated by government. The aim of this labour law reform was
clearly to mix control of individual workers on the basis of a flexible labour market with
authoritarian labour control based on the repressive control over trade unions. Therefore,
the state's repressive control over trade unions was to be sustained, not allowing the
independent unions to be legally recognised. Not surprisingly, this proposed bill faced
strong oppositions from workers establishing the 'Joint Committee for ILO Issues and
Labour Law Reform' and was forced to be withdrawn. In the early 1990s, although
individual capitals attempted to intensify labour through developing new management
strategy further at the work places and the state attempted to tackle the development of
the working class struggles, those attempts produced no outcome satisfactory enough to
overcome the crisis-ridden development. While the productivity of manufacturing
labour showed continual growth, 7.5 % in 1994, 11.9 % in 1995 and 15.7% in 1996,
average growth in this period was still well behind the average growth rate of 14.5 %
between 1991 and 1993. Also, the real wage still did not stop increasing, despite the
income policies, showing annually 6.4% increase between 1994 and 1996. Indeed, the
flexibility of labour also seems not to have increased enough to overcome the pre-crisis
symptoms at the expense of the working class. Although lay-offs and other flexible
measures had already implicitly been used by capital to reformulate the employment
structure, it was still not easy for individual capitals to impose officially a great degree
of flexibility on organised labour since the labour law reform, which had been expected
to bring the individual capital a substantial reduction of labour costs and full recovery of
its managerial power through institutionalising flexibility, was suspended by the
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working class struggles. 5° Individual capitals reacted in various ways to overcome the
barrier by mobilising methods other than making more profit from production. They
attempted to go beyond the national boundaries in order to move their capital to
somewhere with better relations of exploitation, without insubordination of labour to
capital. Therefore, Korean capitals' OFDI (Overseas Foreign Direct Investment) began
to massively increase, mainly toward other parts of Asia, from 1994, far superseding
inward foreign direct investment. As a result, Korea's OFDI toward Asian countries
almost doubled between 1994 and 1996, reaching 6.2 billion dollars in 1996 (Kim, E. M.
2000, p. 113). On the other hand, capital in the form of money also was speculatively
invested in South East Asia through the newly liberalised merchant banks and financial
companies. Credit was also expanding massively, making it possible for capitals to keep
producing in a vain attempt to overcome the barriers caused by the development of the
tendencies to crisis. Yet, it seemed necessary for overcoming growing instability of
capital accumulation to push forward the ultimate restructuring of capital relations and
then maximise the efficiency of the introduction of new means of production, and
thereby overcome the crisis at the expense of the working class. It was in 1996, facing
the instability of capital accumulation, which became increasingly uncontrollable, that
5o The most important issue with regard to 'flexibility' was lay-offs. Although capital had no
problem employing part-time or short-term contract workers, the issue of lay-off has always
been a matter of struggle. In the mid-1990s, the issue of lay-offs became one of the most
important issues dealt with in collective bargaining. Therefore, in that period, the number of
permanent workers appears not significantly to have decreased while part-time and short
contract workers were increasing.
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capitals and the state began seriously to try to institutionalise labour and labour market
flexibility.
Restructuring capital relations, the general strike and the crisis of reproduction
2
By the mid-1990s, all of the aspects of early capitalist development in Korea
(unilateral labour relations at the workplace, state control over collective labour, and
state leadership against individual capitals) appeared to be defunct. The state attempted
to keep its role in the reproduction of capitalist relations, however this time it had to be
done in a different way, since the state could not ignore the social power of the
democratic unions that had already succeeded in organising themselves in a unified
national federation, covering all major and core industries and firms. President Kim
Young-sam announced the 'New Thought on Industrial Relations for Leaping into the
First Class Nation in the 21st Century', as the bridgehead for reviewing labour law, in
April 1996. This programme was composed of five principles: 1) maximisation of the
common good, 2) participation and co-operation, 3) autonomy and responsibility of
employee and employer, 4) priority of education and respect for human beings, 5)
globalisation of institutions, and was followed by the establishment of 'the Commission
for Reform of Industrial Relations'. This was the first Tripartite Commission, in which
democratic trade unions were allowed to participate. The discourse about labour law
reform focused on the fair 'exchange' between relaxing control over trade unions by
improving collective labour law to the internationally recognised level (i.e., removing
the prohibition of multiple trade unions, the prohibition of unionisation by teachers and
public servants and the prohibition of political activity of unions) and allowing a more
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flexible labour market by loosening the 'rigid' labour standards law (Lee, J. H. 2000, p.
6). However, in spite of months-long discussion about the reform in the Tripartite
Commission, the bill proposed by the government in December 1996 'accommodated
almost all the demands' made by capitals, 'while giving only minor concessions to
labour' such as 'allowing multiple unions at the national and industry level but not at
the enterprise level, and granting collective bargaining rights to school teachers starting
from 1999' (Koo 2000, p. 238). Even worse, the essence of the labour law reform was
revealed when the law was enacted through a secret session at the National Assembly,
in the absence of members of the opposition parties, in the early morning of 26
December. The enacted law was full of the employers' demands without any evidence
that the state's forceful control over collective labour would be relaxed. In fact the
legislation legalising the KCTU was postponed until 2000 and the right for school
teachers to unionise was completely denied (Koo 2000, p. 239).
This provoked the first nation-wide general strike in Korea since 1948. On 26th
December 1996, 143,695 workers from the KCTU and 70,000 workers of the GHHTU
and affiliated unions initiated the strike. Thousands of unionists, citizens and students
held rallies in Seoul. Meanwhile, workers from public transportation, hospitals,
carmakers, shipyards and textile factories subsequently joined the strike. Also, even the
reactionary FKTU, that had maintained its position as the largest union, organised a
walkout by 156,000 workers at 486 work-sites. Again, from 3'1 January 1997, 230,000
workers joined the second stage of the nation-wide strike. In the third stage of the strike
from 15 th to 19th January, a total of 350,000 workers joined the protest. This strike
continued until 10 th March. As a result, the labour law was returned to the National
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Assembly and amended in March, only this time partly reflecting the element of
exchange which had formed the basis of the commission's discussions. Lawmakers
removed the anti-trade union elements within the collective labour law, allowing
multiple trade unions at national and industrial level but with a five-year moratorium at
company level, and allowing political activity by unions. However, the new law also
allowed more flexibility of labour through legalising flexible working hours
arrangements, redundancy dismissals (although this was not to be enacted until two
years after the passing of the act) and allowing capital to substitute workers during
labour disputes. It seems that now the threat to the reproduction of capital relations had
been finally treated properly, satisfying capital as well as labour, at least partly.
However, this time, the restructuring of capital relations, which took more than 10
years, seems not to have been done in time. In overcoming the limits of the markets, by
sustaining the mass of production, changing the items of export goods and introducing
new means of production mainly through importing hi-tech capital goods, in the form of
increasing competitive pressure on individual capitals, Korean individual capitals had
come to rely heavily on massive credit expansion since the early 1990s, mainly in the
form of short-term loans, through various private financial institutions. However, the
further valorisation of capital based on massive credit expansion appeared to be
reaching the limits of its success. Credit expansion had resulted only in accelerated
overproduction without overcoming the barriers of the market. The emerging symptom
of the tendency to overproduction began to appear more concretely and severely in the
collapse of the export of semi-conductors, which occupied 17.7% of total exports in
1995, when 'a glut of memory chips led to a precipitous fall in unit prices, accompanied
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by dramatic reductions in Korean exports' in 1996, worsening the financial pressure on
Korean capitals (Bernard 1999, p. 197). Even well before the emergence of the Asian
crisis, Korean capitals began to collapse. Beginning with the bankruptcy of Hanbo Steel,
the 14th
 largest company in Korea in January 1997, large chaebols, such as Sami, Jinro,
Daenong, Hansin had collapsed by June 1997. Kia, which was the 8th largest chaebol,
was found to be bankrupt too late to be revitalised. Afterwards, Ssangbanul, Haitai and
NewCore, all of which are among the thirty largest chaebols, went bankrupt. Meanwhile,
the breakdown of chaebols precipitated a critical breakdown in the financial system that
could also cause a massive subsequent collapse of the circulation of capital by forcing
the banks to rush to ask individual capitals to repay the credit in order to compensate
their loses in the collapsed branches and firms. At last, a general crisis emerged. On top
of this, financial turmoil in Asia also contributed to make the general crisis more
dramatic. While Korean banks attempted to recover their losses in the collapsed firms
by withdrawing further loans, foreign financial institutions began to refuse roll over of
the short-terms loans in Asia. With the massive increase in demand for the dollar in the
foreign currency market, a foreign currency crisis followed, precipitating a massive
liquidation of capital. The stock price, which had reached its highest level, 1,027.4 in
the Korean Composite Stock Price Index in late 1994, fell to 350.68 in late 1997.
Concluding Remark
Capital accumulation, which had been sustained by massive credit expansion but
had not been accompanied by successful reproduction of the relations of capitalist
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production at the expense of the working class, i.e., by more fundamental mobilisation
of the methods for overcoming the tendencies to crisis, at last revealed its limit in the
form of massive bankruptcies of individual capitals. The failure of the attempt of capital
and the state to reproduce the social relations of production without a serious liquidation
of capital shows that the working class struggles had become a barrier to the further
development of capital accumulation based on the particular pattern of reproduction of
social relations of capitalist production since the late 1970s. The development of the
working class's struggles has continually threatened the restructuring of capital relations,
as we saw in the Great Workers' Struggle in 1987, through undermining the state
regulation of collective labour as well as labour relations on the shop floor. Facing the
growing social power of labour at the workplace as well as at the national level, the
state and capital attempted to overcome the development of competitive pressure
provoked by the general tendency to overproduction and overaccumulation through
liberalisation, which could enable individual capitals to introduce new means of
production and therefore survive in the face of competition through massive expansion
of credit in the form of short-term loans, on the one hand. This liberalisation also
marked the end of capital allocation by the state, which was an important moment of the
early settlement of capital relations in Korea. On the other hand, the state and capitals
sought to institutionalise labour flexibility in order to restructure the national social
relations of capitalist production in favour of further accumulation. However, once the
politicised reproduction was critically undermined by the working class struggles from
1987, neither capital nor the state succeeded in restructuring the social relations in
favour of capital accumulation before the emergence of a general crisis. The
259
development of class struggle, provoking the demise of the settlement of capital
relations that had developed during the 1960s and 1970s, mediated the possibility of the
emergence of capitalist crisis, which has been imposed by the development of the
i
general tendency to crisis in growing over-production and overaccumulation at global
level, with the historical necessity of the crisis in Korea. Indeed, the Korean economic
crisis showed that credit expansion, which inherently can only suspend the emergence
of the contradiction of the social form of capitalist production, can provoke more
disastrous consequences, rather than overcoming the crisis tendencies, unless it is
accompanied by the successful mobilisation of social methods to overcome the limits of
the market at the level of production and ultimately by the successful reproduction of
the social relations of capitalist production in favour of further capital accumulation. In
this sense, the Korean crisis in 1997 is to be understood not as a financial crisis, but as a
social crisis of reproduction, which is a form of capitalist development in itself.
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Chapter 9: The State, Capital and Labour in Transition
Introduction
It was not until the four-year restructuring period in the aftermath of the emergence
of the general crisis that a new basis of further capital accumulation began to take shape
in Korea. The immediate response of the Korean state to the crisis, in accordance with
the IMF's stabilisation and structural adjustment policies, resulted in a rather disastrous
further development of the crisis. Its commitment to stabilisation policies that drive
debt-ridden or 'inefficient' individual capitals from the markets, accelerated the
subsequent collapse of individual capitals in the aftermath of the crisis. Capitals that
were lucky enough to survive the immediate impact of the crisis reacted swiftly to the
stabilisation policies by withdrawing planned investment, cutting wages, downsizing
production and most of all utilising mass lay-offs and other numeric adjustment
methods. These measures brought bankruptcy to many individual capitalists,
particularly small and medium size capitals whose ability to avoid financial rigidity by
negotiating the rollover of their short-term loans was far more narrowly limited than
larger firms, and imposed unemployment and job-insecurity on the mass of the working
population. Nevertheless, it was through this misery and at the expense of the working
class and the meltdown of financially backward capitals that the restructuring of capital
relations in Korea has eventually been pushed forward in favour of further capital
accumulation after the long period of contested transition from the 1980s.
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The newly elected Kim Dae-jung government pushed forward a full-fledged 'reform'
of the corporate, financial and public sectors and of the labour market from the
beginning of 1998. Those reforms were geared to enhance the efficiency of the rule of
the market, in accordance with an agreed diagnosis of the Korean economy between the
Korean government and the IMF, by eliminating the lack of transparency in corporate
management, heavy handed government intervention in financial flows on the basis of
the non-transparent relations between government officials and capitalists, inefficiency
in the public sector and the so-called rigidity of the labour market. While the state
facilitated the flexibilisation of the labour market by institutionalising the market-based
arrangement of employment relations, individual capitals utilised a more 'flexible'
arrangement of labour at the workplace, the introduction of which had been delayed by
the unions' intervention since the late 80s. The labour movement, now losing its basis
for militancy in the face of increasing job-insecurity, appeared to be largely unable to
organise effective struggle against this increasing introduction of flexible measures.
From the very beginning, those reforms indicated an accelerated marketisation of the
reproduction of capital relations. Indeed, the four years of restructuring after the
emergence of the crisis, under the principle of market-based reforms, without doubt
brought an enormous change in the way in which capital relations in Korea are
reproduced, showing a transformation from the old settlement on the basis of the state's
control over individual capitals and collective labour to a somewhat new settlement on
the basis of the rule of money, with an accompanying transformation of the form of the
Korean state. The way of reproducing the subordination of the working class to capital
now appears to be significantly `marketised' on the basis of a new system of
262
competition-based personnel management, workplace re-organisation and a wages
system as well as the massive development of a so-called flexible labour market that
increases the insecurity of employment. This new arrangement appears to be threatening
the basis of the traditional militancy of the trade unions, as we will see in the case of
Hyundai Motors Workers Union. While individual capitals are now exposed to the
increasing competition in the world market by the diminishing protection and privilege
previously given by the state, they also instead appear to enjoy a full-fledged freedom in
attracting financial flows from a totally liberalised financial market without heavy-
handed government intervention. In this sense, now the state appears to be a regulator
rather than a controller. The state role in reproducing capital relations in favour of
further capital accumulation has also changed, since it is focused on institutionalising
and supervising the market rule in labour relations, rather than directly controlling
labour conflicts in individual firms, despite its on-going intervention in labour conflicts
where the rule of the market appears to be threatened.
However, a closer look, presented in this chapter, at the process of the transformation
of capital relations during the period in the aftermath of the crisis will show us that the
restructuring of capital relations based on the marketisation of reproduction is unlikely
to guarantee a smooth further reproduction of capital relations in Korea. The
implementation of the restructuring, which in practice relies most of all on attacks on
trade unions by the state utilising authoritarian measures, although largely successful,
has been provoking the resistance of militant unions, despite their dissipated militancy,
as we saw in the strikes of Hyundai Motors workers in 1998. Most of all, in response to
the new forms of labour regulation, new forms of worker resistance and solidarity are
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emerging in traditionally non-militant and non-unionised sectors, such as irregular
workers and public sector workers. These new forms of resistance are likely to put the
state and capital in a situation in which they find the further pursuit of those reforms
J
increasingly difficult.
1. The Response to the Crisis and Initiation of the Restructuring of
Capital Relations
IMF, the stabilisation policies and the further development of crisis
At the onset of the crisis in 1997, the immediate threat to Korean capital came from
the so-called external liquidity problem. As the subsequent collapses of Korean
chaebols seriously undermined the credibility of Korean financial institutions by
accumulating a massive amount of non-performing loans, the rollover of short-term
foreign loans, apart from the immediate refusal to offer new loans, by foreign financial
institutions became virtually impossible by November 1997. As the Central Bank
attempted to meet the increasing demands of foreign currency by commercial banks and
merchant banking companies, the foreign currency reserve reached near exhaustion by
the end of November. Under this external pressure, domestic financial institutions also
began to increase pressure on individual capitals, accelerating the subsequent collapses
of firms. In the face of this immediate problem, the Korean government, having lost its
control over the foreign currency market, on 21 st November 1997, finally asked the IMF
to help out by injecting funds to relieve the immediate pressure on the foreign currency
and financial markets. Beginning with an immediate $5.5 billion financial aid from the
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IMF, a total of $58.3 billion financial aid ($21 billion from IMF, $10 billion from IBRD,
$4 billion from ADB and further $23.3 billion from the U.S. and other countries) was
announced to be injected in order to stabilise the financial turmoi1. 51 As a condition of
the financial aid, the Korean government pledged to introduce stabilisation policies and
structural reforms of the economy. According to the letters of intent of the Korean
government, announced on 3' d December and again on 24 th December 1997, those
policies consisted of the usual package of IMF policies, comprising stabilisation
measures and market-based structural adjustment. With regard to the measures for
stabilisation, the Korean government pledged first of all to tighten monetary policy in
order to restore and sustain stability in the financial markets by providing appropriate
incentives for holding Korean won (Republic of Korea 1997b). Accordingly, the interest
rate was to be kept much higher during the stabilisation period and money growth was
to be limited by a target of less than 5 % inflation. Also a tight fiscal policy, targeting a
fiscal surplus of 0.2% of GDP in 1998, was pledged (Lee and Lee 2000, p. 60).
After the agreement between the IMF and the Korean government was announced,
the interest rate was immediately more than doubled, reaching a peak of around 30 % in
January 1998 (World Bank 1999, p. i). Commercial banks were also forced to keep a
high level of deposit ratio with the Bank for International Settlement (BIS) and
therefore became 'reluctant to provide corporations with funds for fear of incurring new
51 Out of this announced financial aid, only a total $ 30.2 billion from the IMF, IBRD and
ADB appeared to be really injected by the end of 1999. As the Korean government began to
repay the loans from 1999, $1.5 billion aid from the IMF was cancelled. Also $3.3 billion from
IBRD and ADB was also called off by the end of 1999.
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non-performing loans' (Lee and Lee 2000, P. 63). By the end of 1998, the immediate
economic problems that required the IMF's bail-out appeared to a large extent to have
been resolved. Foreign currency reserves recovered, from merely $3.9 billion at the end
2
of 1997 to $48.5 billion at the end of 1998, while the exchange rate, which had reached
more than 1,900 won/US$ at the peak, also stabilised at around 1,204 won/US$
(Republic of Korea 1999). However, this 'recovery' was possible only at the expense of
the vast majority of the population. The initial impact of the stabilisation policies
appeared immediately with the bankruptcies of so-called non-competitive small and
medium size firms and the massive growth of unemployment and deterioration of the
living standards of the mass of the population. Given the fact that Korean firms have
relied on external debts for capital investment and the short—term circulation of capital,
further collapses of firms, particularly small and medium size firms, whose ability to
survive under the financial pressure was weaker than large scale firms, was not at all a
surprise but, rather, was regarded as a necessary remedy, paving the way to the
'healthier' operation of the financial market on the basis of transparency and
accountability. In the face of growing 'difficulties in short-term rollovers and
promissory note discounts at their banks' (World Bank 1999, p. 6), a total of 22,828
firms, most of which were small and medium size firms, went into bankruptcy during
the year of 1998. Firms that survived the financial pressure still had to call off planned
investment and downsize the scale of scheduled production. As a consequence, overall
GDP growth was recorded at minus 5.8% in 1998. Production in manufacturing also
showed a 7.2% decrease in 1998 as the average operation rate in the manufacturing
sector fell to 13.8% below that of the previous year. It was not until the massive
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liquidation of the financially troubled capitals and financial institutions that the tight
monetary policies were relaxed by lowering the interest rate to the level prior to the
crisis.
The most devastating impact of the crisis was obviously on the working class. Most
noticeably, job insecurity, which had already been imposed on workers in the form of
voluntary retirement and implicit layoffs since the beginning of the recession in the
early 1990s, increased quickly. By the end of 1998, according to KBF's research on
employment adjustment in 192 firms employing more than 100 workers, more than half
of them had reduced workforces through voluntary retirement, layoff and outsourcing
since the economic crisis (Samsung Economy Institute 2000, p. 156). About a million
lost their jobs during the first half of 1998, so that the unemployment rate skyrocketed
from 2.8 % in 1997 to about 8% at the end of the first half of 1998. Accordingly, the
real wage also decreased more than 9% during 1998. It is no surprise to find that the
crisis hit the poorest part of the population most severely. Distribution between the
lowest and highest 20 % has been significantly widened. Those who had been sacked
floated in the daily and temporary job markets in a devastating search for employment
opportunities, enlarging the scale of the urban poor (World Bank 1999, ii). In the face of
the massive meltdown of individual capitals, trade unions faced a significant problem,
the nature of which was unexpected and different from the one they had struggled
against for the last decade.
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Structural adjustment toward the restructuring of capital relations
While the tightened monetary policy was hitting those 'unsustainable' individual
capitals and the mass of the working population, a large-scale structural reform was
announced in December 1997. This structural adjustment plan included 1) financial
sector reform that included an immediate suspension of critically troubled financial
institutions, restructuring and re-capitalisation of financial institutions that could submit
a clear rehabilitation plan, establishment of an exit strategy through closure, mergers
and acquisitions by foreign and domestic institutions, and introduction of closer
financial supervision; 2) trade liberalisation that eliminated trade-related subsidies,
restrictive import licensing and the import diversification program; 3) capital account
liberalisation, which allowed foreign investors to invest in the equity market, domestic
corporate bond market and liberalised foreign borrowing by corporations; 4) corporate
sector reform that eliminated government intervention in the lending process, subsidies
or tax benefits to bail-out individual firms and reduced debt-to-equity ratios and 5)
labour market reform focusing on enhancing flexibility (Republic of Korea 1997a,
1997b).
The newly elected Kim Dae-jung government, which came into power in the middle
of the unfolding of the crisis, began to push forward further the restructuring of capital
relations on the basis of the rule of the market. Condemning 'a collusive link between
politics and business', 'government-directed banking practices' and 'large business
groups' that have a large number of uncompetitive subsidiaries as the origins of the
crisis, the Kim Dae-jung government pledged a new development, overcoming the crisis
by pushing forward most of all reforms of the chaebols and the government in an
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attempt to pursue harmony between democracy and the market economy (Kim, D. J.
1998). In the pursuit of financial sector reforms, the government shut down five banks
with a total of 10,260 employees while five other banks were merged with other
financially 'healthier' banks during 1998. Out of 30 merchant banking companies, 16
were closed down by the end of 1998 (Republic of Korea 1999). With regard to
corporate sector reforms, a mandatory issuance of consolidated financial statements was
introduced in 1998. Also, cross-debt guarantees between subsidiaries within chaebols
were banned. A relaxation on the restriction of foreign investment was also accelerated
in 1998 by scrapping restrictions on FDIs, the purchase of real estate, and mergers and
acquisitions by foreign investors. Further attempts to secure the rule of the market and
replace 'the heavy hand of government intervention' with the 'invisible hand of the
market' can be found with the establishment and empowerment of governmental offices,
such as FTC (Fair Trade Commission) and FSC (Financial Supervisory Commission),
inspecting the financial soundness and transparency of individual capitals and financial
institutions, thereby ensuring 'market discipline' and 'proper functioning of the market
mechanism' (FSC 2000, p. 8). In addition to the first announced targets of the reforms, a
large-scale public sector reform was introduced in the summer of 1998, comprising 1)
privatisation of 11 out of 24 government-owned parent corporations, 2) restructuring of
67 out of 71 subsidiaries through merger and privatisation, 3) merger and closing-down
of government-invested or commissioned organisations and 4) the lay-off of more than
130,000 public sector employees, including 40,000 in state-owned enterprises, by 2000
(Republic of Korea 2000, pp. 111-3). These reforms and measures taken by the new
government in cooperation with the IMF aimed to establish:
269
'a new economic order based on market discipline, and entailing
restructured corporate and financial sectors, better functioning labour
market, and a redefinition of the role of the Government away from direct
intervention toward one ensuring the sound functioning of a market
economy, providing public goods and protecting the vulnerable through
adequate social safety nets' (World Bank 1999, p. i)
In fact, despite the rhetoric of the Kim Dae-jung goverment, emphasising the
development of democracy as well as the market economy, there was little new about
the reform, except the institutionalised regulation of financial flows and corporate
management. Those financial, corporate and public sector reforms undertaken by Kim
Dae-jung government indicated a pursuit of firmer and more stable marketisation of the
way in which capital accumulation is co-ordinated, by introducing marketised
regulation of financial flows and individual capitals as well as full-fledged liberalisation
of markets. The reforms were in the line with the marketisation of the reproduction of
capital relations that had already begun since the decline of the early settlement of the
reproduction of capital. As we saw in the previous chapter, however, the critical
problem was that the reforms were not accompanied by a successful reorganisation of
the way in which the working class was subordinated to capital toward more a
profitable utilisation of labour. As the later development of class struggle made clear,
'the IMF-mandated economic restructuring inevitably necessitated massive layoffs and
an institutional change toward a flexible labour market' (Koo 2001, p. 202). Therefore,
there was one rather fundamental reform that capitalist development in Korea had to
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take, the more marketised regulation of labour by pushing forward the so-called
'flexibilisation of the labour market'. Already in the aftermath of crisis, soaring
unemployment and increasing insecurity of employment, caused either by bankruptcies
of firms and the measure of numeric adjustment undertaken by individual firms, were
'enhancing' the so-called flexibility of the labour market. Those attempts to restructure
the 'labour market', pushed by the goverment, individual capitals and the IMF,
indicated a critical transition, which necessarily caused struggles around the
restructuring process with the working class, the success of which could ultimately
guarantee successful reforms in other sectors.
Labour movement and class struggle in the crisis
During 1997, the Korean labour movement faced a new and rather unexpected
problem: growing job insecurity. As the symptoms of crisis began to emerge more
obviously, many firms started utilising employment adjustment as a supreme measure
of restructuring of their businesses. About 125,000 jobs disappeared due to employment
adjustment and bankrupted firms during the first half of 1997. In the face of increasing
job insecurity, workers and enterprise unions found no way but accepting a wage freeze
through concession bargaining. In many enterprises, unions gave up collective
bargaining and declared no-strike agreements with their employers. While the unions at
the individual firms were overwhelmed by the growing job insecurity, the KCTU began
to respond to the problem. The KCTU's response was two-fold. On the one hand, it
concentrated on the 'saving nation' campaign from April 1997 by raising the issues of
economic 'democratisation' through reforms of chaebols and their corrupt relations
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with goverment, arguing that the reform of chaeboi-dominated economic development
will ultimately resolve the crisis (KCTU 1997b). On the other hand, the KCTU also
declared its immediate struggles against the further development of the implementation
of employment adjustment (KCTU 1997b).
However, as the crisis deepened and overwhelmed enterprise unions, the KCTU
could not organise effective resistance against increasing job instability and the nation-
wide introduction of flexible measures. Rather, the KCTU has been increasingly
preoccupied with an agenda for nationalist social reform, calling for reforms of
chaebols in order to save the Korean economy. At the workplace, this rather defensive
union response appeared in the form of 'business-first-unionism'. For instance, when
Kia, the 8th largest chaebol, went into bankruptcy and the management threatened to lay
off thousands of workers, the trade union in Kia strove to save the company by
collecting contributions among workers and returning bonuses and allowances, arguing
'we are getting into the painful job-insecurity unless we can revitalise our company'
(Kang 2001, p. 88). The KCTU also launched the 'campaign for saving Kia', arguing
that Kia, the healthy national company, must be protected from the other corrupted
chaebols and foreign capitals, which attempted to take over Kia, for the national
economy.
After the IMF's bail-out, the KCTU initiated a discussion about 'social agreement to
overcome the economic crisis', calling for negotiations in a 'Tripartite commission for
Economic Crisis Management and Employment Security' in which the government,
employers and trade unions 'produce appropriate social agreements as need arises to
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mobilise the social energy to overcome the current crisis' (KCTU, 1997a). The
nationalist agenda of the unions was quickly taken advantage of by the newly
established Kim Dae-jung government, which had also been condemning the chaebols-
based economic development as the fundamental origin of the crisis (Kim, D. J. 1997).
The Kim Dae-jung government proposed to establish a co-operative body, made up of
labour, business and government, calling for national unity in order to save the nation.
The KCTU eventually decided to take part in the Tripartite Commission after Kim's
government succeeded in deriving an agreement on chaebol-re forms with the top four
chaebols on 13 th January. Finally, the first institutional arrangement in which unions,
management and government discussed not only labour policies and a social safety net
but also corporate, financial and public sector structural adjustment as a whole, was set
up on 15 th
 January (Park 2001, p. 41).
After about a month of discussion, the three parties in the commission reached the
'Social Agreement to Overcome the Economic Crisis'. This 'February Agreement'
covered all major areas of reform, such as the corporate, public and financial sectors
and the labour market. The outcome of the negotiation, however, was controversial.
Through this agreement, the government and employers pledged to resolve the
problems of chaebols through 1) enhancing 'transparency' in the management of
chaebols and large-scale individual firms by introducing mandatory consolidated
financial statements for chaebols, 2) strengthening the financial structure of chaebols by
banning the cross-debt guarantee between subsidiaries within chaebols, 3) strengthening
responsible management and 4) enhancing competitiveness by avoiding competitive
investment in over-heated industries and concentrating the major industry of each
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chaebol (KCTU 1997b, pp. 172-83). In terms of labour reforms, trade unions allowed
an earlier and easier implementation of redundancy layoffs by removing the provision
of a two-year moratorium and the narrow definition of 'managerial needs' that could
legitimate redundancy layoffs. They also permitted the operation of temporary-work
agencies for the flexible utilisation of labour. As trade-offs, the government pledged to
build up a firmer social safety net by developing efficient employment and health
insurance and a national pension system. Also the government resolved a long-term
conflict around the teachers' union by legalising it, removed the ban on unions' political
activity and allowed the unionisation of public servants under the condition of not
exercising their right to take collective actions (KCTU 1997b, p. 180). Through this
controversial agreement, unions provided capital with a social justification for
introducing greater flexibility. At the same time, this agreement gave the unions
significantly improved legal rights. Indeed, it appeared to satisfy the reforms of
chaebols that the KCTU had so much concentrated on as its focal agenda after the
emergence of the crisis. It appeared that labour had eventually achieved a fair exchange
and this agreement 'was welcomed and praised as a historic compromise both inside
and outside the country' (Koo 2001, p. 202).
However, the leadership of the KCTU immediately faced a massive criticism from
rank and file delegates, who accused the leadership of bargaining their members' lives
by allowing further introduction of flexible measures, particularly lay-offs. The
leadership was distrusted soon after the announcement of the February Agreement. The
delegates also voted down the February Agreement. Instead, the KCTU and affiliated
unions called for a general strike in order to stop the revision of labour law in
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accordance with the February Agreement. However, after serious erosion of the
leadership of the KCTU, the general strike was not effective enough to stop the revision.
The February Agreement, however, was not a mere mistake of the leadership of the
KCTU. It showed the rather fundamental dilemma of Korean trade unions during the
period of the general crisis, in which the trade unions, which had been developing
militancy against the authoritarian government for the last three decades, came to the
conclusion that the fate of labour is attached to that of capital as far as it pursues its
betterment through more capital accumulation and better distribution. It is in this sense
that the February Agreement is to be understood as a watershed in the development of
the Korean labour movement after the uprising in 1987. Indeed, subsequent
developments of labour relations on the shop-floor show that the 'exchange' through the
agreement was by no means equitable in nature. The better legal recognition of unions
appeared to be powerless to stop the increasing job insecurity imposed on individual
workers by the institutionalisation of the flexible labour market.
2. Labour Movement in a Dilemma: The Case of Hyundai Motors
Workers Union
The strike against restructuring
After the institutionalisation of the measures to enhance the flexibility of labour in
1998, it was the struggle of Hyundai Motors Workers Union (HMWU) that appeared as
'a microcosm of the more general conflicts between labour and capital' (Neary 2000, p.
1). Even before then, the dynamic labour relations in Hyundai Motors had been the
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catalyst for the development of labour relations in Korea since 1987, representing both
the miraculous accumulation of capital and the notorious military-like labour control at
the workplace. But this strike had its own special significance: it was an experimental
struggle between the new measures of management based on the institutionalisation of
the flexible labour market and the union's possible aggressive strategy for the renewal
of the trade union's workplace domination. In 1997, the tensions between capital and
labour were increasing in Hyundai Motors Car. While management had already been
threatening to implement a massive employment adjustment scheme since the onset of
the economic crisis in 1997, workers elected a new union leadership from a militant
workplace organisation 'Committee for Democratic Struggle' with the slogan of 'not a
single layoff'.
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Text box (2) - Hyundai Motors Workers Union — a short history
Hyundai Motors Trade Union, established in 1987, is one of the biggest enterprise
trade unions in Korea. Now in 2002, it covers 23,592 members in the main factory in
Ulsan and 13,994 members in two subsidiaries and four branch factories of Hyundai
Motors. It also has a well-developed body of delegates who represent each production
line and department, including 249 delegates in the main factories in Ulsan and 157
delegates representing other subsidiaries and branch factories. In the 1980s, the HMWU
was not a militant union, in comparison to the Hyundai Heavy Industry Union, which
represented the radical union movement against Hyundai management and the military
goverment in the aftermath of the Great Workers' Struggle in 1987. It was in the
general strike called by the CKTU in 1990 that Hyundai Motors Union began to be
focused together with other Hyundai subsidiaries' unions. However, even in the general
strike, the HMWU was the one that called off the solidarity strike earliest. After 1991,
the HMWU became more active, with a radical union leadership, and became one of the
leading trade unions in the democratic union movement, joining the general strikes by
the Federation of Hyundai Trade Unions, the CKTU, and later the KCTU in almost
every year. What is particular about the HMWU is its internal dynamic. Apart from the
Trade Union, there are several workplace organisations, including the most militant and
influential Mintuwi (Committee for the Democratisation of Hyundai Motors Workers
Union), which compete with each other over delegate and union leadership in elections.
This internal dynamic on the basis of the large number of shop-floor activists appears to
have played a great role in developing particularly well-developed workplace
domination of union delegates, even if the union leadership often fell back into
cooperative relations with the management. The HMWU's collective agreement with
Hyundai Motors shows one of the most developed examples of the systematic
involvement of the union in personnel management and other decisions on the operation
of the production line, reflecting well-developed union domination over the shop-floor 
Although Hyundai Motors Car dismissed 2,380 workers through voluntary
retirement with little compensation in early 1998, the trade union's response was
relatively moderate. The HMWU suggested that, instead of introducing numeric
adjustment through layoffs, there should be working hour adjustments, even though that
would lead to a reduction in wages (HMWU 1998b, p. 8). However, the management
informed the union of its plan for laying off 8,189 workers on May 19 th while, at the
same time, dismissing 1,423 workers through a second voluntary retirement scheme by
20th May. Under the newly amended labour law, layoffs were allowed only if there were
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urgent managerial needs, and only after making efforts to seek other measures to
overcome the managerial difficulties. However, what the management of Hyundai
argued was that their main concern was reducing labour cost and the cost of welfare of
workers, and, therefore, they were not prepared to look for other solutions, revealing the
formality of the legal conditions for layoffs (HMWU, 1998a, p. 5). While management
kept refusing to talk about the matter of employment adjustment with the union,
HMWU instigated a two-day strike on 27 th May. Meanwhile the KCTU, which had
decided not to join the Tripartite Commission, again participated in the commission on
June 10th, after the unsuccessful General Strike in May. This decision to take part in the
Commission, as well as the policy of abandoning nation-wide struggles against the mass
layoffs, isolated the HMWU, and left the impression that the nation-wide resistance to
the layoffs, declared by the KCTU, was more rhetorical than real (Neary 2000, p. 4).
And then, to everyone's surprise on June 24 th, management met union's demand to hold
a committee to discuss the matter of the layoffs. But this appeared to be merely an
official process to justify the layoffs, especially when the company officially reported to
the Ministry of Labour its plan to lay off 4,830 workers on June 29 th . Workers in
Hyundai Motors Car flew into a rage.
The response by the HMWU was to organise a limited strike, while management
pushed their third voluntary retirement scheme. As a result, 1,252 workers chose to
retire with fringe compensations. On 16th July, in spite of the union's last suggestion
that they would accept over 30% wage cut and unpaid vacation in rotation, Hyundai
finally laid off 2,678 workers and forced 900 workers to take a two-year unpaid
vacation. The HMWU immediately called for a general strike. With strong support from
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the union membership, the President of the HMWU, Kim Kwang-Sik, declared that the
union would not accept even a single layoff. Supported by 3,000 workers who were
now occupying the Hyundai Motors Car factory in Ulsan, a chimney protest began by
three former presidents of the union, while more than 7,000 workers' families began to
live in makeshift tents beneath the smoke-stack in protest (Neary 2000, p. 3). In the
meantime, management allowed some laid-off workers to accept voluntary retirement
and confirmed that 1,569 workers would be laid off on 31st July. On 14th August, they
shut down the factory.
The goverment, noticing the importance of this event, also stepped into negotiation
both with management and the union, and, at the same time, prepared to use the police
to stop the strike before other unions got ready for solidarity struggles. Whilst the
negotiation was going on, the heavily industrialised city of Ulsan became a police town
with thousands of riot police on the streets. After the shut down, marching around the
factory, riot police blocked the factory gates. Outside the factory on August 17 th , over
ten thousand riot policemen tried to regain control over the factory. On the same day
that the riot police attempted to enter the factory, August 17 th, the Minister of Labour
came to Ulsan and attempted to mediate between management and the union. After a
few days, negotiation was resumed and both parties reached an agreement on the size of
the layoffs. On August 24, both parties held a press conference and announced 'an
agreement for employment adjustment and management-employee harmony'. The
Union accepted 277 workers' layoffs and one and half year's unpaid vacation for 1,261
workers under the condition of consolation bonuses for those who had been laid off
The company promised its best efforts to re-employ the dismissed workers in HMC and
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other Hyundai firms (HMWU and HMC, 1998). This compromise solution made for a
real a dilemma for the union leadership as Kim Kwang Sik, the President of the HMWU,
expressed:
The three days I spent on making the final decision to accept the layoffs
were the most painful days of my life. I feel as if I have lived half of my life
since then... I have run the HMWU, based on a firm determination that not
a single layoff can be accepted. However, the reality was cruel. It was
extremely difficult to halt the layoffs, which were being pushed by both
capital and the state, as a single union. All that the 550,000 KCTU
membership achieved even after a nation-wide general strike for 20 days
was merely a 2 years moratorium of the implementation of layoffs. So I
decided to let the company have a formal victory and to take the best offer
for union members (Kim, K. S. 1998, pp. 161-2).
In spite of its success in minimising the size of the layoffs, the compromise
agreement by the union, which had initially promised not to accept a single layoff,
disappointed workers who had been on strike for more than a month. The workers
rejected the agreement by a majority of 64% in a referendum on the agreement (Neary
2000, p. 5). However, the workers' decision could not make any difference. The strike
was over. Immediately after the agreement was signed, 15 trade union leaders were
arrested and imprisoned. Management now began to reorganise the workplace swiftly,
taking advantage of the absence of trade union leadership as well as other militants who
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were targeted for the redundancies and non-paid vacation by the management. A worker
described the changes at the workplace in the aftermath of the struggle:
After the agreement, the workplace has changed significantly... in the
past, management could rearrange labour after consulting with the union.
This time however, management did it unilaterally. Also UPH (Unit Per
Hour) are increasing seriously. This was also possible through negotiation
with union delegates. But, now they (management) just enforce after merely
explaining. The company now plans to increase the real working hour per
unit hour from 65% to 86%. But in reality it is now 90%. Intensity of labour
has increased approximately one and half times so far (Kang 2001, pp. 115-
6).
Although HMWU succeeded in minimising the lay-offs, the negative influence of
this strike to Korean trade unions appeared significant. Allowing the first 'officially'
implemented structural adjustment through mass dismissal, the result of the strike
publicised the necessity of a structural adjustment through lay-offs both to other unions
and individual capitals. Now lay-offs and other measures of flexibilisation appeared to
be justified and it seemed that a national 'consensus' was firmly constituted: struggle
against flexibilisation and structural adjustment was irrational and harmful to the nation.
The transformation of workplace labour relations after the strike
After the strike, Jeong Kap-Deuk, who was a former President of the union from
1996 to 1997, was again elected under the slogan of 'labour movement with citizens'
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and 'accommodation with the company', and with a promise of the union's co-operation
for higher productivity as a trade-off for better employment stability, in the absence of
militant union activists. At first sight, the new union seemed to have achieved better
stability of employment, including the re-employment of dismissed workers. However,
the relative stability of employment which 'regular' workers in Hyundai enjoyed was
based, at least largely if not fully, on the supply of sub-contract workers through in-
company-subcontract firms on a massively increasing scale (particularly after the mass
dismissal in 1998). Now at least three in-company-subcontract firms are providing
subcontract workers on each production line (Interview with Hyundai Motors Workers,
no.2, 21 June 2002). More than 10,000 subcontract workers, more than 96 % of whose
contracts with the subcontract firms are shorter than sixteen months (HMWU 2002, p.
5), were working in Hyundai Motors Car in June 2002 (Interview with Hyundai Motors
Workers, no.2, 21 June 2002). Many of them were located in so-called 'avoided' parts
of the production process, where industrial accidents are likely to happen (Interview
with Hyundai Motors Workers, no.2, 21 June 2002). Functioning as a 'cushion'
between the union's attempt to secure existing jobs and the company's attempt to take
advantage of flexible employment, subcontract workers seem already to have become a
necessary part of labour relations in Hyundai (Interview with Hyundai Motors Workers,
no.1, 19 June 2002). Due to the merit of having a cushion that could minimise the
impact of flexibilisation of labour to its membership, the trade union now appears to
hesitate to engage, at least implicitly, in attempts to organise those subcontract workers.
The increasing number of those workers also constitutes a new form of hierarchy,
between the workers employed by the parent firm, Hyundai Motors Car, and workers
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employed by the subcontracted firms, in which the usually cheap and young subcontract
workers are treated as inferior. In accordance with technological development, such as
modularisation and platform unification, further employment adjustment also seems
inevitable. HMC plans to decrease 21 platforms to 7 unified platforms by 2005
(HMWU 2000, p. 4). Also according to its modularisation plan, over 800 firms
supplying parts will be reduced to 200 (Korean Metal Workers Federation 2000, p. 22).
These structural adjustment plans, together with intensified labour, will create
redundant labour. Most likely, in-company-subcontract workers, who can be 'flexibly'
utilised, will fill those redundant posts, replacing the permanent and full-time workers
of Hyundai Motors Car. Also, labour shortages, if any, are likely to be supplemented by
employing more subcontract workers.
The mass dismissals also contributed to taming militant union activists. Union
activists, who returned to work after one and half years non-paid vacation, had to
promise, in order to be re-employed, not to cause further industrial disputes and do their
best for the development of Hyundai (HMWU, 1999). Many of them found it difficult
to be actively re-engaged in union activities because of the fear that they would not be
re-employed if sacked once more (Interview with Hyundai Motors Workers, no.2, 21
June 2002). Furthermore, during the absence of the union activists, the union's power to
intervene in the regulation of labour by management seems to have been seriously
undermined. A worker, who was re-employed in a Hyundai Motors' branch firm,
Hyundai Mobis, describes this change:
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In this workplace, workers cannot walk around in groups during working
hours or even during a break. All workers should be in exactly the same
uniforms, without exception. Smoking is prohibited and we cannot even
imagine having a cup of coffee on the way back from the toilet. We cannot
do anything but work. I feel as if even my imagination is being supervised.
According to a fellow worker, it became worse after the struggle in HMC
ended up with a ghastly defeat... slave, yes, the workers in this workplace,
Hyundai Galloper factory, are in a slavery condition. They do whatever the
management tells them to do, no matter what it is... a worker working next
to me worked 460 hours a month. I asked him how he managed it. Then he
said, "The education allowance for my son was cut by half. I have to earn
money now since I don't know when I will be fired. Hey, just do what they
want you to do. Otherwise, they will send you somewhere else" (Kang 2001,
p. 33).
This increasing domination of management over the shop-floor is largely due to the
declining militancy of union delegates on the production line. Union delegates
increasingly tend to compromise with managerial decisions, avoiding troubles 'as far as
it is not necessary' (Interview with Hyundai Motors Workers, no.1, 19 June 2002).
Employers' strategy toward the union delegates has also changed. Now, rather than
merely ignoring the representativeness of the delegates on the production line, managers
give privileges to the more cooperative delegates with regard to work-schedules and the
allocation of work (Interview with Hyundai Motors Workers, no.2, 21 June 2002). On
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some occasions, group of workers on a production line with a delegate who has a better
attitude toward management enjoy privileges, such as less UPH, together. This again
attracts more workers' votes for those non-militant delegates in union elections.
Taking advantage of this declining dominance of militant unionists, the management
has pushed forward new working arrangements under a programme known as 'WIN 21'
which had been launched by the management in 1997 as a new labour regulation
strategy, but had often been nullified by union delegates at the workplace. It was now
being reintroduced as an effective method to change workplace labour relations, in the
absence of union intervention. One of the main aims of WIN 21 was to increase the
foremen's authority in managing individual workers. Increasing authority of the
foremen, who are now largely in charge of personnel management, the merit-rating
process, quality management and workplace safety-management, weakens union
delegates' influence among fellow workers (KILSP et al. 2000, P. 195). Under the
supervision of the foremen, every team has to compete with each other for monthly
evaluation, the results of which are publicised and can give the workers awards or
punishment. The promotion system, which was firmly based on seniority, has now
changed into an examination-based system in which anyone who has been working for a
minimum duration in a certain position, can be given the opportunity to do the exam
and get promoted (Interview with Hyundai Motors Workers, no.2, 21 June 2002). The
increasing introduction of the piece-rate also appears to instigate more competition
among workers, increasing real working hours almost without limit. If willing to, one
could work 361 days per year and earn the whole package of the piece rate. Increasing
competition among workers appears not only at the workplace but also at communities
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amongst workers' families. Many informal mutual assistance communities in Hyundai
Motors Car are now broken down (Interview with Hyundai Motors Workers, no.1, 19
June 2002). All those recent transformations of the power balance on the shop-floor also
enables the management to tighten workplace discipline. On many occasions, workers
cannot leave the production line without permission. Chairs in the workplace have been
removed. In HMC Chunjoo factory, a card system, by which managers can trace every
single movement of individual workers in the factory thanks to ADC (Automated Data
Collection) technology, was introduced (Kang 2001, p. 105; KILSP et al. 2000, pp. 207-
8).
During the two-year period of structural adjustment based on the flexibilisation of
labour, labour relations at the workplace are now undergoing significant changes mostly
in favour of management in HMC. More flexibilisation through the increasing
employment of subcontract workers is likely to undermine the union's power at the
workplace further by forcing individual workers to compete with each other more and
more rather than allowing them to unite for survival, removing the basis of workers'
militancy in Hyundai Motors Car. The case of the Hyundai Motors Car clearly shows
the nature of the difficulties that the Korean labour movement faces. Labour regulation
now does not simply aim to smash the collective power of labour unions through vulgar
and forceful suppression as it did before. Rather, new forms of labour regulation aim at
the decomposition of the working class through the subordination of individual workers
to management by the flexible measures. More competition-based regulation over
individual workers is now undermining the basis of the militancy that had been formai]
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in the development of the democratic trade union movement, more effectively than the
vulgar measures of military regimes that smashed trade unions by force.
3. The Nature of the Transition: Marketisation of the Rqproduction of
Capital Relations in Korea
Growing marketisation of labour control
The changes in capital relations in Korea in the aftermath of the crisis can firstly be
captured as the increasing marketisation of labour control. This process involves
mainly 1) growing job insecurity on the basis of the creation of a large-scale reserve
army of labour and the irregularisation of workforces (so-called 'flexibilisation' of the
labour market) 2) increasing introduction of more competition-based personnel
management, capability-based wage systems and reformulation of workplace
organisation (together, so-called 'rationalisation of labour'). Insecurity of employment
had already appeared seriously in the form of voluntary retirement and implicit lay-offs
since the beginning of the recession in the early 1990s. Mass and more explicit layoffs
followed from the subsequent implementation of restructuring policies: the cleaning up
of the financial sector, the reduction in the number of government employees in the
process of government restructuring toward a so-called 'small and effective'
goverment, and sacking a large part of the public sector workforce in the process of the
privatisation of SOEs. Worse still, 'as firms undertook swift adjustment to improve
flexibility' by taking advantage of the deterioration of unions' capacity to resist against
the managerial authorities and the institutional changes in the labour market's regulation,
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job security, which had been relatively well protected since the 1987 upsurge of
democratic trade unionism, began to be critically undermined (Lee, J. H. 2000, p. 10).
The continual pressure from the insecurity of employment is based on the creation of a
large-scale reserve army of labour. At the beginning of the crisis, about a million were
cast out of work, and in the spring of 1998 some 300,000 college graduates joined the
reserve army of labour, floating to get daily and temporary employment opportunities.
A total of 1,710,000 workers had been forced to leave their jobs by lay-off, expired
contract which employers refused to renew, and voluntary retirement during the three
and a half years after the crisis (Chun 2002, p. 4). Numerical employment adjustment
became a routinised business, rather than an emergency measure, maintaining a certain
degree of unemployment as a whole. Hence, even though the Korean economy
recovered from the economic crisis from 1999, the measures of numerical employment
adjustment did not retreat. In fact, 135,000 persons were 'reported to have been
dismissed or forced to retire involuntarily' in 1999 (OECD 2000a, p. 191). While the
number of jobless in 2002 was lower than in the months immediately following the
onset of the crisis, the unemployment rate remained at about double the pre-crisis level.
Although unemployment gradually decreased after the peak of the first quarter of
1999 (about 1.6 million out of work), we should notice that the fall was made possible
by the increasing number of temporary, daily-contracted and other 'flexible' forms of
employment after the crisis and the subsequent labour law reform, not by the production
of new jobs. This irregularisation of employment can firstly be quantitatively captured
by the increasing number of temporary and daily-contracted workers. Temporary
daily contracted workers, the number of whom had gradually increased as recession
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began in the early 90s, now appear to outnumber permanent full-time workers,
accounting for 52 % of total wage-workers in 2001. In fact, in international comparisons,
Korea has the highest percentage of irregular jobs in total employment, while the
number of workers holding a permanent job is the lowest among OECD countries
(Martin and Torres 2001, p. 6). This resulted firstly from a widespread employment
strategy that sacked the full-time permanent workers and re-employed them afterwards
as temporary or part-time workers performing almost the same labour that they had
been doing before dismissa1. 52 In the banking and financial sectors, about 15% of the .
total workforce was made up of those re-employed in this way after being sacked during
the mass layoffs in 1998 (KILSP et al. 2000, p. 118). 4,640 out of 6,612 new
employments in 1998 were irregular and 4,671 out of 5,501 in 1999 (Kwon 2001, p. 91).
In the public sector, about two thirds of the laid-off full-time permanent job holders had
been re-employed as irregular workers, including part-timers, temporarily contracted,
dispatched and sub-contracted workers, which increased 46.1% during the four years
after the crisis (KFTPSU 2002a, p. 9).
In the manufacturing sector, the increasing number of dispatched and in-company-
subcontract workers, whose employment contracts are temporary, estimated at about
800,000 workers (Joint Committee for Abolishing Dispatched Labour 2000, p. 2), drove
this irregularisation of employment. This increase can be attributed to the legalisation of
52 During a one-year period from June 1998, 80 % of those who could escape from
unemployment had been re-employed as temporary and daily workers (Lee and Hwang 2000, p.
289).
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temporary-work agencies in 1998. In theory, these forms of employment are supposed
to be under strict regulation and allowed only for particular forms of skilled-labour.
However, firms increasingly utilise those indirect forms of employment by having
numbers of small subcontract firms and work agencies, the survival of which is entirely
subjected to yearly or monthly contracts with the mother companies. In many cases,
large-scale enterprises establish sub-contract firms and work agencies by themselves
and put them under direct control (Ahn et al. 2001, pp. 182-6). The merit of these forms
of employment for individual capitals lies in that fact that, by making the employment
relations more indirect and untraceable, the management can avoid and ignore their
legal obligation as direct and large-scale employers and therefore could adjust the
number of workers at their will. Also, by putting together these irregular workers with
regular workers on the production line, the management can precipitate more
competition between regular workers and irregular workers and thereby make it easier
to control the regular workers, showing them that they are replaceable. Other forms of
'workout' measures also contribute to the changing employment structure. As many
processes of the production of components in assembly-based manufacturing industries,
particularly in car-making companies such as Hyundai, Kia and Daewoo, are now given
to small and medium size external subcontract firms, which rely heavily on cheap daily
and temporary workers, 53
 the permanent jobs in the mother companies are likely to
disappear (KLISP 2000, pp. 121-2). Also, the establishment of quasi-independent
53 Wages of workers employed in external sub-contract firms producing parts for major car-
making companies are merely 60% of those of workers in the major companies (KLISP et al.
2000, p. 125).
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subsidiaries within a firm also contributes to changing large numbers of workers
employed in the mother company into in-company-subcontract workers whose contract
is no longer guaranteed to be renewed (KLISP 2000, pp. 118-26). This insecure basis of
the irregular forms of employment results directly in less pay, worse working condition
and no union protection. While the average wage of irregular workers reached a mere
52.6% of that of the regular workers in 2001, workers in irregular forms of employment
worked longer than regular workers, averaging 46.5 hours per week, in comparison to
45.9 hours of regular workers (Kim, Y. S 2001). Due to the temporary and mobile
nature of these forms of employment, union density of irregular workers was less than
1 % in 2002 (KCTU 2002a, p. 6).
This increasing irregularisation of labour also accompanied other measures changing
the nature of the reproduction of workplace labour relations, from a system based on
authoritarian control to one based more on competition-based labour control. Amongst
many changes, flexible wage adjustment, based on the conversion from a seniority-
based to a capability-based system, appears to be the primary method (Kim, Y. B. and
Yoo 2000, p. 166). In particular, an annual salary system was widely introduced as the
most prevalent form of wage adjustment. Among the firms employing more than 100
full-time workers, the number of firms having introduced an annual salary system
increased from merely 94 in 1996 to 1,612 firms in January 2002, accounting for 32.4%
of 4,998 companies surveyed by the Ministry of Labour (Ministry of Labour 2002).
This system appears to have spread rapidly, especially among large-scale companies,
after the crisis, showing that more than 45 % of Korean firms listed in the stock market
had introduced merit pay systems by 2000 (Park and Yu 2000, p. 9). In addition to the
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annual salary system, an increasing number of firms have introduced various forms of
performance-based pay system, such as profit sharing, gain sharing, team incentive and
stock option systems (Park 2000, p. 28).
Accordingly, personnel management, which relied merely on forceful discipline, is
also being considerably transformed, with the increasing introduction of more
'scientific' and flexible human resource management strategies. Merit-based promotion
systems are replacing service-year-based promotion systems, while the measures of
merit rating also become more important and sophisticated through enhanced monthly
and annual evaluation of performance on the basis of participation and performance in
education programmes, the acceptance of specific behavioural norms, the quality of
goods produced by individual producers (with the introduction of a 'real name quality
system'), the quality of suggestions by the workers to enhance production and the speed
at which an operator works etc. (KILSP et al. 2000). Management publicises the
monthly and yearly evaluation scores of individuals and teams and supplies appropriate
rewards and punishments. Reformulation of workplace organisation also follows,
concentrated on the introduction of team-based work organisation (Park 2000). In the
public sector, a team-performance based system has also been increasingly introduced,
together with an 'independent operation division system', within which each of the
enterprise departments is managed and evaluated independently in accordance with its
own performance (KILSP et al. 2000, pp. 91-2). The development of these personnel
management techniques, based on merit-rating procedures, also significantly enhances
the authority of the foreman and middle managers in the manufacturing sector. They are
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the people responsible for promotion, discipline, wage increase and even job stability
(KILSP et al. 2000, pp. 187-98).
All of these seem to increase significantly management's regulative power over
labour through shifting power relations at the workplace. Individual employers can now
enjoy enhanced managerial authority merely by publicising their plans for numerical
adjustment. Also, the threat of being laid-off has been an effective method to implement
another form of numerical employment adjustment, e.g., voluntary retirement in a way
that rarely provokes industrial disputes. In order to avoid being laid-off or voluntary
retired, workers are forced to enhance their productivity voluntarily. In the meantime,
trade unions are largely unable to stop capitals' attempts to worsen working conditions
by renewing or ignoring existing collective agreements. Increasing irregular workers
also enhances the power of managerial authority at the workplace since the job security
of the irregular workers relies fully on managerial authority without the unions'
protection. Furthermore, increasing competition among workers and conflicts between
regular and irregular workers contributes to enhanced managerial authority.
Since the piece-rate has been higher than the wage increase through collective
bargaining in the aftermath of the crisis, the capability-based wage system has been
increasingly accepted and welcomed by workers. On the contrary, facing the sheer
speed of the job losses, enterprise unions have been accepting a wage freeze, as the
trade off for job security, giving up collective bargaining and declaring no-strike
agreements with their employers. As a result, trade unions seem now to suffer from
declining collective bargaining power caused by the lack of support from the shop floor.
293
Continual reformulation of workplace organisation also undermines trade union
delegates' leadership on the shop floor, replacing it with foreman and increasing team
leaders' authority. In attempts to avoid being laid-off, competition between teams and
individual workers is intensified to a great extent. As the domination of the trade unions
at the workplace weakened, working conditions in general have worsened. According to
the International Labour Organisation (ILO), South Korean workers in the
manufacturing sector put in an average of 50 hours per week in 1999, which is the same
level as ten years ago and 8.3 hours more than the average among the 75 countries
surveyed (Korea Herald 26 th
 April 2000).
Growing marketisation of the regulation of individual capitals
Together with growing marketisation of labour control, which, however, also
accompanies authoritarian management of the flexible labour market by the state, the
other elements of the recomposition of the capital relation can be found in the
restructuring of the financial and corporate sectors in the aftermath of the crisis. The
most apparent feature of the recomposition can be summarised as 'letting the market
rule'. On the basis of this principle of market-based rationalisation, the financial sector
has come to be subjected to structural adjustment and 'as of the end of June 2001, a
total of 590 insolvent financial institutions' had not been saved, but, rather had 'been
exited from the market' (MOFE 2002a, p. 10). In particular, 26 out of 30 merchant
banks, which had been pointed out as a major cause of the distortion of the financial
market, had been kicked out of the market by 2001. The state has also significantly
deregulated the financial market in accordance with the IMF's requirements, allowing a
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great degree of freedom of in-and-out flow of capital. Accordingly, restrictions on
Foreign Direct Investment have been abolished. The limit to foreign investors'
ownership of Korean stock in aggregate was raised to 55% in December 1997 and
finally abolished in May 1998, while regulations on corporate bonds were also
abolished (Lee, K. K. 2000). As a result, 'shareholdings of foreign investors have
surged and, as of early 2000, account for nearly 22% of the Korean Stock Exchange's
total capitalization' and FDI has reached 52 billion dollars, which is twice as much as
total FDI in Korea by 1996, during the four years after the crisis. Accordingly, the
number of foreign invested firms also increased from 4,419 in 1997 to 11,525 in
January 2001 (MOCIE 2001). Furthermore, the state's control over borrowing of
individual capitals was also eased, allowing a greater degree of freedom of direct
foreign borrowing, real estate investment abroad and issuing of bonds abroad.
Deregulation of the foreign exchange market was also expected to be accelerated,
'featuring full-fledged liberalization of the market by 2001' (MOFE 2002b, p. 23).
Following the deregulation of financial flows, the focal role of the state in relation to
private capitals has been transformed from beforehand-controller to afterwards-
regulator. This is also reflected in corporate sector reform, which has focused on
establishing the rule of the market by institutionalising the 'transparent' process, in
which individual capitals' decisions are made exactly in accordance with the market
situation, such as financial soundness and profitability. Accordingly, state intervention
is now considered only to the extent that it facilitates the smooth operation of the market.
Therefore, while the corporate sector reform is largely left to the willingness of
individual capitals, the state introduced a ban on intra-group cross-debt guarantees and
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mandated publication of combined and consolidated financial statements, on the one
hand, and has overseen some large scale capitals going into bankruptcy, as in the case of
Daewoo Motors Car, on the other (MOFE 2002a, pp. 12-3). To encourage 'structural
i
adjustment' of corporate sectors on the basis of the market mechanism, the Corporate
Restructuring Promotion Law that 'specifies clear and transparent regulations for the
imposition of market principles among creditor financial institutions' was legislated,
expected 'to promote the creditor institutions to initiate further actions to impose
corporate restructuring onto financially stressed debtor companies' (MOPE, 2001, p.
25). Given these reforms, it seems true that the relations between the state and
individual capitals also changed substantially in the aftermath of the crisis, showing a
significant transformation from developmental leadership of the state to the
`marketised' regulation of individual capitals.
4. Newly Emerging Forms of Class Struggle and the Incomplete
Transition
Two-fold nature of the restructuring and limited transformation
The serious crisis of the reproduction of capital relations that Korean capitalist
development faced in the late 90s seems to have been overcome. More or less, market-
based reforms have succeeded in overcoming the crisis and creating a new social basis
for capital accumulation. After 6.7 % minus growth in 1998, the economic growth rate
again began to rise, showing 10.9% in 1999 and 8.8% in 2000. Foreign exchange
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reserves, the shortage of which triggered the acceleration of the crisis, now reached a
record-breaking level $97.76 billion and all IMF loans have been already repaid (MOFE
2002a). Although it accompanied the massive liquidation of capital at the beginning, the
stabilisation measures seem to have achieved a lower debt/equity ratio in the private
sector, recovering so called 'creditors' confidence'. Most of all, during a four-year
period, capital has succeeded in taking the best advantage of the reformulation process,
re-establishing capital-labour relations in favour of capital through the systematic
decomposition of the working class by marketising labour control.
However, although at first glance the crisis of the reproduction of capital relations for
further capital accumulation now appears to have been resolved, the transition from the
politicised reproduction to the marketised reproduction of capital relations is far from
complete. As we saw above, even if it is true, in contrast to the traditional form of the
reproduction of capital relations, that their reproduction now relies more than ever
before on the flexible operation of the labour market, this does not mean that the role of
the state in reproducing capital relations in favour of further capital accumulation is
contained within a mere regulative role. Quite the opposite, the state does not hesitate to
intervene directly in labour disputes when the unions and workers appear to 'fracture'
the smooth operation of the labour market. Also, as to capital-state relations, the
accelerated liberalisation of foreign borrowing and the deregulation of financial markets
largely seem to meet what individual capitals have been asking for since the 1980s.
However, whereas state control over individual capitals has been weakened in many
senses, replaced by so-called genuine market-based regulation, the legacy of the earlier
configuration of capital-state relations, as a moment of the politicised reproduction of
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capital relations, has often also been found in the process of the transformation. The
state is playing the most important role in founding the new basis of capital
accumulation in the rule of the market by promoting corporate structural adjustment, on
the one hand, and by strengthening regulatory institutions, on the other.
At the beginning of the restructuring, the labour policy of the newly elected
government seemed to seek a social consensus through the Tripartite Commission,
integrating the outlawed democratic union movement into the decision-making process.
On the other hand, regarding unions' legal status, the renewal of the collective labour
law, which allowed the unions the freedom of political activity and plural unionism at
the national level, therefore recognising the KCTU, seemed to end the traditionally
authoritarian control of the state over collective labour. However, it was after the
Tripartite Commission succeeded in extracting the unions' agreement to the necessity of
the reformulation of the labour market that the nature of the state's labour policies,
which aim to institutionalise marketised control over labour and at the same time
attempt to sustain its reproductive role by utilising authoritarian measures in order to
subordinate the working class to the operation of market rule, on the other, was clearly
revealed. Immediately after the controversial 'February Agreement' on labour market
deregulation and the following amendment of the labour standard law, which allowed
the immediate implementation of lay-offs and labour dispatch, the state began to
intervene in labour conflicts as much more than a mere regulator of the labour market,
arguing that struggle against structural adjustment can be a matter of 'discussion' but
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cannot be a matter of 'struggle' and therefore strikes related with structural adjustment
are all illegal (Park 2001, pp. 69-72). 54 Beginning with Hyundai Motors Workers
Union's strike in July, which ended up with more than 10,000 lay-offs and Mando
Machinery Workers' strike in August, in which more than 2,600 workers were arrested,
the state violently broke almost all major attempts of the working class to minimise lay-
offs and other forms of structural adjustment, relying fully on authoritarian suppressive
measures (KCTU 2001a, pp. 230-41). From 2000, the way in which the state dealt with
workers' resistance became more and more explicitly aggressive. In an operation where
the police stormed the 36th
 floor of Lotte Hotel, which workers were occupying, in the
summer of 2000, a total of 1,100 hotel workers were arrested and 111 workers severely
injured, including a case of miscarriage of a women worker (Lotte Hotel Trade Union
2001). Again, in Daewoo Motors workers' strike precipitated by the layoffs of 1,750
workers, a total 671 workers and families were arrested during a month of struggles
54 The February Agreement, which says 'we will do our best in order to avoid layoffs and
management should... consult with the representatives of workers about the measures taken to
avoid layoffs', has been seriously abused in the sense that employers' attempt to minimise is
interpreted as 'optional' whereas unions, although they can discuss the matter beforehand, have
to accept employers' decisions (For a summary of the February Agreement, see OECD 2000b, p.
49). Since, according to the government's interpretation, structural adjustment cannot be
subjected to collective action and strikes caused by disagreement on the adjustment measures
are a violation against employers' rights, they are therefore illegal. It has been revealed that the
government took advantage of this rhetoric to a great extent when government appeared to have
even encouraged Korean Minting & Security Printing Corporation Unions to take 'illegal'
collective actions by suggesting an unreasonable structural adjustment plan, in order to break
the union by force in late 1999 (KCTU 2001a, pp. 243-8).
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(KCTU 2001b, p. 2). As a result, a total of 722 workers have been sent to prison since
Kim Dae-jung, the Nobel Peace Prize Winner, came into power.
Table (1) Imprisoned Trade Unionists Under the Past and Present Governments
Presidency First Year Second
Year
Third
Year
Fourth
Year
Fifth Year Total
Roh Tae Woo
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992
1,973
80 611 492 515 275
Kim Young
Sam
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
632
87 188 165 149 43
Kim Dae Jung
1998 1999 2000 2001 Mar. 2002
722
219 129 97 241 36
* Source: KCTU 2002b
Having considered all of these, it is clear that, during the four-year period of
restructuring, the marketisation of control over labour has not replaced but developed in
parallel with the authoritarian management of the marketised control of labour, in
which the state has often maximised its reproductive role in removing obstacles to
marketised labour control and thereby ensured the smooth operation of the deregulated
labour market. This also has significant implications with regard to the further
development of class struggle and thereby of the basis of the labour movement. Most of
all, as far as capital relations are politically reproduced in favour of capitalist
domination at the workplace on the basis of hard-line measures taken by the state, the
further politicisation of class struggles seems inevitable. Indeed, a closer look at the
development of class struggle in the process of the transformation of capital relations
during the four-year period shows us that the restructuring of capital relations is
unlikely to guarantee the smooth further reproduction of capital relations in Kom.
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The implementation of the restructuring, which in practice relies most of all on
attacks on trade unions by the state, although temporarily successful, has repeatedly
provoked devastating resistance of the traditionally militant unions in large-scale firms
despite their dissipated militancy, as we saw in the strikes of Hyundai Motors workers
in 1998 and of Daewoo Motors in 2001. In this sense, the marketisation of the
reproduction of capital relations, the development of which, however, relies on the state
deploying authoritarian measures, actually allows a further development of a militant
unionism, putting the state into a difficult condition in which it cannot push forward
market-based reforms effectively enough. While the authoritarian element of the
transformation gives the struggles of the working class a militant and politicised nature,
the structural changes of employment provoked by this transformation based on
`flexibilisation' develops new forms and subjectivity of class struggles, through which
the unresolved contradiction of the newly created basis of capital accumulation is
manifested. These are found among traditionally non-militant and non-unionised sectors,
such as irregular workers and public sector workers.
New forms and subjectivity of struggle —1) public sector
The public sector workers' struggle after the onset of the crisis shows the two-fold
nature of this transformation. In 2000, the public sector employed 1,219,590 workers,
which amounts to 9.28 percent of the total wage labour force of 13,140,000. Among
public sector employees, government employees account for 70 % with 880,000
workers, while workers in State-owned enterprises account for 30 %, with 220,000.
Moreover, in 2001, there were 222 unions with 413,578 members in the sector, which
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account for 27.9 % of the total union membership (Kim, S. G. 2002, pp. 5-6).
contrast to the size of industry and its relatively high union density, labour relations in
the public sector had been described as rather cooperative and tranquil relations on the
basis of a well-developed corporate welfare system as well as secure permanent
employment. There was little change in this nature of the relations even after the nation-
wide upsurge of the democratic trade union movement. However, after the crisis of
1997, as the state-owned industries came to be subjected to the most severe structural
adjustment, including the acceleration of privatisation, labour relations in the public
sector increasingly fell into turbulence. A total of 131,100 workers were forced to leave
their jobs between 1998 and 2000 (KFTPSU 2002b, p. 39).
Table (2) Reduction of the Number of Public Sector Employee: 1998-2000
Plan
98-01
1998 — 2000
Plan
(B)
Achievement
(C) C/B, %
Total 142.6 130.3 131.1 101
Central
Government 26.0 21.9 21.4 98
Local Government 56.6 49.5 49.5 100
SOEs 41.2 41.2 41.7 101
Subsidiaries 18.8 17.7 18.5 105
*Source, Ministry of Planning and Budget 2001, p. 5
Wage increases have been extremely restrained, showing declines in 1998 and 1
while many elements of the corporate welfare system have completely broken down
55 A total of 106 trade unions, comprising about 200,000 public sector workers, were
affiliated with the KCTU. Most of the rest of the public sector unions were affiliates old*
FKTU (KFTPSU 2002a, p. 31).
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under structural adjustment (KFTPSU 2002b, p. 41). Also, the Kim Dae-jung
government introduced a so-called 'occasional budget allocation policy', according to
which the central government allocates the annual budget strictly in accordance with an
annual evaluation of the achievement of the restructuring process, encouraging the more
competitive pursuit of employment adjustment among public sector enterprises and
government branches (Ministry of Planning and Budget 2001, p. 12).
Korean Electric Power Corporation (KEPCO), the biggest single firm in the public
sector, which covered generation, transmission, wholesale and distribution and
comprised about 38,000 workers, was also subjected to a whole-scale restructuring.56
During the two-year period between 1998 and 1999, a total of 6,826 workers had been
dismissed as a result of the initiation of restructuring (KCTU 2002c, p. 2). The KEPCO
trade union had begun their campaign against the privatisation plan and mass dismissal
in 1999 and had succeeded in delaying the immediate implementation of privatisation,
which was planned to be done by 1999. However, at the end of 2000, the government
finally enacted the 'Act for the Promotion of Structural Adjustment in the Electric
Power Industry'. On the basis of the law, KEPCO was divided into 6 independent
56 According to the 'Basic Plan for Structural Adjustment of the Electrical Industry' provided
by the Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Energy (MOCIE), there were three main purposes
of the restructuring; i) introducing and raising competitiveness and efficiency in the industry, ii)
providing a cheap and stable electric supply in the long term, and iii) widening consumer's
choice for using electricity, thereby increasing public 'benefit'. The privatisation plan consisted
of two stages: 1) divide the power generation unit of the Korea Electric Power Corporation
(KEPCO) into several independent state-run power plants and 2) privatise these power-
- generating companies by selling them to domestic or foreign companies (KILSP at al. 2000).
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companies: Korea Midland Power Co., Ltd. (1,898 employees), Korea South-East
Power Co., Ltd. (1,563), Korea East-West Power Co. Ltd. (1,800), Korea Western
Power Co. Ltd. (1,610), Korea Southern Power Co. Ltd. (1,734) and Korea Hydro &
Nuclear Power (6,151) (KCTU 2002c). Now, these state-run companies, except the
Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power, were on the market for sale.
In response to this, trade unions in five independent companies organised a single
union, the Korea Power Plant Industry Union (KPIU), in an attempt to prepare a more
solid resistance against further privatisation and employment restructuring. The
managerial authorities in the five independent companies refused to recognise the
unified union nor renew the collective agreement made between the KEPCO union and
management before the separation, while pushing forward the privatisation plan.
Eventually, on 25 th of February 2002, the Korea Power Plant Industry Union went on
strike against the privatisation of electric plants, with strong support from its rank-and-
file workers as well as other social movement organisations, including human rights and
the student movement. Although two other public sector unions, the Korea National
Railroad (KNR) labour union and the Korea Gas Corporation (KGC) labour union,
which went on strike together with the KPIU, called off their strike within 3 days, the
KPIU's strike last 38 days, being supported by a solidarity strike by 132,000 KCTU
members. Through this strike, the KPIU demanded withdrawal of the privatisation plan,
renewal of the collective agreement and new employment for labour shortage, arguing
that the privatisation would threaten workers' right to live and lead to a full domination
of chaebols over public service (Lee, H. D, the President of the KPIU, 9 th October 2002).
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At the end, on 3 rd April 2002, this 38-day-long strike was concluded by a mutual
agreement between the government and the KCTU, which negotiated the agreement on
behalf of the power workers. The agreement contains four main elements; i) observance
of law and principle, ii) -excluding the issue of privatisation from negotiation, iii)
minimising punishment of the workers, and iv) stopping the strike and an immediate
return to work (Yoon 2002). In fact, it looks more like a union acceptance of the
government's demands rather than a mutual agreement. The KPIU did not achieve its
main goal to make the government withdraw or reconsider privatisation policy in the
electrical industry. However, the KPIU's struggle implies significant changes in the
Korean labour movement after the crisis of 1997. It certainly shows the fact that the
transformation of capital relations created a new subjectivity of class struggle without
completely removing its politicised nature. It is quite clear that public sector unions are
no longer a model case of cooperative labour relations. Moreover, the strike created a
social alliance strongly against the whole structural adjustment by questioning not only
the authoritarian way in which the state pursued restructuring, but also the nature of the
whole restructuring of capital relations on the basis of `marketisation'. Nation-wide
debates and concern regarding structural adjustment, which the strike raised, critically
undermined the social consensus with regard to the reforms that the Kim Dae-jung
government had pursued since 1998. 57 This development means that it will never be
57 Finally, a conspicuous feature of the KPIU's strike was the active declaration of intention
and action from many NGOs and other social movement organisations. The government was
overwhelmed by nation-wide criticism. Beginning with 988 leading figures of religious and
-social movements (7th mare s,n) many social organisations including, the National Association of
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easy for the state to carry out its privatisation policies, which could be a heavy political
burden in the future.
Further transformation of labour relations in the public sector can also be found in
the attempt to legalise the government employees' union. For the first time in Korean
history, a public servants' union, the Korean Goverment Employees' Union (KGEU),
was established on 16 th March 2002. Since the establishment, KGEU has struggled in-
and-against the government that has not recognised the union on the basis of the
understanding of government employees as 'servants', not workers eligible for the right
to undertake collective actions. The government proposed a bill for 'the Act on the
Establishment and Operation of a Government Employees' Association' on 15th
October 2002 (Hankyurey 21 No 434. 2002, p. 37). However, this act severely
restrained union rights by forbidding public servants from exercising rights to collective
action and collective agreement, allowing merely the right to unionisation of public
servants in a very restricted sense. Making any solidarity with other workers is banned.
The KGEU has opposed the Act. So far, even if it is too early to evaluate this ongoing
development, it is clear that the government employees' unions could bring the state
Professors for Democratic Society (8 th March), 102 professors in economics and business
administration (19 th March), professors in sociology (20 th March), 13 medical institutions (26111
March), the Korean Federation for Environmental Movement, Green Korea, People's Solidarity
for Participatory Democracy, the Korea Women's Associations United, the KCTU (27 th March),
30 professors in politics (29 th March), the Korean Association of Labor Studies (ist April),
issued their statements supporting the KPIU's strike and demands. It is certainly a very rare case
for a single union's strike, and shows that strong solidarity between labour movements and
NGO's activities could be a potential solution to resistance against the neo-liberal restructuring
policies.
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into an extremely difficult condition in which the implementation of public sector
restructuring faces an internal barrier of unionised public servants.
New forms and subjectivity of struggle —2) Irregular Workers
1
Attempts to unionise irregular workers have increasingly been emerging in the
workplace. The greatest difficulty in these attempts is the strong hostility of regular
workers toward irregular workers' unionisation, the struggle for which is believed to
undermine their own job security. Consequently, on many occasions, irregular workers
have to establish their own independent unions, without being supported by the existing
regular workers' unions, as regular workers' unions often turn their back on irregular
workers. Those antagonistic relations between regular and irregular workers appeared in
the case of the Korea Telecom contracted workers' strike, in which the regular workers
not only refused to accept irregular workers but also practically attempted to disturb the
establishment of an independent irregular workers' union, and in the case of Korea
Career subcontract workers' strike in 2001, in which the existing regular workers' trade
union appeared to co-operate with the employer in breaking the in-company-subcontract
workers' union. 58 Accordingly, these attempts to organise their own independent unions
without support from existing regular unions have very often developed into a long-
58 According to Korean Labour Law, as far as the existing regular workers' union allows, in
their union articles, irregular workers to be a member, irregular workers could not establish their
own union since the plural union is illegal. In Korea Telecom, the regular workers did not allow
the irregular workers to be members of the regular workers' union, even though their
constitution allows it. At the same time, it also refused to amend the article so that the irregular
workers' union has to remain outlawed.
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term struggle for union recognition that is often intolerable for the irregular workers
who earn their living on a daily and monthly basis. The biggest attempt by the Korea
Telecom Contracted Workers Union, which led to a strike lasting 290 days involving
more than 1,300 contracted workers, ended up with a bitter failure: layoffs of all
involved workers . and unionists. However, those struggles publicised the need for
unionisation of irregular workers, particularly illuminating the necessity of developing
solidarity between regular and irregular workers in the unionisation of irregular workers.
Text Box (3)— Career In-Company-Subcontract Workers Union (CICSU)
The Career Korea, a Korean branch firm of an American mother company, Career,
producing air-conditioners, employed about 800 regular workers and hundreds of
irregular sub-contracted workers employed through 6 small-size subcontract firms
(Interview with Lee Kyung-Seok, the President of Career In-Company-Subcontract
Workers Union, 26 th June 2002). Those subcontract workers earned about half of the
wage of regular workers employed by Career and worked on the same production lines
with regular workers. The number of irregular workers varied from 350 in winter time
to 750 in the summer, when hundreds of in-company-subcontract workers were laid-off
without any formal procedure. Those subcontract firms are in fact illegal temporary
work-agencies and the Career has managerial authority as a practical employer.
Subcontract workers have attempted to unionise their own union, comprising all
irregular workers in the six subcontract firms, since September 2000. In February 2001,
they succeeded in establishing the Career In-Company-Subcontract Workers Union
(CICSU). At the beginning, the regular workers' union appeared to support CICSU.
However, as CICSU went on strike and deployed more radical strategies, the regular
workers union began to withdraw its support and finally to play an important role in
breaking the CICSU. Career's response to the strike was to close down the six
subcontract firms and thereby sacked hundreds of subcontract workers at once. Later the
CICSU won a trial against Career and Career had to employ those who had renewed
their contracts with Career for more than three-years, as regular workers. This was the
first successful case in which subcontract workers sought to be re-employed as regular
workers by the mother company. However, since Career closed down the subcontract
firms, the CICSU in fact also no longer exists (Interview with Lee Kyung-Seok, the
President of Career In-Company-Subcontract Workers Union, 26 th June 2002). 
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In spite of the existing antagonism between the regular and irregular workers, there
have been a number of cases in which irregular workers have been successfully
organised in cooperation with regular workers' unions, particularly in small and
,
medium size firms. In those firms, unionisation of irregular workers appears not to
threaten to undermine regular unions but rather to empower the overall capacity of the
unions, particularly through solidarity strikes in which employers find it difficult to
cope with the strike action by replacing regular workers on strike with irregular workers.
Firstly, there are cases in which existing regular workers' unions aggressively integrate
irregular workers into regular workers' unions, in an attempt to prepare effective
struggles against the increasing introduction of flexible measures of employment
adjustment. 59 There are also cases in which regular workers' unions actually nurture
and support an independent irregular workers' union. In both cases, regular workers'
unions made a great effort to organise irregular workers and persuade their own
members to recognise the irregular workers' union and union membership, by setting up
a special union branch for unionisation of irregular workers, organising workshops,
trade union education programs for both regular and irregular workers, training for
leadership, and many other joint events.60
59 Successful unionisations in this form appeared throughout various industries, including the
service industry (Lotte Hotel, AC Nielson Korea), garments (E-Land) and the metal industry
(INI Steel ) (Kim, H. J. 2002).
60 The Sinho Paper Manufacturing Union is a good example of an elaborated preparation of a
regular workers' union in supporting irregular workers to unionise themselves. During more
than two years of preparation, the union organised 'a special committee for organisation of
irregular workers' and offered various educational training programs for union activists among
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Another developing form of unionisation of irregular workers is ultra-firm level
organisation. There are 8 general unions (Ilbannojo) for workers in petty-scale
enterprises. 61 This form of unionisation is gaining increasing significance since it is in
these petty-scale enterprises that most irregular workers are concentrated. Now, 5
regional-based general unions exist, including Gyungi Province Trade Union, Seoul
General Trade Union, Masan-Cahngwon General Union, Chung-Nam General Trade
Union, Busan General Trade Union, offering umbrella union membership, legal
consultancy and support to irregular workers without regard to the types of occupations
(Park 2002, pp. 86-99). This form of union appears to be effective in organising
individual workers whose workplace is too small to organise individual enterprise
unions and exercise collective actions against employers, by setting up branches of the
general union in small size firms. There are also general unions which aim to organise
particularly women irregular workers, who account for more than 70% of irregular
workers and suffer from sexual discrimination in the process of the restructuring of
employment relations, such as Seoul Women's Trade Union, Korean Women's Trade
Union and Seoul-Gyungi Equal Trade Unions. They attempt to support individual
women workers to struggle against sexual discrimination and the deterioration of
irregular workers (Kim, H. J. 2002, pp. 53-7). On the other hand, E-Land Union's case shows
that segregation between regular and irregular workers could be overcome by developing
solidarity through a co-ordinated strike (Hong 2002).
61 Another form of ultra-firm level unionisation is an occupational union on the basis of
industries which consist exclusively of irregular workers, such as daily-construction workers.
Seoul Daily Construction Workers' Union, established in 1988, is a good example of this kind
of organisation.
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working condition by offering union education, conducting collective bargaining and
providing legal advice.
Text Box (4) - Seoul Women's Trade Union and women irregular workers
Seoul Women's Trade Union (SWTU) was established in 1999, calling for more
concerns about the sexual discrimination of women workers, the male-centred nature of
existing trade unions and the increasing deterioration of the conditions of women
workers (Seoul Women's Trade Union 1999). While the employers targeted women
workers in implementing employment adjustment through mass layoffs and
irregularisation during and in the aftermath of the economic crisis, trade unions,
reflecting their male-centred nature, largely ignored the increasing deterioration of the
conditions of women workers caused by this sexually 'biased' employment adjustment
process, as a trade off of male workers' job security. Union density of women workers
remains merely 5% while more than 70% of women workers are now subjected to the
various forms of irregular contract. Worse still, more than 70% of those women
irregular workers appear to be employed in petty-enterprises with fewer than 5
employees (Interview with Kim, Hye-Seon, Secretary of Seoul Women's Trade Union,
7th February 2001). The SWTU aims to organise particularly those irregular women
workers who remain largely without union protection. Covering mainly women in their
20s and 30s, service, clerical and sales workers, this union is open to all individual
women workers in Seoul Metropolitan area (Interview with Kim, Hye-Seon, Secretary
of Seoul Women's Trade Union, 7th February 2001). The SWTU runs union education
with a particular emphasis on the response to sexual discrimination and harassment,
develops a model collective agreement, conducts collective bargaining on behalf of the
women workers in petty-size firms and offers legal support for the victims of sexual
discrimination as well as of violation of labour standard law. The most remarkable
achievement of the SWTU was the legalisation to unionise the unemployed in 2001
after a year struggle, for the first time in the history of the Korean labour movement.
However, as for other general unions, the SWTU has barriers to overcome in order to
function as a general union. Most of all, the ban on plural unionism, which prevents
individual women workers in enterprises with an established trade union from joining
the SWTU, makes it difficult to increase its membership (Interview with Kim Hye-
Seon, Secretary of Seoul Women's Trade Union, 7th February 2001). Although the
effectiveness of this general women workers' union remains to be seen, it is clear that
the SWTU will contribute to accelerating the unionisation of various forms of irregular
women workers and thereby the revitalisation of the labour movement.
The growing significance of irregular workers and the changing forms of subjectivity
of the labour movement can also be found in the struggles of the workers in the form of
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'special employment' (Teuksugoyong), which refers primarily to service workers who
are legally not workers but self-employed, in spite of their employment relations with
certain companies. These forms of employment have been regarded largely as non-
workers since the firms introduced freelance-like employment contracts in those
particular industries in the early 1990s, in an attempt to avoid the regulations imposed
by the labour standard law. The private tutoring industry, which employs more than
100,000 private teachers tutoring more than 6 million students by visiting their homes,
is the biggest in this sector. Also, caddies in golf resorts, remicon (ready mixed
concrete) and other construction-related lorry drivers are not legally recognised as
workers but self-employed although they are bound to certain forms of employment
relations and subjected to managerial authority in terms of pay, workload and hours and
code of conduct. As irregular forms of employment have been focused in the aftermath
of the economic crisis, these workers in 'special forms of employment' also have
attempted to unionise themselves. Private teachers in Jeneung Education, the biggest
private tutoring firm, established Jeneung Education Teachers' Labour Union (JETLU)
in 1999 after a month long strike against the government and employer that did not
recognise the teachers as workers therefore refused to legalise the union. Furthermore,
the JELTU achieved a collective agreement with employer in 2000. This was an
important step because this showed that workers under special forms of employment
contract were eligible for collective action, collective bargaining and other union rights
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The JETLU, which began with 2,000 teachers, now has about 3,300 members in more
than 300 branch offices (Han 2002, p. 119).62
The irregular workers' movement is now developing further into a nation-wide
movement by going beyond firms and occupational boundaries, on the basis of
solidarity among different forms of employment and unions. While the existing
confederations are increasingly alerted to overcome the regular-male-worker centred
unionism, the irregular workers' movement, in spite of its short history, is already
beginning to organise a nation-wide alliance by establishing the 'National Alliance for
Removing Insecure Labour' in 2002. Together with growing politicised unionism in the
public sector, those new forms of resistance are likely to put the state and capital in a
situation in which they find the further pursuit of these reforms increasingly difficult. A
closer look at the development of class struggle in the process of the transformation of
capital relations during the four-year period shows us that the restructuring of capital
relations is unlikely to bring a resolution to the long-term development of politicised
class struggle in Korea. Rather, the restructuring is opening a further development of
class struggle by developing further a militant and politicised nature as well as new
forms and subjectivity of class struggles through which the unresolved contradiction of
the new basis of capital accumulation reveals itself. It is in these senses that the form of
62 Many other special forms of employees, personal tutors in other tutoring firms, caddies in
golf resorts and remicon (ready mixed concrete) and other construction-related lorry drivers also
organised trade unions successfully in spite of an on-going dispute about their legal status as
'workers'. Most of their unions are affiliated with the KCTU.
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the reproduction of capital relations as well as the form of the Korean state is still in
transition, the result of which remains to be seen.
Concluding Remark
In an attempt to explain the recent transformation of the state more fully, without
abstracting the state from the totality of capitalist social relations, we looked at the re-
formulation of capitalist social relations in Korea by tracing the new development of the
basis of capital accumulation and class struggles. In doing so, the demise of the
particular form of the Korean state has been captured not in terms of the demise of the
developmental state, the theory of which ignores critical aspects of capitalist social
relations, thereby distorting the nature of the state, but in terms of the transformation of
the way in which capitalist social relations are organised and managed. The
transformation was conceptualised as a transition from the 'old' settlement, in which the
reproduction of capital relations largely relied on political regulation over individual
capitals as well as labour, to a somewhat different composition in which the
reproduction is more marketised and monetarised on the basis of marketised control
over labour and the marketised regulation of individual capitals.
However, it is clear that the consequence of the contemporary transition of capital
relations in Korea as well as the form of the state still remains to be seen. Although
labour control is now largely based on more marketised methods, as far as the state has
to exercise force in order to establish the flexible labour market and the stabilisation of
the labour market relies on the state's forceful interventions, its reproductive tole
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continues to exist. As far as the working class resists against marketised subordination,
in particular against continual structural adjustment at the expense of the workers
pushed by the state, the politicisation of class struggle also continues to develop. As far
as social production relies on the subordination of the mass of the population to the
expansion of capital, new forms and subjectivity of class struggle keep emerging, as we
see in the contemporary development in public sector workers' and irregular workers'
struggles. Indeed, it would be far too naïve to have an expectation that an increasing
integration of national capitalist development into the global whole through the
deregulation of financial and commodity markets will guarantee a stable development.
Rather, what the recent transition shows us is that the crisis-ridden nature of capitalist
development cannot be overcome either by the market or the state. Further capitalist
development will need continual re-formulation of capital relations, which is possible
only through further struggles and conflicts.
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Chapter 10: Conclusion
The aim of this research was to understand the nature of the Korean state. In
particular, this thesis was designed to reveal the nature of the state behind the
appearance of the Korean state by presenting the development of the form of the Korean
state without abstracting the state from the formation and reproduction of capital
relations through class struggle in Korea. The attempt to understand the nature of the
Korean state without abstracting it from the development of capital relations has been
made in two different stages. Firstly, I had to tackle the mystified form of the Korean
state, by revealing the shortcomings of the theories of the developmental state, which
had been dominating the exposition of the Korean and other 'oriental' forms of the
capitalist state by highlighting the unusual involvement of the state in East Asia's
economic development since the 1980s. Secondly, I developed an alternative historical
exposition of the development of the Korean state. Through both the theoretical critique
of developmental state theories and the historical critique of the capitalist state in Korea,
the mystified form of the Korean state has been demystified by showing the
development of the state as a moment of the development and reproduction of capital
relations as a whole in Korea.
The Mystified Image of a Capitalist State
The first half of my thesis was dedicated to criticising the mystified form of the
Korean state by developmental state theories, developing an alternative way of
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understanding the Korean state on the basis of Marx's critique of capitalist social
relations, in the context of which the state is to be understood as a complementary-but-
differentiated moment of the reproduction of capital relations. In the first chapter, core
arguments in developmental state theory have been examined: 1) the miraculous
economic development in Asian NICs is based most of all on the existence of a
particular form of the state exercising a great degree of leadership in the catching-up
process of economic development 2) the origin of successful state intervention in Asian
NICs lies in the unusual development of the bureaucratic capacity of governmental
organisations which are internally coherent, with an extraordinarily meritocratic nature
3) the effective utilisation of various developmental measures by the state is based
outwardly on a large degree and particular sort of state autonomy from other societal
forces, insulating the state from the particular interest of other societal forces and
thereby enabling the state to pursue a common good. In short, developmental state
theories defined the state in Asian NICs as having a particular sort of autonomy from
society: 'developmental autonomy'. On the basis of this specific 'autonomy', the
Korean state has been described as one of the prototypes of the 'developmental state',
which appears to exist above the interest of other societal forces, effectively utilising the
interventionist measures in pursuing the common good.
The immanent shortcoming of developmental state theories lies in their inability to
explain the reason why the state contributes most of all to the accumulation of capital
even though it is believed to be autonomous from capital. This intrinsic problem marks
almost all of the literature dealing with case studies on the states in Asian NICs. Those
case studies that describe the state in Asian NICs as the developmental state are based
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firmly on a particular set of state theories developed by the attempts to 'bring the state
back in' (Skocpol et al. 1985). In those attempts, the autonomy of the state is derived
from a very narrow and a-historical understanding of the relations between the state and
capital as the relations between different societal forces as 'sets of individual-social
actors', rather than from a serious attempt to understand the nature of the capitalist state
in relation to particularly 'capitalist' social relations. In doing so, those theories did not
question the contradictory mode of existence through which the capitalist state appears
to be autonomous from capital as well as to be subordinated to capital. Instead, those
expositions tend to merely attribute this contradictory form of the capitalist state to an
individual or organisational propensity of the bureaucratic body. In an attempt to 'bring
the state back' into the centre of the analysis of capitalist development, any serious
attempt to illuminate the inner relation between the state and capital or the political and
economic forms of domination has been merely denied as an attempt to put the state
back into the trash bin. In consequence, those case studies on the state in Asian NICs
ended up not with an 'explanation', not to mention critique, of the mode of the capitalist
state but with an accumulated 'description' of the state as it appears from outside.
In an attempt to overcome the immanent shortcoming of developmental state theories
by understanding the mode of existence of the capitalist state and thereby illuminating
the way in which the state is related to the social domination of capital, we moved onto
Marxist discussions about the nature of the capitalist state. However, despite Marx's
making a distinction between the 'capitalist' state and other forms of the political
apparatus in other modes of production, according to our reading of the traditional
Marxist expositions of the capitalist state, no Marxist exposition appeared to be able to
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offer a satisfactory answer to the question of the contradictory mode of existence of the
state. Rather, the 'essentialist' theories, developed by Lenin, and afterwards the theory
of state monopoly capitalism and Miliband, ignored the specific capitalist separation
between the political and economy by arguing the social domination of capital appears
immediately in a political domination on the basis of direct and indirect influence of the
members of the capitalist class over the state apparatus. Worse still, they deal with the
state merely as a set of organisations and capital as a set of members of the capitalist
class, in the same way that the bourgeoisie state theories did, offering no basis of the
critique of the specifically capitalist way in which the state is subordinated to the
interest of the ruling class. On the other hand, the autonomy-centred approaches,
particularly by Poulantzas, in spite of their contribution to enlightening the systematic,
rather than immediate, relations between the state and capital, could not overcome the
shortcoming of essentialist approaches since they tend to put those two sets of
individuals into differentiated social arenas that appeared to be webbed with one
another through structural relations. In doing so, those autonomy centred approaches
end up with an unintended contribution to strengthening the reified image of the state as
independent of 'economic' social relations by recognising the autonomy of the political
superstructure as one of the essential features of the capitalist state without criticising
the way in which the state appears to be separated from the economic. In both theories,
the Marxist understanding of the state could not answer the question of the dichotomy
between the state and capital either by recognising the dichotomy as a real
differentiation between two different social spheres or by reducing the dichotomy Ito a
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mere false differentiation between two different, but in fact inter-personally related, sets
of individuals.
Marx's Critique of Capitalist Social Relations and the State
In order to develop a critique of the mode of existence of the political state, which
appears, in both Marxist and non-Marxist approaches, as an independent entity in
abstraction from capitalist social relations, we reconsidered Marx's controversial
argument about the state existing above the social relations of production. In an attempt
to put Marx's incomplete exposition of the capitalist state back into the context of his
critique of capitalist social relations, what we firstly did was to explore his critique of
the labour theory of value and commodity fetishism, in which we found Marx's
explanation of the way in which the social reality of capitalism is reproduced, by
illuminating the social organism governing the reproduction of capitalist social relations.
Contrary to the way in which his followers fall back into the 'bourgeoisie' foundation in
which the social institutions and spheres, notably the state and capital, appear as
independent entities relating to each other externally, Marx's critique of the value-form
of social relations offers us a foundation of a critique of those social entities and
relations between them by penetrating into the abstract domination of capital on the
basis of fetishistically naturalised social forms. For Marx, value is most of all a social
form through which the socially labouring individuals are webbed with each other in a
very specific way. Through this value-form, later developed into the money-form,
relating social individuals, the relationship between those individuals appears not in an
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immediate relation between people but in the mysterious forms of relations between
things. In other words, social relations between people are fetishised into the relations
between commodities through those mysterious social forms. What is striking is that
social relations between people not only appear but also really exist in the form of
relations between things and those illusion-making social forms, through which the
social relations between labouring individuals appear, actually consist of the reified-but-
real social reality in which we live. In this way, Marx's critique of the law of value
shows the most abstract law governing the reproduction of social relations in
commodity-producing society through the continual inversion of social relations
between people into material relations between things through the social forms.
Understanding of the relations between the state and capital in the context of Marx's
critique of capitalist social relations led us to interpret Marx's superstructure-base
metaphor in a quite different way. Now the relation between the social relations of
production and the political superstructure can best be captured by understanding it as a
relation between the totality of social relations, within which the labouring individuals
are related with each other, and social forms, through which social relations between
those people appear, rather than between economic interest of capitalists and their
political tools or between the economic basis and the political state above the economic
interests. The most serious attempt to understand the state as one of the mysterious
social forms by applying Marx's critical method of form-analysis to state analysis has
been made by the German derivation debate. This debate made it clear that the state is
as fetishistic as money, in that it appears as an external force above the class relations,
although the state-form comes from the very nature of capitalist social relations.
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Therefore, just as money itself can appear to be detached from the class characteristic of
capitalist society, the state itself can also appear to be detached from its class
characteristic. However, although this was a strong counter-argument against the social
democratic belief that the working class can take advantage of the state by occupying its
bureaucratic body, their form-analyses failed to fully develop the exposition of the state-
form in relation to the fundamental mechanism of the reproduction of capitalist social
relations. It was mainly because they tended to explain the particularisation of the state
not as being a 'moment' of the very general reproduction of capitalist social relations on
the basis of the reification of social relations, but as the externalisation of a particular
aspect of that reproduction. Therefore, for Milner and Neustiss, the state appeared to be
a regulator over the self-destructive nature of the capital relations while Blanke, Jiirgens
and Kastendiek, as well as Hirsch, attributed the particularly coercive nature of the
reproduction of capital relations to the state, in contrast to the self-reproductive nature
of capital relations. In doing so, whereas they confirmed that the state functions as a
particular social form through which social relations are fetishised, they did not explain
the way in which the state-form becomes a moment of the reproduction of capital
relations through the very basic organism of the reproduction of capital relations, i.e.,
the movement of the inversion of the unequivocal-coercive relations between
individuals into technical-abstract relations between things, in the development of class
struggle.
In order to fully develop a critique of the state-form in relation to the abstract
reproduction of capitalist social relations, we had to see the more concrete forms of the
inversion of the social relations within the social organisation of commodified labour
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under the command of the capitalist. The movement of inversion of social relations that
was mediated by money appears now also in the form of the inversion that the social
relations of surplus value exploitation, i.e., capital relations, continually appear in the
form of technical relations between 'capital' as owner of a gum of money capital, and
'wage labour', as owner of labour power commodity. Under the capitalist production in
which capital valorises by exploiting the mass of the population under the command of
capitalists, the general organism of the reproduction of social relations of commodity
production therefore still dominates the reproduction of capital relations between
workers and capitalists.
Within capital relations, the exchange relation between workers and capitalists
appears as an equivalent relation between capital and commodity labour power as two
different sets of individuals who own the respective sources of revenue. However, the
rule of the law of value governing the reproduction of social relations, through the
inversion of the relation of exploitation into the form of relations between commodities
through free-contract, now appears inevitably in contradiction with the reality that
workers face in the form of the deprivation of the production process and products from
the direct producers, precipitating conflicts and struggles around what is real and what
is to be real. It is through this struggle between wage-labourers and capitalists that the
movement of the inversion of social relations reveals its actuality. Indeed, it is through
this struggle that the concrete manifestation of the most general organism of the
reproduction of capital relations conditions the separation between the state and capital
and thereby the form of the capitalist state. The state now increasingly finds difficulty in
identifying itself with capital as far as it is to contribute to the reproduction of capital
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relations. Hence, the state gradually took a form differentiated from the capital-form
through which class relations are inverted into the equal relations between commodities,
while it also remained as a moment of the inversion of unequal social relations into
abstract and technical relations by translating class relations into relations between
equal citizens. In doing so, the public state could now appear as if it is an embodiment
of the free will of individuals who are connected with one another thorough free
contractual relationships. In this sense, the inversion through the state-form is
essentially a complementary and differentiated moment of the reproduction of capital
relations through the value-form, in which the relations between classes is transformed
into classless relations between things, making the state appear to be detached from the
relations of capitalist production. This understanding of the form of the capitalist state
led us to the conclusion that capital and the state are complementary-but-differentiated
forms of capital relations and therefore there is no such thing as a state autonomous
from capital. If anything, it is a myth that is based on a misreading of the dual nature of
the mode of existence of the capitalist state.
Mystification of the Korean State and Critical Perspective
As we saw in the first chapter, the statist approach does not question the
contradictory form of the capitalist state and argues that the states in Asian NICs are
autonomous from capital and furthermore from the society. Given the activeness of the
state in Asian NICs in relation to the other societal forces, this developmental
'autonomy' appears to be a relevant conceptualisation of the nature of the state in Asian
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NICs. However, according to our investigation into the form of the capitalist state, this
developmental autonomy of the state can make sense only within the benign bourgeois
conceptualisation of the relations between the state and capital. This approach, rather
than revealing the nature of the state by recognising the relations between the state-form
and the totality of capital relations and penetrating into the state formation in the context
of the reproduction of capital relations as a whole, is as superficial as the neo-classical
approach, in juxtaposing the 'political' state representing the relations of political
contract between free individuals without regard to the economic resources that those
individuals own, against the 'economic' society, which is supposed to consist of non-
political relations between different sets of individuals who own technically different
sources of revenue. Worse still, their empirical analyses attempted to create a model
state showing the relevance of the statist approach in which the state appeared to be free
from and, for some reason, in favour of all societal forces by wrongly but systematically
generalising organisational relations between business and state apparatus into relations
between society and the state.
The post-developmental state theories, which emphasise a socio-political analysis of
the developmental state by seriously introducing 'labour' as an important category, also
seem merely to reproduce, or at least allow, the once mystified image of the state by
decorating the old theory by a new context, without recognising the incompatibility of
the concept of developmental autonomy with that of labour as far as they understand
capital as a mere set of businessmen, rather than a social relation. The consequence is
that the statist theories of the state strengthen the reified image of capitalist society in
which the state appears to exist above class relations. This led us to conclude that
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neither the contradictory form of the capitalist state in general nor the particular form of
the state in Asian NICs could be explained in this framework, which fell back exactly
into the mystification that capitalist social relations produce. In order to avoid the same
failure, the autonomy of the state itself was to be regarded as an object of a critical
inquiry, not the starting point of state analysis. Now, we had to investigate the formation
of the state as one of the critical moments of the formation and reproduction of capital
relations by closely looking at the way in which the capitalist state has taken a particular
form in the process of the development of class struggle in Korea.
Early Development of Capital Relations and the State in Korea
The initial formation of capitalist social relations in Korea was presented as having
three main historical moments: Japanese colonisation and liberation, the subsequent U.S.
control over Korea, and the Korean War. Japanese colonisation initiated a serious
capitalist development in Korea by depriving the means of production and subsistence
from farmers, turning traditional land-ownership into capitalist private property rights
and commodifying the products of labour as well as labour power. However, the
colonial capitalist development also left specific colonial features. As a whole, even if
the separation of producers from the means of production and subsistence was achieved
to a great extent, integration of the mass of the population into capitalist relations was
far more limited. By the end of colonisation, the majority of the population still existed
as surplus population, making their livings from within tenant-landlord relations and
paying their rent to the landlords primarily with grain. Indeed, many of the industrial
326
workers in manufacturing sectors were mobilised and allocated by the colonial state and
state agents often with feudal-like labour contracts managed by police and security
unions. The Japanese colonial period also left the immature development of Korean
capital and the capitalist class, since the vast majority of capital invested in Korea was
by and for Japanese capital. During this period, the reality of the Korean capitalist class
was far from a dominant social power. Contrary to the immature development of the
capitalist class, the colonial development allowed the social power of the landlord class
not to disappear, by making an alliance between the state and the landlord class in an
attempt to effectively control the majority of the Korean population.
The sudden end of colonial capitalist development caused a deep crisis of the further
development of capitalist social relations in the aftermath of the liberation. Most of all,
it was the emerging workers' and peasants' movement that challenged the capitalist and
landlord classes by occupying former Japanese-owned properties and thereby
threatening reproduction of capital relations in the aftermath of liberation. It was the
provisional government of the U.S. military that played the most significant role in
stabilising the crisis after liberation through 1) establishing the Korean state 2)
redistributing state-vested property to Korean capitalists and 3) demolishing the labour
and peasant movements. A further development of capital relations was conditioned by
the devastating Korean War, which followed the political turmoil during the post-
liberation period and led to a complete decomposition of the working class in both
Koreas by completely destroying the working class and peasants' movements. During
and in the aftermath of the war, the social power of the landlord class also massively
declined due to a revolutionary land reform in the South. By contrast, the state
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apparatus survived through the war against the 'communist threat to freedom' and
achieved a significantly increased organisational power as well as legitimacy.
During the post-war period, capital accumulation in Korea depended on the
development of domestic firms that had access to raw materials and financial resources
supplied by the U.S. aid program and dominated the almost non-competitive domestic
commodity markets. In order to secure the exclusive allocation of raw materials and
loans, it was necessary for these early individual capitals to hold a strong partnership
with the state controlling foreign aid and imported raw materials. It was at this time that
the early Korean chaebols began to appear by taking advantage of the state and thereby
purchasing state-vested means of production and land at extremely low prices. Indeed,
the state kept playing a significant role in further capitalist development by suppressing
the collective power of the working class effectively, therefore guaranteeing the
unilateral labour relation at the work places. This marked the beginning of the
politicised formation and reproduction of capital relations, through which the state
exercises dominant power over the working class as well as individual capitals.
However, the early politicisation of capital relations was based on an 'immediate
alliance' between a few individual capitals and the state, without making a distinction
between the state and dominant class. As capital investment concentrated intensively on
some specific sectors, relying on the raw materials from U.S. aid, capital faced
realisation problems in the limited domestic markets and suffered from a shortage of
resources due to significantly decreased foreign aid from 1958, so that this early
development of the politicisation of capital relations reached an impasse. The state and
capital attempted to overcome this difficulty either by speculative investment or at the
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expanse of the working class by intensifying labour and extending working hours,
causing massive resistance against deteriorating income distribution, mass
unemployment and high inflation. Finally, the 'immediate alliance' between a few
individual capitals and the government came up against the barrier of mass struggles
against corrupt relations between public officials and individual capitalists. The
reconstruction of capitalist social relations, based on this immediate alliance between a
few capitalists and the state, was finally overthrown by the student movement.
The Politicised Formation and Reproduction of Capital Relations and the
State
The Park Cung-hee government, which came into power through a military coup in
1961, continued to suppress the collective power of the working class by banning the
labour movement and establishing the government-controlled FKTU, allowing
individual capitals to continue to enjoy unilateral labour relations at the workplace.
However, even if the state found its supreme role in suppressing the collective power of
labour, the immediacy between political and economic domination appeared to be
significantly resolved. In other words, the state appeared to be separated from the
immediate dominant class since the state exercised its force not only against labour but
also against individual capitals by putting them under institutionalised control on the
basis of nationalised banks and financial institutions. The initiation of this politicised
formation of capital relations, through which the state began to exercise strong
leadership in nurturing capital and controlling labour, was a product of a particular
historical context. On the one hand, after the economic and political turmoil in 1960,
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which was caused by conflicts around the way in which capital accumulation took the
form of a political state as an immediate alliance between individual capitals and the
state, individual capitals could not organise themselves politically, because of their
association with the Rhee Syng-man government, while the working class movement
could not overcome the complete decomposition imposed on it through the Korean War
nor could it develop as a dominant portion of the population. Rather, it was the military
government that appeared to be an effective vehicle for development by making a clear
distinction from the former corrupt government. On the other hand, pursuing export-
based industrialisation, the Korean state finally responded to the continual attempts of
the U.S. to integrate South Korea into a newly developing regional basis of capital
accumulation in East Asia. According to developmental state theories, the basis of the
so-called autonomous developmental state was laid by this transition in the early 60s.
However, the transition, beginning with the emergence of Park's military government,
was not the development of an autonomous state. Rather it was marked by the highly
politicised formation, and reproduction of capital relations, in which the state exercised
its force to secure maximised exploitation of the working class by capital. The
understanding of the Korean state as a developmental state autonomous from capital in
the statist argument is therefore a mere mystification based on an ignorance of the
simple 'fact' that the state, even if it exercised its leadership against 'individual capitals'
in capitalist development, found its foremost role in contributing to suppressing the
working class for the sake of early capital accumulation in Korea.
Under Park's regime, Korean economic development was momentous, relying on the
maximised developmental leadership of the state against individual capitals and
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suppressive control over collective labour as well as unlimited supply of labour from the
large-scale surplus population. The particular elements of the capitalist development
began to appear from the 60s in Korea, the big chaebols and the state's leadership in
economic development. These were the forms taken by the politicised formation and
reproduction of capital relations. However, the mystification of the state contributing to
the massive capital accumulation became increasingly unstable as another particular
moment of the politicised reproduction of capital relations developed. As capitalist
industrialisation developed and the grass-roots resistance of labour developed against
extreme exploitation, the state exercised its power to the extent that it gradually
undermined the very basis of the mystification by provoking 'politicised class struggles'.
In other words, the politicised reproduction of capital relations now provided the
politicisation of class struggle against the state's control of labour. This caused the
emergence of the democratic labour movement and the democratisation movement from
the end of the 1960s and later led to the first crisis of the state at the end of the 1970s,
when Korean capitalist development also began to suffer from the changing conditions
of capital accumulation at a global level.
After the assassination of President Park, emerging class struggle could no longer be
controlled by the state. The aspirations of the working class appeared in massive re-
unionisation in a few months, providing an expectation of the demise of the repressive
state. The crisis was stabilised through a disastrous collision between military and
people in KwangJu, a southern city of Chola province after another military coup by
Chun Doo-hwan. Although the politicised reproduction of capital relations appeared to
be resumed by another military government, the subsequent development of class
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struggle shows us that the early settlement of capital relations was getting into a deep
crisis. From the-mid 1980s, the state could not control the re-emerging class struggle as
effectively as Park's regime did in the 1960s and 1970s. Now class struggle appeared in
4
the form of a more radicalised democratic labour movement, developing solidarity with
the Minjung movement, in spite of draconian measures deployed by the Chun Doo-
hwan government. Meanwhile, as capital accumulation developed and individual
capitals were now able to find external funds without the mediation of the state, the
state's grip on financial flows, and therefore control over individual capitals, began to
weaken. Afterwards, the decade from 1987 was marked by the resurrection of the
working class movement and by declining state power in terms of regulating individual
capitals.
The Crisis of the Politicised Reproduction of Capital Relations
During the period between 1987 and 1997, the deconstruction of the early settlement
of capital relations accelerated, marked by the increasing liberalisation of financial and
commodity markets, in accordance with the growing demands of individual capitals for
unregulated financial markets and international pressure over the protected domestic
markets, on the one hand, and the organised labour movement challenging both
unilateral labour relations at the workplaces and the state's suppressive labour policies,
on the other. The organised labour movement critically undermined the early settlement
of capital relations during the Great Workers' Struggle in 1987, through challenging the
state regulation of collective labour and undermining unilateral labour relations on the
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shop floor. Afterwards, developing its domination over individual workers at the
workplaces and finally establishing a nation-wide confederation of the democratic trade
unions, the labour movement continued to confront managerial authority at the
workplace and the state's anti-labour policies and thereby make difficult a smooth
transformation of capital relations at the expense of the working class.
After three-years boom between 1986 and 1988, Korean capital began to suffer from
both growing labour costs and growing tendency to overaccumulation in the form of
difficulty in exporting products into increasingly competitive global market. Facing this
growing difficulty, the state and capital attempted to overcome the development of
competitive pressure through the liberalisation of financial flows, which they though
would revitalise capital accumulation by making it possible for individual capitals to
introduce new means of production and new products through credit expansion. This
liberalisation led to the end of capital allocation by the state, which had been a primary
element of the early settlement of capital relations in Korea. Individual capitals,
particularly the chaebols, became more reluctant to follow the industrial policy of the
state. Meanwhile, the state also attempted to control labour by sustaining its
authoritarian control over trade unions and, most of all, institutionalising flexible
measures that individual capitals introduced in order to effectively control individual
workers. However, rather than bringing a fresh basis of capital accumulation, _these
caused instability of the financial basis of the chaebols due to growing dependency on
short-term credit and more militant resistance of the working class, that appeared in the
nation-wide general strike in 1997. Finally, the fall of the early configuration of capital
relations and the contested transformation of the configuration, amalgamated with the
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growing tendency to overaccumulation in the global markets, expressed themselves in
the form of a general crisis of reproduction of capital relations.
Class Struggle, Capital Relations and the Form of the State in Transition
The ten-year period of contested transformation ended up with a deconstruction of
the early settlement of capital relations, in which the intrinsic limitations of the
politicised reproduction of capital relations were revealed. Capital accumulation, which
had been sustained by massive credit expansion but had not been accompanied by
successful reproduction of the relations of capitalist production at the expense of the
working class, i.e., by more fundamental mobilisation of the methods for overcoming
the tendencies to crisis, at last revealed its limit in the form of massive bankruptcies of
individual capitals. It was not until the four-year restructuring period in the aftermath of
the general crisis that a new social basis of further capital accumulation appeared in
Korea. Apart from the immediate impact of the crisis on Korean society, the response of
the Korean state to the unfolding of crisis, which showed a strong commitment to the
IMF's stabilisation and structural adjustment policies, provoked a disastrous
consequence. On the one hand, it kicked the debt-ridden individual capitals out of the
markets. On the other, it forced individual capitals to withdraw planned investment, cut
wages, downsize production and utilise mass lay-offs and other numerical employment
adjustment measures in attempts not to be involved in the unfolding of crisis. The most
devastating result appeared in the imposition of a great degree of job insecurity on the
working class.
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Although it risked massive devaluation of capital and a massive polarisation of
society, it was through this misery and at the expense of the working class and small
and medium size capitals that the revitalisation of capital accumulation in Korea has
been finally made. The reconstruction of capital relations began with the Kim Dae-jung
government's attempts to reform the corporate, financial and public sectors and the
labour market in a way in which the so-called efficiency of the rule of the market could
be enhanced. This reform brought measures to ameliorate transparency in corporate
management, reduce government intervention in financial flows and inefficiency in the
public sector. Most of all, those reforms accompanied and presupposed a fundamental
reform of the so-called rigid labour market. The crisis offered the surviving individual
capitals a great opportunity to introduce the 'flexible' arrangement of labour at the
workplace, including irregular forms of employment contract, more competition-based
personnel management and pay systems, full utilisation of which had been blocked by
the unions' domination over the shop floor since the upsurge of the militant labour
movement in the late 1980s. Facing this reformulation of workplace labour relations,
the unions appeared to be impotent. In the meantime, the state also succeeded in
institutionalising the market-based arrangement of employment relations.
Consequently, this restructuring process after the onset of the crisis, under the
principle of market-based reforms, led to a transformation from the old settlement, in
which capitalist development took the mystified form of the so-called developmental
state, to a new settlement on the basis of the rule of money. Individual capitals now
enjoy a full-fledged freedom in attracting external funds from the almost totally
liberalised financial market without heavy-handed government intervention, even if
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they are now loosing the protection and privilege secured by the state. In this sense, now
the state appears to be a regulator rather than a controller. The state's role in
reproducing capital relations in favour of capital has also significantly changed since the
way in which the subordination of the working class to capital is reproduced now relies
most of all on the smooth operation of the labour market. The role of the state is in
principle institutionalising and supervising the market rule in labour relations,
selectively exercising its force against labour where the rule of the market is threatened.
This new arrangement appears to be undermining the basis of the traditional militancy
of the trade unions, as we saw in a case study of Hyundai Motors Workers Union.
However, the consequence of the contemporary transition of capital relations in
Korea, as well as the form of the state, still remains to be seen because the restructuring
of capital relations based on the marketisation of reproduction is unlikely to guarantee a
smooth further reproduction of capital relations in Korea. First of all, the market-based
reconstruction of capital relations, the implementation of which, however, relied in
practice on the state re-deploying authoritarian measures, allowed a further development
of a militant unionism, putting the state into an increasingly difficult situation in which
it could not ensure a smooth operation of the so-called flexible labour market. While
this politicised element of the transformation provided the working class's resistance
with a politicised nature, the changing forms of employment provoked by the
flexibilisation developed new forms and subjectivity of class struggles, such as irregular
workers and public sector workers, through which the unresolved contradiction of the
newly created basis of capital accumulation revealed itself.
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In an attempt to explain the transformation of the form of the state without
abstracting it from the reformulation of the totality of capital relations, we looked at the
decline of the particular form of the Korean state, not in terms of the demise of the
developmental state, but in terms of the transformation of the way in which capitalist
social relations are organised and reproduced. We saw that there is a significant
transformation from the 'old' settlement, in which the reproduction of capital relations
largely relied on political regulation over individual capitals as well as labour, to a
marketised composition in which the reproduction is more monetarised. At the same
time, however, we also confirmed that, as far as social production relies on the
subordination of the mass of the population to the expansion of capital, new forms and
subjectivity of class struggle keep emerging and blur a clear-cut transformation of the
capital relations as well as form of the state. As long as the working class resists the
marketised subordination to capital and the state responds to the struggle by exercising
its force, the politicisation of class struggle in Korea will continue to develop,
accompanying another transition of the form of the state.
This possibility of the development of new forms and subjectivity of class struggle
provides a further research agenda regarding changes in the state-form through further
development of class struggle. The reformulation of capital relations on the basis of the
marketisation of labour control during the recovery period created 1) the fragmentation
of the working class, as we saw in the conflicts between organised regular workers and
marginalised workers and again in the KCTU's somewhat impotent reaction toward the
reformulation of the employment structure and 2) the potential subjectivity of class
struggle, as we saw in the grassroots struggles by marginalised workers. At the same
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time, a rapid reform on the basis of the rule of the market, however often backed by
strong state intervention, created a political alliance, the political project of which lay in
the belief in the positive role of the state in promoting more balanced marketisation by
introducing a well-structured social safety-net. The further reformulation of the state is
likely subjected to the further development of those results of the transitional period.
The late-blooming of statism in Korea reflects the fragmentation of the working class,
particularly between the irregular and regular workers after the general crisis, and a
political alliance between privileged sections of the working class and statist reformists,
on the basis of a nationalist-statist agenda which is only sentimentally against market-
only-based reform. This alliance is likely to open the reform process to the traditionally
organised fraction of the working class, calling for a firmer and wider social consensus.
If the range of the social alliance between statists and the working class can be widened
and the organised sector of the working class is going to get closer to the state's
reconstruction policies by showing a great degree of cooperation with statist reformism,
the marginalised working class will again have to challenge both the authority of
existing trade unionism and the state's reformist agendas, by developing it from scratch
into a new movement. Another possibility is that the political alliance will be weakened
and again fragmented into two groups i.e. social democrats, who might support the
organisation of the marginalised section of the working class, and statists, who will
possibly give up their ambitions for a social safety-net. No matter what happens, a
further research agenda will be an examination of the width and depth of the impact of
the social alliance between the working class and the statists in the context of the further
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development of class struggle, particularly by the marginalised section of the working
class, on the form of the Korean state.
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